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ABSTRACT 
 
ST. IGNATIUS’ QUILL PEN: EXPLORING THE ORALITY-LITERACY 








Dissertation supervised by Dr. Janie M. Harden Fritz  
Informed by the work of Walter Ong, in the first prelude of the First Week in the 
Spiritual Exercises, St. Ignatius of Loyola used an emblematical image, the “prison-
cage”, to provide phenomenological accounts for the exercitants to examine the 
existential situation within. This dissertation explores into the difficulty of being 
rhetorical in mediating on the existential situation emblematically. I try to understand the 
orality-literacy dynamic within the Exercises through the theoretical framework of 
semiotic phenomenology. The Ignatian emblematics can be understood as 
phenomenological descriptions that asked the exercitants to provide the parts of moral-
phenomenological reductions and phenomenological interpretations within personalism.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
Orality and Literacy and the Difficulty in the Word-Image Dynamic  
The Spiritual Exercises1 is regarded as the best-known work of St. Ignatius of 
Loyola2 as the founding father of the Society of Jesus.3 Ever since the publication of the 
Exercises in 1548,4 this little book has been within the intellectual arena, with debates 
around Ignatius’ protecting and promoting the training of mnemonics (in contrast to the 
natural memory), the application of the whole sensorium organization into the 
meditations, and more personal conversations with the Three Persons.5 With or without 
conclusions to these debates, the distinctive value of the Exercises, as a book that has 
been read and used continuously for more than 470 years, should become more 
interpretatively approachable in the current historical moment.  
The recent wave of interest in the Exercises was riddled with a rich dynamic 
between considering the Ignatian imagery as calculated literacy6 and considering it as 
genuine orality.7 Multiple issues can be examined derivatively from this dynamic, but 
                                                   
1 Throughout this project, I use “Spiritual Exercises” to refer to the particular book, and “Spiritual 
Exercises” to refer to the Jesuitical way of meditation.  
2 To call Ignatius of Loyola a “Saint” should not be far from calling Lao Er “Lao Tzu”. “Saint” and “Tzu” 
are to honor the person.  
3 St. Ignatius of Loyola. The Spiritual Exercises of Saint Ignatius. Translated by George E. Ganss (The 
Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1992), 2.  
4 Ignatius, Exercises, 8.  
5 The Three Persons and One God can be understood as the Christian way of dealing with the dynamic 
between the synchronicity of phenomenological perceptions (one God) and the diachronic phenomenology 
of time (the Three Persons). 
6 See Roland Barthes. Sade, Fourier, Loyola. Translated by Richard Miller (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1976). Also see Marjorie O’Rourke Boyle. Loyola’s Act: The Rhetoric of the Self 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).  
7 See Walter Ong. Hopkins, the Self, and God (University of Toronto Press, 1986). Also see Antonio de 
Nicolas. Ignatius de Loyola, Power of Imagining: A Philosophical Hermeneutic of Imagining through the 
Collected Works of Ignatius de Loyola, with a Translation of These Work (Albany: State of University of 
New York Press, 1986).  
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first of all, for us to be aware of the riddle, we already stand upon “the modern discovery 
of orality”,8 both benefiting from and being puzzled by it.  
The riddle itself is clear: when understanding the Exercises, there were two 
intellectual traditions in combat. One can be traced back to Claude Lévi-Strauss’ 
publishing La Pensée Sauvage in 1962 at the birthplace of structuralism, from which 
Roland Barthes was able to perform a critical media reading on the Exercises. In Barthes, 
Ignatius was understood as a film director who wrote scripts in the Exercises to cater his 
powerful imagination to the mass. The other can be traced back to Eric Havelock’s 
publishing Preface to Plato in 1963 at the birthplace of orality studies, with which Walter 
Ong was able to understand the difficulty of being rhetorical in the Exercises. One way or 
the other, as Ong had it, “the question [of orality and literacy] is more focused today than 
ever before”.9 In this dissertation, I try to understand Ignatius’ difficulty in dealing with 
the situation of the spoken word.  
In the field of communication, interpretative efforts on the rhetoric of the 
Exercises can be dated to 1962 when Ong republished “St. Ignatius’ Prison-cage and the 
Existentialist Situation” in The Barbarian Within as a collection of Ong’s essays around 
the theme of personalism. “St. Ignatius’ Prison-cage” was originally published in 
Theological Studies in 1954. From 1954 to 1962, to the extent of this research, the only 
article was George Tade’s “The Spiritual Exercises: A Method of Self-persuasion” 
published in Quarterly Journal of Speech in 1957. Tade was interested in the use value of 
the Exercises for rhetoricians. Here, it may be noted Ignatius was a man with a profound 
                                                   
8 Eric Havelock. The Muse Learn to Write: Reflections on Orality and Literacy from Antiquity to the 
Present (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), 24-29.  
9 Walter Ong. Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word (London: Taylor & Francis Routledge, 
1996), 179. Originally published in 1982.  
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resemblance to Martin Luther10 – part of the practical implication of the Exercises was 
that Ignatius lived in a time when the word-image dynamic was framed and examined 
within the dynamic between the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation.  
Among more recent work, in Traditions of Eloquence: The Jesuits and Modern 
Rhetorical Studies, the rhetorical elements in the Exercises were highlighted.11 In 
Eloquence, the questions were self-confrontational indeed. One could almost hear these 
communication scholars ask: as rhetoricians, why are we interested in the history of 
rhetorical studies? And why do we find that we have been collaborating with the Jesuits 
(and now consciously do so)? And why do we feel it necessary to always have the 
communication practitioners in mind? Within those questions, some legitimation may be 
established for pinpointing “St. Ignatius’ Prison-cage” as a starting place to understand 
the orality-literacy difficulty in the Exercises, given the innate dynamic between 
rhetorical praxis and religious studies built into Fr. Ong’s work. A brief review of Ong’s 
work should follow.  
Much has been done to trace this line of thought in Ong around the theme of “the 
technologizing of the word”. This line could go roughly from Ramus, Method and the 
Decay of Dialogue (the orality-literacy bluntness in Ramus’ dichotomy), to Rhetoric, 
Romance and Technology (the rebellion against the oral tradition in Romanticism), to 
Presence of the Word (the orality-literacy intensity in the Judeo-Christian tradition), to 
Interface of the Word (the orality-literacy dynamic as ways to study the history of 
                                                   
10 See Paul Soukup. “Ritual and Movement as Communication Media.” Journal of Communication & 
Religion 11.2 (1988): 9 -17.  
11 See Tradition of Eloquence: The Jesuits and Modern Rhetorical Studies. Edited by Cinthia Gannett and 
John C. Brereton (New York: Fordham university Press, 2016).  
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consciousness), and to the conclusive masterpiece Orality and Literacy.12 When we take 
this line, it should be cautioned that Ong was indeed critical of using the term “media” 
overtly.13 On the structural approaches to the Exercises, Ong was critically concerned 
with reading the four-week Exercises (communication) as tautological to a four-side 
structure (communicative architecture in which communication happens). But to praise or 
to blame “the technologizing of word” was also not Ong’s central concern.14 Epideictic 
rhetoric is after all between man and man, and less of the “I-It” relationship.15 Here, it 
may be more accurate to say that Ong was interested in offering phenomenological 
accounts for the difficulty of the spoken word to become “things”, and for “things” to be 
after all different from “objects” (in phenomenological terms, “objects” are simply there, 
while “things” exist into the human perception along with communication). For the 
current project, in order to better understand the orality-literacy difficulty in the 
Exercises, another line of thought in Ong around the theme of “personalism” may be 
proposed.  
This line could go roughly from The Barbarian Within (1962), to In the Human 
Grain (1967a), to Presence of the Word (1967b), to Fighting for Life (1981) and to 
Hopkins, the Self and God (1986). As Farrell indicated, Ong was “broadly interested in 
working out an adequate personalist philosophy”.16 By “adequate”, this personalist 
                                                   
12 See Paul Soukup. “Orality and Literacy 25 Years Later.” Communication Research Trends 26.4 (2007): 
3-33. 
13 See Ong, Orality, 175.  
14 See Walter Ong. In the Human Grain: Technological Culture and its Effect on Man, Literature, and 
Religion (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967), 134. Also see Walter Ong. Rhetoric, Romance and 
Technology: Studies in the Interaction of Expression and Culture (New York: Cornell University Press, 
1971), 8-9.  
15 See Jeffery Walker. Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 7-10.  
16 See Corey Anton. “Presence and Interiority: Walter Ong’s Contribution to a Diachronic Phenomenology 
of Voice.” In Of Ong and Media Ecology: Essays in Communication, Composition and Literary Studies, 
edited by Thomas J. Farrell and Paul Soukup (New York: Hampton Press, 2012), 71-90.   
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philosophy should then reveal the difficulty within the particularity of a person, hard to 
be rhetorically generalized while wired into the public sphere via rhetoric. In the context 
of the Counter-Reformation, personalism can also be understood as the very existential 
effort to conquer the word-image dynamic within the diachronic phenomenology of the 
spoken word. In the Preface of the Barbarian, Ong said,  
The personalist theme involves a subsidiary theme, that of voice itself, the 
most sensitive manifestation of personal presence and the normal mode of 
communication opening persons to one another and rendering fertile the 
grounds on which relationships with the object world was established … 
What is said tells off against what is not said, reminding us that total 
explicitness is impossible to human beings: one always means more than 
one says or, in another sense, says more than one means. In being to some 
degree necessarily occult, myth is a by-product of this limitation of human 
voice. It exists by virtue of what is says not explicitly but symbolically. 
Mythos complements logos.17  
As mythos is bound with imago, “mythos complements logos” should be a good 
interpretative entrance into the Ignatian imagery in the Exercises. In the context of 
Reformation and Counter-Reformation, mythos also complemented logos by combating 
and confronting logos. Now, Ignatius was a sixteenth century man; in the Exercises, he 
simply could not calculate the meaning of an image in a way that a contemporary visual 
artist could do. If indeed the Exercises was “mystical”, the Ignatian mysticism should be 
within the complexity between human imagination and communication. Simply put, 
                                                   
17 Walter Ong. The Barbarian Within (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962), 10 
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imagination is occult in the sense that one runs his or her own risk in understanding or 
misunderstanding a watermark on the wall to be in the shape of a holy cross, but it is 
fundamentally a Christian emblem to present a holy cross without the body of Christ as a 
form of meditation.  
With Ong’s work on personalism,18 we may outline two general tasks for this 
dissertation: to make the meaning of Ignatius’ images in the Exercises more explicit, and 
to understand the difficulty within the Ignatian imagery. As a preliminary definition, 
personalism can be defined as a particular kind of philosophy of history that focuses on 
the difficulty in communicating with the spoken word – a diachronic phenomenology19 in 
which there are good reasons to refrain from visual synchronicity. And to highlight 
communication ethics in personalism is also a philosophy of communication20 in which 
one tries to understand the real difficulty in the birth and the birthplace of a strong moral 
consciousness. Moreover, in the pragmatic sense of practicing the paradox in “visual 
(versus) communication”, personalism can also be understood as a way to understand the 
phenomenological nuances within the Ignatian imagery in the emblematical tradition.21 
The Ignatian emblematics can be an important counterpart to a digital New Criticism22 in 
                                                   
18 See Ong, Grain, 127-29; Hopkins, 19-21; Barbarian, 233-41.  
19 See Corey Anton. “Diachronic Phenomenology: A Methodological Thread within Media Ecology.” 
Explorations in Media Ecology 13.1 (2014): 10.  
20 See Ronald C. Arnett, “Defining Philosophy of Communication: Difference and Identity.” Qualitative 
Research Reports in Communication 11.1 (2010): 57–62. 
21 See Peter Daly and Richard Dimler. The Jesuit Emblem in the European Context (Philadelphia, PA: Saint 
Joseph’s University Press, 2016). 
22 To offer one connection between digitalism and New Criticism, both the psychology of “flow” (knowing 
exactly what to do at any given moment) and the New Criticism doctrine of understanding an art piece 
independently from the artist, can be traced back to the Greek mythos of Hercules’ twelve labors – for the 
oral poets to highlight the action, the myth must be one labor after another in which the rhetorical clarity on 
the continuity and the independence of the labors cannot be disturbed. This is the psychological blind spot 
of an Apollonian-centric rhetorical education.  
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which one tries to explain away the problem of selfhood and authorship in both words 
and images.23 
Keeping in mind the discursive discourses on media (as technologies of 
communication), as much as “mythos complements logos”, media also complements 
communication. Modern communication theories were not image-shy in borrowing from 
the symbolic meaning of things in order to study inter-subjectivity. On one hand, 
communication scholars knew that these images were meant to be incomplete in 
explaining human communication. On the other hand, such intellectual habit certainly 
came from the Western imagerial thinking tradition, within which images had a social 
function that in turn promoted theoretical collaborations.  
For example, in the age of electronic communication when our imagination of 
human communication can be heavily influenced by the sender-receiver model, it is not 
that the sender-receiver model is over-determined to be structurally reductive; rather, it is 
that the existential element within must be dug out from the deeper. As Mumford had it, 
in an industrial factory polluted by the noise of the machine, it was a communicative 
virtue for one worker to use his or her human chest in “fighting” against the mechanical 
noise in order to get the message delivered.24 The moral implication in Mumford’s 
elaboration should not be neglected. Therein, to raise an incomplete parallel between 
modern communication theories and the Ignatian emblematics, the emblems in the 
Exercises should function in a similar way by picking up an inner movement which exists 
                                                   
23 See Barthes, Loyola, 41-44.  
24 Lewis Mumford. Technics and Civilization (A Harbinger Book, 1962). Originally published in 1934.  
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independently of the image itself.25 Without the emblems, the psychological movement 
inside would be difficult to examine and exist.  
In the vicinity of media ecology, the media ecologists tend to understand the 
existential element of the medium as the excessive expressiveness of the man-made 
technologies of communication (in Mumford’s term, the machine-tools26). As a good 
emblem book writer would not avoid moral reductions, the ethics of studying 
communication as media should be in the capacity to reveal the phenomenology of the 
spoken word as both between man and man and between man and things.  
Accordingly, my argument in “St. Ignatius’ quill pen” (with the meaning of an 
earlier writing tool) is of a developmental parallel: as much as the consonant was a 
technical closure, nonce internalized by the Greek orality so that in rhetorike (the Greek 
word for “public speaking”), the speaker’s vocal intensity could reach a wider variety of 
audiences,27 the printing press (as if one were holding a pen with extreme firmness) was a 
technological28 closure that was meant to create a communicative intensity that went 
beyond the realm of human voice. The quill pen, as within Ignatius’ using the 
emblematics in the Exercises, was to hold the writing tool sophisticatedly, with a half-
open and half-closed gesture, not without a good sense of media ecology (on the social 
level of promoting wider uses of quill pens, and on a more personal scale in developing a 
bodily habit of using the quill pen).  
                                                   
25 Ong, Barbarian, 255 
26 Mumford, Technics, 237.  
27 This is to render Havelock's argument radically. See Eric Havelock. Preface to Plato (Cambridge: 
Belknap Press of Harvard university Press, 1963), 60.  
28 In this project, I use “technical” to highlight body-tools, and “technological” to highlight machine-tools. 
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In this first chapter, I will start with a prelude by calling attention to teaching 
media ecology related courses in the field of communication. The aim is to bring the 
American ethos (personalism in America) onto the table. Then, I will focus on one 
particular “composite of places” in the Exercises that Ong called a “prison-cage”.29 The 
aim is to better understand the “media archeology” of the emblematics – “archeological” 
in the sense of studying the non-movement by moving it intellectually again. Eventually, 
I will examine a perceivable post-structuralism critique of the Exercises as a digital 
decision-making matrix. The aim is to better understand the debates around the freedom 
of will in making a decision.  
The Emblematical-Moral Implication in Teaching Media Ecology  
Teaching media ecology related courses started recently, indeed not until the 20 th 
century,30 which now seems to be as popular and problematic as teaching literary 
criticism in the English department few decades earlier.31 Here, I do not aim at covering 
the full varieties of the media ecologists’ intellectual backgrounds, in which for instances, 
one may learn a good deal from Lewis Mumford about the German literature on the 
existential implication of the machine,32 and from Jacques Ellul about modern 
propaganda studies.33 But I do want to highlight a commonplace among the media 
                                                   
29 Ong, Barbarian, 246.  
30 Neil Postman’s graduate program of media ecology was founded in New York University in 1971. See 
Lance Strate. Amazing Ourselves to Death: Neil Postman’s Brave New World Revisited (Peter Lang, 2014), 
Chapter 3. 
31 A temporal reference may be that Frank Raymond Leavis was appointed the director of studies in 
English at Downing College in 1931. He was then the chief editor of Scrutiny from 1932 to 1955. And he 
published The Living Principle: English as a Discipline of Thought in 1975 during his late years.  
32 In Technics, Mumford’s mastery with the German literature on machines could remind us of the hard 
thoughts on the existential philosophy of machines in a high-technologized society like Germany.  
33 See Jacques Ellul. Propaganda and the Formation of Men’s Attitudes. Translated by Konrad Kellen and 
Jean Lerner (Vintage Books, 1973).  
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ecologists in terms of being self-confrontational by being emblematical. And McLuhan’s 
first book The Mechanical Bride may be the best example.34 
In Mechanical, McLuhan almost felt it habitus to structure his examination on 
modern advertising with a three-part organization. 1) Before showing the advertisement, 
McLuhan would start with three or four questions that playfully touched upon the hidden 
message of the advertisement, 2) which was followed by his descriptions on the content 
of the advertisement with all the possible intellectual materials that one can sort through 
via public media. 3) After showing the advertisement, McLuhan concluded the 
examination with the moral implications that were implied in those questions that started 
the examination.  
Now, for those who are familiar with the three-part organization of an emblem, 
commonly defined as inscriptio (the motto), pictura (the enigmatic image) and 
subscriptio (the epigram), the above explanation of McLuhan’s interpretative habitus on 
“the industrial folklore” would seem rather unnecessary – it was already a playful thing at 
the beginning for a man of letters to formalize an incomplete parallel between the 
tripartite of an emblem and the comic content of modern advertisements. However, if one 
is not familiar with the emblematic tradition, the moral basis in McLuhan’s playful 
examination can be easily neglected: part of McLuhan’s critique was on the lack of good 
intellectual puzzles in modern advertisements. In contrast to Barthes’ teaching modern 
advertising in terms of semiotics as in his famous essay “The rhetoric of the image” 
(1965), McLuhan’s approach in Mechanical was to be intentionally within the 
                                                   
34 Marshall McLuhan. The Mechanical Bride: Folklore of Industrial Man (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 
1970).  
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commonplace. The difference between Barthes and McLuhan was that in Barthes, one 
had to understand semiotics so as to understand advertising, and in McLuhan, the 
structure of Mechanical was the interpretative habit that used to be common in the 
Western imagerial thinking tradition, to which McLuhan necessarily belonged.  
McLuhan’s work was confrontational if one may pay more attention to his 
emblematical-moral wittiness. In fact, this strong confrontational tone was built into 
teaching media ecology related courses, about which Neil Postman’s revisiting the 
dystopian hot air in George Owell’s 1984 (1949) by titling his work on public discourse 
as Amusing Ourselves to Death (1985) made the moral element even more 
straightforward. It is easy to ignore that the media ecologists talk to the adolescent inside, 
who does from time to time find the comic content to be more persuasive than a fully 
elaborated critique.  
In reviewing Postman’s The Disappearance of Childhood, Havelock had it that 
“as the written book in turn now yields pride of place to the televised image in human 
experience, so we all – children and adults alike – re-enter that shared world of our 
remoter past in which children are small adults, and adults revert to being grown up 
children"35 As a classist, Havelock reminded us that part of the problem of “the televised 
image” was about the revival (from the Greek rhetorical generality) of a rhetorical 
polemic as in the excessive expressiveness of modern existentialism. To put this in 
Ongian terms, “secondary orality” both made “primitive orality” as the collective 
                                                   
35 Eric Havelock. “Do You Know Where Your Children Are?” ETC: A Review of General Semantics 39.3 
(1982): 291-292.  
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childhood of mankind more examinable, and brought out a new kind of “child cult”36 due 
to the contemporary situation of the spoken word.  
If indeed McLuhan’s work was to conquer Romanticism from within, Ong’s work 
was to conquer the situation of the spoken word from within. With Ong, one way to think 
about the lack of intellectual nuances in today’s visual communication (with extreme 
binaries that even superseded the rhetorical polemic) was that genuine orality was 
muted.37 Here, it should be noted that “secondary orality” was first of all a critical term 
used in the contexts of criticizing Romanticists’ mocking at the redundancy of orality38 
(in Ong’s example, a modern speaker’s using “blah-blah-blah” in the speech) and the 
excessive emphasis on the candidates’ televised images in American presidential 
debates.39 The paradox within “the muted orality” in the age of “secondary orality” can 
be understood as a special complexity within the silence of an imagery as a fully 
technologized word.  
Within the critical contexts above, on a brighter note of the “secondary orality”, it 
would then be fair to observe that not only the former institutions of Latin acquisition 
gave ways to a variety of language studies, from which masterpieces of the past century 
certainly benefited. Auerbach’s philological training in Mimesis should be a good 
example. More importantly, in America, teaching media ecology itself should be an 
important counterpart to the irenic turn of the academy. No less problematic than the 
polemic mindset of an orator (as well as the counterbalancing effort to be more well-
                                                   
36 Ong, Grain, 46 
37 See Water Ong. Ramus, Method and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of 
Reason (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1958). 
38 Ong, Romance, 21.  
39 Ong, Orality, 136-137.  
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rounded), the effort to be not irenic can be even richer with intellectual complexities. To 
raise a classroom incident here, one student in a history of communication class in 
Duquesne University wrote that “the world is full of prison cultures” after reading 
Postman’s Amusing. If we may pay attention to the self-confrontational tone of our 
student’s message, to say “full of prison cultures” was in fact an existential intake of 
Postman’s original saying, “culture becomes a prison”.40 Postman simply used the prison 
imagery in its common sense for a more descriptive account on the lack of vitality in an 
overtly technologized society; yet, to say “the world is full of prison cultures” was more 
or less saying that “we all live in prison cultures” with a much more self-confrontational 
tone. Regardless of the risk in our student’s personalizing or internalizing the original 
message, it should be noted that it was not until a Victorian poet Gerard Manley Hopkins 
that this kind of self-confrontational messages, with some self-anguish but genuinely 
expressive, became so prominent to the degree of contemporary critics’ considering 
Hopkins to be a modernist ahead of his own time. But as Ong constantly reminded, there 
is no ahead of time, only in time. Keeping in mind the vocal strength of our student’s 
written message, personalism can be as simple as the writer’s challenging the readers 
with the writer’s confronting himself or herself.  
Now, it can certainly be said that the early American personalists have prepared a 
collective literary expression for those who want to follow this “errand into the 
wilderness”41 – the formation of an American ethos so to speak. But this inward-directed 
self-confrontation of our student’s aphorism, if put in contrast to the axiomatic inter-
                                                   
40 Postman, Amusing, 155.  
41 See Perry Miller. Errand into the Wilderness (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1956).  
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personalism of the Hebrew thinkers such as in Levinas’ saying “I am my brother’s 
keeper”, indeed opens the dynamic between the spoken word and the written word like 
never before. It appears that Levinas’ built-in rhetoric – the declaration of “I” must claim 
the independence only by “being my brother's keeper” – took the reader’s breath away 
into a powerful human relationship, fictional but fundamental.42 The inter-personalism 
here is that it was certainly Levinas’ saying the message, but it was also more than 
Levinas’ personal saying.  
More straightforwardly, to say “the world is full of prison cultures” was to 
challenge oneself by understanding the matrix of media effects, and to say “I am my 
brother's keeper” was strictly interpersonal and exceptionally poetic by not referring to 
the thing-character of any medium at all. To say this fondly, not only the Greek boys 
grew up, the Hebrew thinkers also became much more self-aware of the situation of the 
spoken word. Hence, what Ong wrote at the end of Orality should not be a shock that 
stops, but a research question. Ong said,  
Yet Christian teaching also presents at its core the written word of God, 
the Bible, which, back of its human authors, has God as author as no other 
writing does. In what way are the two senses of God’s "word" related to 
one another and to human beings in history? The question is more focused 
today than ever before.43  
                                                   
42 See Communication Ethics: Between Cosmopolitanism and Provinciality. Edited by Kathleen Roberts 
and Ronald Arnett (Peter Lang, 2008), 80.   
43 Ong, Orality, 175.  
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Ong contended that it is only in this historical moment that we may examine the situation 
of the spoken word, and understand the real reasons for the orality-literacy dynamic to 
exist. In other words, why and how the orality-literacy dynamic can be better studied 
today? With this question, let us move towards understanding the orality-literacy 
dynamic in the Exercises.  
The Initial Probe into the Ignatian “Composite of Places”  
The Spiritual Exercises is considered to be the best-known work among Ignatius' 
writings,44 and one of its keynote characteristics was that Ignatius asked the exercitants to 
examine their moral consciousness meticulously. Therein, the book is first of all valuable 
in terms of the history of moral consciousness itself, which arguably has been moving 
from being organized by the rhetorical formation of commonplace sayings, towards being 
driven by the details of an event in today’s information societies.45  
At the beginning of this section, in order to highlight Ignatius’ dealing with this 
dynamic between “rhetorical generality” and “moral particularities” in the context of the 
early Renaissance, I should firstly offer a comparative moral philosophy that sat more 
comfortably within the rhetorical tradition. A cross-cultural parallel to Confucianism 
should be very illustrative. In the Analects, one of Confucius’ students, Teacher Zeng 
said at the beginning of Book One,  
Every day I examine myself on three counts. In what I have undertaken on 
another’s behalf, have I failed to do my best? In my dealings with my 
                                                   
44 Ignatius, Exercises, 2.  
45 See Alasdair MacIntye. A Short of History of Ethics: A History of Moral Philosophy from the Homeric 
Age to the Twentieth Century (Norte Dame, IN: University of Norte Dame Press, 1998), 1-4.  
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friends have I failed to trustworthy in what I say? Have I passed on to 
others anything that I have not tried out myself?46 
In terms of self-examination, Zeng offered three situations along with his own practicing 
Confucius’ virtue theory. For those who are familiar with Confucianism, the three 
keynote virtues in Confucianism was “ren” (familial relationship), “yi” (socially just), 
and “li” (communal rituals). From the above quote, it is clear that Zeng did not aim at a 
perfect correspondence with Confucius’ three keynote virtues; rather, the situations seem 
to be genuinely personal, which was certainly part of the merit of the Analects as 
recorded teacher-student conversations. However, in the quote above, Zeng did not 
explain “why on three counts?” or “why these particular three?”, and he offered no 
temporal framework except “every day”. One could assume that Zeng’s saying was still a 
formal rhetorical practice on Confucianism towards a group of audiences already familiar 
with Confucius’ teaching.  
In comparison to Zeng’s teaching, the “Daily Particular Examination of 
Conscience” in the Exercises was demanding indeed. Ignatius said,   
The first time is in the morning. Upon arising the retreatant should resolve 
to guard carefully against the particular sin or fault he or she wants to 
correct or amend. The second time after the noon meal ... then the 
retreatant should make the first examination ... He or she should run 
through the time, hour by hour or period by period, from the moment of 
rising until the present examination ... The third time is after supper. The 
                                                   
46 Confucius. The Analects. Translated by D.C. Lau (New York: Penguins book, 1979), 59.  
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exercitant should make the second examination, likewise hour by hour ... 
For each time he or she fell into the particular sin or fault, a dot should be 
entered on the lower line of the G____.47 
With the above quote, the “particular examination” in the Exercises almost taxed the 
exercitants with detailing the details. Not only Ignatius provided instructions for “daily” 
as from “morning … upon arising”, to “after the noon meal” and to “after supper”, he 
also supplemented “morning”, “noon meal” and “supper” with further structuring details 
as in “hour by hour or period by period” and eventually to the capta of “a dot … entered 
on lower line of the G ____”. 
Around the 1500s, Ignatius was certainly not the only one who wrote manuals for 
moral examinations. As the Christian priests then were able to recognize that they were 
often addressing similar kinds of sins, it gradually became a common practice to write 
down the sermon beforehand,48 and moreover with the printing press, to print out a 
general “list of sins” for self-examinations.49 But the distinctiveness of the Exercises 
seems apparent. By asking the exercitants to pay even more attention to the 
particularities, Ignatius was dealing with the problem of the rhetorical generality between 
and among sins organized by a list, in which the hermeneutic space in-between was 
further removed from the rhetorical interrelations between and among the Grecian virtues 
organized by Homeric epics.50 
                                                   
47 Ignatius, Exercises, 24-26.  
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49 Boyle, Loyola’s Act, 120.  
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relate the virtue of “courage” to the virtue of being “cunning” with Odysseus. Without Odysseus, such 
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Now, with the help of the modern field of psychology, it is an ontological 
commonplace to indicate that the Exercises roughly followed the three stages of spiritual 
growth: from purgative, to illuminative and to unitive.51 Yet, as illustrated above with 
Ignatius’ particularism accounts for the particularities of “daily”, in the Exercises there 
was also a time-within-time kind of architectural details, being built into the general 
pattern of the spiritual growth. And to say “time within time” here is to highlight the 
difficulty in being narrative when communicating with an imagery. After all, an image is 
more of visual synchronicity than of the oral-diachronic order of perception. Therein lies 
the difficulty of a particular kind of Ignatian imagery that may be deemed as 
“emblematical”.  
In the first prelude of the First Exercise, when asking the exercitants to be 
preparative throughout the first-week exercises, Ignatius used the imagery of “my whole 
compound self as in exile in this valley [of tears] among brute animals”. The basic text 
follows:  
When a contemplation or mediation is about something abstract or 
invisible, as in the present case about on sins, the composition will be to 
see in imagination, and to consider my soul as imprisoned in this 
corruptible body, and my whole compound self as an exile in this valley 
[of tears] among brute animals. I say, my whole self as composed of soul 
and body.52  
                                                   
51 Ong, Barbarian, 242 
52 Ignatius, Exercises, 45. 
  19 
In the above quote, the major comprehensive difficulty itself is simple: why the 
composition as almost jumping from “soul”, to “prison”, to “body”, and to “self in exile 
among brute animals”? (not without a sense of a post-modern search for the genuine 
uncertainty of meanings) 
Among modern readers, the late Roland Barthes considered the Ignatian imagery 
as an “image reservoir” that “forms an ars obligatoria that determines less what has to be 
imagined than what is not possible to imagine – or what is impossible not to imagine”.53 
Here, Barthes used ars obligatoria54 as an equivalent of his term “image reservoir” which 
can be understood as an enforced ideographic “filling in the blank” when a media 
environment was flooded with similar kinds of artful images. Simply put, Barthes was 
criticizing that in a media environment in which the holy cross without the body of Christ 
no longer functioned as a form of mediation but became a sign in itself, it was only 
natural to misunderstand the watermark on the wall as the holy cross.  
Not to diminish his contribution to critical media studies, Barthes missed the real 
difficulty in the Ignatian “composite of places”. In the first prelude, not only Ignatius 
wrote “will be to see”55 in dealing with the difficulty in the passivity of a future-
orientated imagination (the Grace), within which it is safe to say that the imagery was 
more complex than the Platonic craftsman’s blueprint that aims at bringing things in the 
                                                   
53 Barthes, Loyola, 51.  
54 The structuralists used the term ars obligatoria loosely in allusion to the complexity within the meaning 
of “artificial” as both “artistic” and “fake”. The term ars obligatoria in itself had scholasticism root in 
dealing with the theological difficulty of the Trinity – in particular, the perceptive order of the Father, the 
Son and the Holy Spirit as “one God in three Divine Persons”.  
55 In the “Vulgate” version of the Exercises in classical Latin, Ignatius’ original “la composicion sera ver” 
was translated by the Jesuit Latinist, Pere des Freux as “poterit loci constructio talis esse, ut si … 
cernamus” (the composition of places could be such as though we were to see). The point here is that Freux 
highlighted the imagery was after all invisible; in other words, an incomplete metaphor with a more 
complete imagery. See Ong, Barbarian, 243. 
  20 
future (the ideal thing in heaven) to the present (the real thing that the craftsman shall 
build) with the power of imagination.56 More importantly, if indeed Ignatius was good 
enough to compute the “negative” spaces in a figure-ground imagination, why did he 
emphasize at the end that “I say, my whole self as composed of soul and body” as if he 
was clearly concerned with possible misinterpretations? It only seems fair to say that 
Ignatius was an early printing man, and he simply could not calculate the effect of 
printing to the degree of a contemporary visual artist’s managing the meaning of an 
image. In other words, Ignatius was not manipulating the imagery; rather, his message 
somewhat exceeded the framework of the imagery – there are simply too many meanings.  
On this kind of word-image dynamic in Ignatius, Ong’s insight was helpful 
indeed. In “St. Ignatius’ Prison-cage”, Ong pointed it out that,  
Exiled among brute beasts, the soul should certainly find its prison-cage a 
decided asset. When you are surrounded by wild animals, the very next 
best thing to having them in cages is to be in one yourself.57 
Cunning as Ong may sound, the argument was true: in imagining a “prison” among brute 
animals with “the whole self” in it, the “prison” must also be a “cage”. Therein, Ong 
called the imagery “prison-cage” in order to highlight the emblematical enigma within.  
Now, at the initial probe into the Ignatian imagery, it is certainly too early to form 
a full interpretation on the meaning of the “prison-cage” emblem. But within Ong, the 
existential element of the imagery was highlighted. For a convenient illustration, keeping 
                                                   
56 See Hannah Arendt. Lectures on Kant’s Philosophy. Edited by Ronald Beiner (Chicago: The University 
of Chicago), 82.  
57 Ong, Barbarian, 246.  
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Barthes’ critique of the “image reservoir” in mind, the co-presence of the “sun” and 
“moon” in the Chinese character for “ming” (明, “brightness”) was certainly an effort to 
communicate the effect of brightness, without caring to discern the cause. “Ming” is 
rather rhetorical as if the written word were talking to the user that “[this is] as bright as 
the sun and the moon being put together”. In terms of the ars obligatoria, as this Chinese 
character may be in artistically imagining the artificial situation of the sun and the moon 
in the same sky so as to communicate the meaning of brightness, the “sun-moon” 
imagery only seems to be a philosophical entertainment if in comparison with the 
“prison-cage” emblem. In short, the way “prison-cage” (two things similar but different) 
works is more complex, and therefore more study-worthy, than the way “sun-moon” (two 
things different but similar) works.  
In “St. Ignatius’ Prison-cage”, Ong did not put an end to all the interpretive 
difficulties within the first prelude. One may only ask more questions: why did Ignatius 
consider the “prison-cage” invisible? Why valley of tears? Why this particular image 
compound as meditating on sins? Why did Ignatius prioritize the existentialist’s situation 
at the very beginning throughout the first week? The Exercises was filled with this kind 
of minor puzzles, and I shall deal with these questions in the following chapters. Here, it 
should be pointed out that Ong’s call for future research was clear: some sort of “media 
archeology” or hermeneutic work on the proto-phenomenological should be developed, 
given that we now lack interpretative tools to enter into the symbols (not yet signs) in the 
rituals of communication, of which Barthes’ critical media approach was symptomatic.  
As a Jesuit himself, the “prison-cage” was certainly Ong’s own hermeneutic effort 
on Ignatius’ original narrative. To say “prison-cage” with some degree of Romanticism in 
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aligning cause with effect closely, was also a reminder of the difficulty in Ignatius’ 
writing, without reifying the commonplace on the “divided self”58 about which a man of 
letters knew too well. In contemporary times, the Jesuits are sometimes judged to be 
“military” with overly full chests that simply love rhetoric too much.59 Although this 
dissertation is not an apologia, I do want to make the following argument: the 
ideographic technique was indeed developed in the West with “the composite of places” 
in the Exercises as good examples. However, with the spoken word being built into the 
alphabetic writing, the Western intellectual sphere did not proceed with the silence of the 
ideographs. Although the acoustic basis in the alphabet can be problematic (as writing 
was meant to be read), “secondary orality”, if to use Ong’s term radically, also demands 
us to conquer the “oral traditions” by being even more attentive to the way the spoken 
word works. To use the word “conquer” is to indicate the problem of all kinds of critical 
recognitions of the oral traditions. With this, I shall move towards examining a post-
structural critique of the structure of the Exercises.  
Post-Structural Critiques of the Spiritual Exercises  
 
The structuralists were after all not interested in deconstructing the Spiritual 
Exercises in the sense of revealing the difficulty of using a binary system in decision-
making. In Loyola, Barthes’ argument can be no more than that: in providing a structural 
solution to a difficult situation, Ignatius also run the risk of making the decision-making 
tool to be more powerful than the decision-making itself. Therein, Barthes considered the 
                                                   
58 This project tends to refrain from the psychology of the divided self. I tend to agree with Havelock’s 
remarking on the dividing power of the consonants, which was a technique designed to promote public 
speaking, rather than examining the private realm of psychology.  
59 Barthes, Loyola, 39. 
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First Week of the Exercises as a decision-making tree.60 His argument was that in the 
First Week, Ignatius wanted the exercitants to be aware of that “choosing to be a priest 
can be good” as much as “choosing not to be a priest can be good”.  
In other words, rather than highlighting the significance of the First Week as the 
birth of a strong moral consciousness, Barthes simply weakened the First Week as 
Ignatius’ calming the exercitants down by providing foresights into the possibility of 
having the same result with making opposite choices. If indeed we may consider Barthes’ 
critique of the Exercises as in modernity that Barthes himself taught semiotics as a 
structural solution to the problem of having a structure, the post-structuralists were 
indeed attacking the very idea of the “freedom of the will” in making a decision. Keeping 
in mind the discourse discourses on “free will”, it seems to be my obligation to start with 
“the discernment of the spirits”61 in the Exercises before handling post-structuralism.  
The Discernment of the Spirits  
Once again, it may be clarified that the Exercises was less about forming a 
rhetorical generality for decision-making, and more about the existentialist’s making a 
decision. For a convenient illustration, it is artistically touching for a modern filmmaker 
to portrait a good teacher, when making a hard choice of leaving the students, to be 
standing in front of an empty classroom, with candles on the students’ desk whose little 
drama of fire becomes a good signifier for the students with the appearance and then the 
disappearance of the students’ faces.62 As noble as these moving pictures were, the above 
scene was not about the teacher’s making a decision, since the decision has been made. 
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61 See Jacques Guillet et al. Discernment of the Spirits (Collegeville: MN, The Liturgical Press, 1970), 80-
89.  
62 The movie being referring to is Chen Kaige’s King of the Children, released in 1987.  
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Rather, it is about the Grecian “ideal spectator”63 on mankind’s shared difficulty in 
decision-making. In other words, this movie scene was meant to be seen, and the pictures 
had good reasons to be silent.  
With the Exercises, as Ganss noted, the exercitants were more or less already on 
their ways to be conscious of the meaning and the difficulty in being a “companion of 
Jesus”.64 For instance, before his becoming a Jesuit in 1571 and applying to do 
missionary work in China in 1577, the famous Jesuit Matthew Ricci was already a very 
competent young man, who started to study law in Rome when he was sixteen years 
old.65 Though we do not know for sure if Ricci practiced the Spiritual Exercises 
especially for the sake of deciding to apply for the missionary work in China, it was 
unlikely that Ricci did not know the difficulty before making that decision. Here, the 
point is that: in writing the Exercises as a manual, Ignatius had good reasons to be less 
orientated towards reminding the exercitants of the difficulty in decision-making in that 
nobody else (save God) should know the history of that difficulty better than the 
exercitants themselves. In other words, the epideictic part of the Exercises was built upon 
this interpersonal difference, rather than the readily available options.  
To continue the example of Ricci’s missionary work, in The Memory Palace of 
Matteo Ricci, Jonathan Spence (like most of us) tended to think of the Spiritual Exercises 
as Ricci’s significant source of faith, and therein, “the discernment of the spirits” would 
be understood as a psychological approach to Ricci’s own “believing and doubting game” 
                                                   
63 See Friedrich Nietzsche. Basic Writings of Nietzsche. Translated and edited by Walter Kaufmann (New 
York: Random House, 2000), 56.  
64 Ignatius, Exercises, 4.  
65 Jonathan Spence. The Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci (Penguin Books. 1985), xiii.  
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along with his facing the socio-political difficulties in China then.66 And this may be 
evidenced in Ricci’s journals in which he clearly knew well about the problems of China 
during the Ming Dynasty.67  
However, on a second thought, even if the spirits were Ricci’s own rational and 
irrational “logic of the heart” that being more conscious of the real problems of China 
could make him more doubtful of doing the missionary work (though the opposite should 
be true), it would not be in Ricci’s psychological blind spot to recognize that such doubt 
should in turn make him the rightful candidate for this particular mission. Again, if Ricci 
already knew that the spirits were his own believing and doubting, there was no genuine 
uncertainty to be discerned.  
Alternatively, we may understand the “spirits” as effect that problematically 
coincides with cause. For Ricci, when applying for the missionary work, the decision was 
indeed a polemic one – to go to China or to not go to China. Therein, the technical 
difficulty was that the cause, which is having the idea of going to China, was also the 
positive part of the effect which is actually going to China to do missionary work. To put 
this differently, from the making of decisions (the “choice of contexts” as the open 
system of all the things Ricci could do as a Jesuit) to making the decision (the “context of 
choices” as the existential situation in Ricci’s deciding to go to China or not), Ricci have 
already phenomenologically reduced (with the Ignatian emblem that Ong revealed as the 
“prison-cage”) the original phenomenological description. And it was the original 
phenomenological description (as the difficult narrative in the “composite of places” of 
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“prison”, “valley of tears” and “among brute animals”) that needed to be discerned. 
Moreover, in making the decision to go, Ricci was then “divided”. The existential 
situation could only hope for a reunion (with God). In this sense, the Jesuit’s motto “Ad 
Majorem Dei Gloriam” (AMDG, “for the greater glory of God”) can be understood as 
pivoting on the existentialist’s situation. Of course, the real “sin” here would be for 
someone to will too much, and simply go to China without making the decision.  
In terms of this particular kind of cause and effect that coincide, as I have 
mentioned the Chinese character “明” with the “sun-moon” imagery, it would make some 
sense to give up discerning cause and effect by focusing on the effect of “brightness” 
alone. To borrow the terms from semiotic phenomenology, we may call this a 
“phenomenological reduction” with too much difficulty in offering the real 
“phenomenological description”.68  
As a side note, similar to the “sun-moon” imagery as a phenomenological 
reduction without the description, the “moment of Zen”  in Zen Buddhism can be 
understood a phenomenological description without the reduction. As a Chinese media 
ecologist Peter Zhang noted, the Chinese painter-poet would use the compound image of 
the “pine-wind” (松风) to communicate two phenomenological perceptions at the same 
time – the wind makes the pine more perceivable with the pine otherwise being in 
stillness, and the pine makes the wind more sensible with the wind otherwise being tactile 
only. Here, the point is that: without reductively judging the wind to be cause and the 
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pine to be the effect, the Chinese painter, with the help of the poetics, contended that the 
pine and the wind are cause and effect to each other.69 
Now, in contrast to the poetic effort of not distinguishing the cause and the effect 
(necessarily of Romanticism), the distinctiveness of dabar (Word) in the Hebraic 
tradition should be salient. In Genesis 1:3, we read, “And God said, let there be light, and 
there was light” – the Old Testament writers at the very beginning chose to not give up 
discerning cause and effect, and the perceptive order was established within the 
diachronic phenomenology of the Word. To use Lanigan’s terms, we may call this a 
particular kind of Phenomenological Description with a built-in diachronic 
phenomenological order of perception. In this sense, for Ricci, talking to the Three 
Persons of God would be the phenomenological way to examine having the very idea of 
going to China. As Auerbach reminded in Mimesis, in the Old Testament, to say “yes” 
was more of a moral relationship than a personal will.70  
In contemporary times, we have heard the American personalist Stanley Cavell 
point out that “God created the Day within a day”71 in remarking on this conquering time 
within time as part of Thoreau’s mission in Walden. And we have heard the media 
ecologists like Eric McLuhan saying that “a chicken is the egg’s idea to have more 
chicken”72 as a comic reconciliation of the cause-and-effect grievance in the “chicken or 
egg” conundrum. Be it more personalistic as in Cavell or more emblematical as in Eric 
McLuhan, in terms of “the discernment of the spirits”, I tend to agree with Carl Jung in at 
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least not reducing “God” into an excessive obsession with causes. In God and the 
Unconscious, as White reminded, the devils in the Old Testament were more of the effect 
than of the cause.73 With this elaboration on the “discernment of the spirits”, I shall move 
towards a preliminary examination of the post-structuralism take on the Exercises via the 
notion of the decision-making matrix.  
From the Decision-Making Tree to the Decision-Making Matrix 
In The Clash of Empires, Liu did a rhetorical performance on a word-image 
impasse between the Chinese character and the English word. She put the Chinese 
character “yi” (夷, or “barbarian”) right beside the English word “barbarian”, and divided 
those two languages with a slash. So it became “yi / barbarian”. Using Derrida’s term, 
Liu called “yi / barbarian” a “super-sign”. And she defined the “super-sign” in the 
following way.  
A super-sign is not a word but a hetero-cultural signifying chain that 
crisscrosses the impact on the meaning of recognizable verbal units ... the 
super-sign emerges out of the interstices of existing languages across the 
abyss of phonetic and ideographic differences.74  
To put Liu’s term differently, in “yi / barbarian", “/” then became a mirror that con-fused 
the signifier and the signified – who was the barbarian? In the context of critical 
translation theories, Liu contended that it was the nihilism in-between that became the 
fuse of the two Opium Wars between the British Empire and the Qing Dynasty.75 
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Moreover, drawing attention to the military use of the Morse Code, Liu argued that the 
code for Morse’s system – A . ___ and B ___. . . – was memorized as “Ag.ainst 
Barb.a.ri.an”, and no longer as “Al.pha B.e.t.a”. 
From the above quote, Liu’s “super-sign” was a post-colonial and post-
structuralism take on the early structuralists’ critique of the ars obligatoria. The 
radicalness in Liu’s argument in fact made the problem of ars obligatoria more 
straightforward – in a time when the perceptive order between word (the English 
alphabet) and image (the Chinese ideograph) became rather confused, the moral order 
was then reduced to the existential polemic of “which came first, word or image?” which, 
according to Liu, was an intellectual impasse that led to the warfare between two 
empires.76 
Now, although “yi / barbarian” could be reviving the argument from the 
Reformation and the Counter-Reformation by remarking on the word-image impasse, the 
cross-cultural element between the Chinese character and the English word certainly 
made Liu’s argument compelling to today’s media studies. In The Freudian Robot, Liu 
continued to alert us of the “ideographic turn of the phonetic alphabet”,77 within which, 
for example, one can still recognize “uvernisty” as “university” in a sentence, but the 
good fear in not being able to pronounce “uvernisty” was cancelled out. For Liu, the 
word in its digital form is therefore no longer a word, but an ideograph whose strangeness 
lies that also no user of the Chinese characters would know how to approach the 
ideograph of “uvernisty” in meaningful ways. Furthermore, with the Chinese visual artist 
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Xu Bing’s A Book from the Sky, Liu cautioned against a digital Freudian nightmare about 
ideographs that look like Chinese characters, while no-body could understand the 
meaning of these ideographs. In other words, Liu was critical of both the Chinese 
character and the English word in falling into some digital nihilism.  
Now, Liu’s radical critique should be not be excluded too conveniently. In a time 
when we hardly used the “discernment of spirits” as in Ricci’s conquering his having the 
idea of going to China with the Ignatian emblem, or the “decision-making tree” in which 
the moral weight was still kept in evaluating the choices analytically,78 by using the 
“decision-making matrix”, a digital New Criticism could eventually claim that some 
hyper-structuralism has fully replaced the notion of “authorship”, as there is no way to 
identify the “author” in a globalized age when all art pieces must somewhat involve 
industrial collaborations that are indeed impossible to trace completely.79  
From the perspective of a contemporary rhetorician, meaning is always in danger 
of losing its own meaning. Meta-communication or communication theories are 
particularly in demand in this historical moment when we become more conscious of the 
situation and the difficulty of the spoken word. How to apply the Exercises into today’s 
media environment? I shall deal with the complexity in this question in the last chapter. 
Before that, in chapter two, let us examine the Exercises within Ong’s work which should 
better ground this project in the diachronic phenomenology of the spoken (speaking) 
word.  
  
                                                   
78 A good example should be the Trolley Problem as the modern way of teaching moral dilemmas.  
79 Walter Benjamin’s The Word of Art in the Age of Reproduction was to not give up “author and 
authenticity”.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Rhetorical Movement, Built-in: Walter Ong’s Appropriation of the Spiritual 
Exercises 
The Spiritual Exercises, written as a manual, can be understood as a guiding form 
in which Ignatius asked the exercitants themselves to provide the content. Different 
exercitants from different historical periods then provided different contents. For 
example, the “Victorian particularism” in Gerard Manley Hopkins’ appropriation of the 
Exercises would simply be unavailable to an early Renaissance man,1 and Walter Ong’s 
appropriation of the Exercises with contemporary developments in the Jungian 
psychology would be unavailable to Hopkins.2 In short, different historical moments call 
for different appropriations of the Exercises, which should be the openness of the 
Exercises, arguably as Ignatius’ advantage as an early printing man in being able to write 
the Exercises with a good structure.  
Among this rich varieties of different appropriations of the Exercises, it is often 
neglected that a keynote component in Ong’s oeuvre was indeed in response to the 
Exercises. In general, Ong approached the Exercises with contemporary developments in 
existential philosophies (with an even more self-conscious personalism) and in studying 
the history of consciousness (as in Teilhard de Chardin’s work on the noosphere). Ong’s 
appropriation of the Exercises, in the vicinities of rhetorical studies and orality studies, 
should be a distinctive contribution to understanding the contemporary meaning of the 
Exercises.  
                                                   
1 See Ong, Hopkins, 54-56.  
2 See Ong, Barbarian, 249.  
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In reflections, this line of thought in Ong on “the technologizing of the word”, if 
indeed in direct responses to Ignatius, was in fact a powerful synthesis of the frontiers of 
scholarly perceptions on the situation of the spoken word. If to take the vantage point of 
such synthesis, we may recognize the toil and trouble in reaching the current effort to 
understand the real reason for the orality-literacy dynamic to exist. The toil and trouble 
was sometimes with residues of Romanticism that promoted intentional rebellions against 
the formulaic expression demanded by the oral memory,3 and sometimes with failures to 
reveal the urgency in examining the situation of the spoken word, such as Polanyi’s 
merely remarking on that “we can know more than we can tell” as phenomenological 
description without reductions.4 Overall, the existential complexity of the spoken word 
was implicit in the Exercises, and became more explicit with Ong as “a specialist among 
specialists” on the spoken word. 
As stated in chapter one, if Ong can help us better understand the real reason for 
the media-communication dynamic in the Exercises, in chapter two, I should explicate 
what is indeed Ong’s appropriation of the Exercises by tracing its history of ideas, from 
“St. Ignatius’ Prison-cage” (1954/1962), to Presence of the Word (1967), and to Hopkins, 
the Self, God (1986). Moreover, keeping in mind today’s discourses on the ideographic 
bias of the digital media at the price of the phonetic-alphabetic edge of perception, I 
should also elaborate on Ong’s relating the Exercises with the emblem book (which was 
notably the “new media” in Ignatius’ time).  
                                                   
3 Ong, Romance, 8.  
4 Michael Polanyi. The Tacit Dimension (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), x. A 
phenomenological reduction of “we can know more than we can tell” would be to reveal the difficult 
dynamic between “knowing” and “telling”.  
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Before reviewing Ong’s work on the Exercises, it should be clarified beforehand 
that Ong was not a theologian. Ong was well-read in English literature (he dedicated his 
master thesis and his final book project to Gerard Manley Hopkins), and he was well-
informed of the excitement in the air then around modern psychological studies (with the 
most notable reference being the section “Communication media and the Freudian 
Psychosexual Sequences” in Presence). With this intellectual background, Ong entered 
the Exercises from the vantage point of English and psychology. And this may be best 
evidenced in Ong’s essay “St. Ignatius’ Prison-cage” on the first prelude in the First 
Week of the Exercises, which was an interdisciplinary work with methods of hermeneutic 
phenomenology (on Ignatius’ original text), semiotic phenomenology (on the forgotten 
meaning of signs and symbols in the ritual of communication) and media ecology (on the 
resemblance between television and the “prison-cage” imagery as mandalas). In short, 
Ong was interested in the orality-literacy difficulty in Ignatius’ image compounds where 
the rhetorical elements remain to be discerned more carefully.  
Though Ong was not a theologian, the Ongian entrance into the Exercises by no 
means lacked materials. The Ongian tradition was rich, and one should take advantage of 
the richness. To simply offer one genealogical trace here, Ong once pointed out that 
Marshall McLuhan was after all a Cambridge man whose teacher was Frank Raymond 
Leavis.5 And F. R. Leavis was someone who would start a discussion on “imagery and 
movement” by saying the following:  
                                                   
5 Walter Ong. “Review of the Interior Landscape.” In An Ong Reader: Challenges for Further Inquiry, 
edited by Thomas J. Farrell and Paul Soukup (Cresskill, N. J: Hampton Press, 2002), 71. The essay was 
originally published in 1970.  
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“Image” and “imagery” are insidious terms; they have prompted an 
immense deal of naive commentary on (for instance) Shakespeare’s verse, 
and, in general, has encouraged confident reliance on two closely related 
fallacies: (i) the too ready assumption that images are visual, (ii) the 
conception of metaphor as essentially simile with “like” or “as” left out.”6  
It is first of all noteworthy that similar to Leavis’ forefront of being an English professor,7 
Ong approached the word-image dynamic with a critical recognition of the Romanticism 
movement (if indeed as the 100 years old English versus the 1200 years old Latin) both 
as the starting place to be intensely aware of the oral tradition, and as the intentional 
rebellion from the “old rhetoric” which could at times seem unnecessarily ornamental and 
excessively oratorical. However, as much as there is no “old rhetoric” in the sense of 
exploiting or over-personalizing rhetoric for private uses (rhetorike is after all public 
speaking), there is also no “new rhetoric” (such as in the New Criticism) in the sense of 
anti-personalizing the interpersonal root of human communication. For this project, we 
may keep in mind the question of whether the Ignatian images were romantic, and I will 
address this in the next chapter.  
St. Ignatius’ Prison-cage and the Existentialist Situation 
As Gronbeck once indicated, with Ong it was always an “intellectual marathon” 
in which understanding the continuity matters more than identifying a specific place. 
Accordingly, this review will be arranged roughly in accordance with Ong’s life of the 
                                                   
6 Frank R. Leavis. The Living Principle: ‘English’ as a Discipline of Thought (Chicago: Elephant 
Paperbacks, 1998), 93.  
7 Ong, Reader, 71.  
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mind,8 from “St. Ignatius’ Prison-cage” as the first probe into the proto-personalism in 
the Exercises, to Presence of the Word as further explorations into the dynamic between 
the human sensorium organization and religious and cultural communication, and to 
Hopkins, the Self, and God in which Ong extended his master thesis on Hopkins’ “sprung 
rhythm” towards his thoughts on the media element in the Ignatian emblems. Throughout 
this review, the question may be put as: is there a theory of “oral image” in Ong’s work 
on the Exercises. And by “oral image”, I mean those image-makers who wanted to 
conquer the synchronic perception of the imago with the diachronic phenomenology of 
the logos. Let us begin with “St. Ignatius’ Prison-cage”.  
 “St. Ignatius’ Prison-cage” should be at the forefront of understanding the 
Exercises, as Ong responded critically to two major historical backgrounds. The first 
background had to with a Neoplatonic reading of the Exercises even within the Jesuits’ 
circle. This can be indirectly evidenced by George Ganss’ citing Ong’s essay to defend 
against reading the “prison-cage” as supporting a Cartesian mind-body dualism.9 And the 
main problem here was about the Platonic a priori in which one would understand the 
power of imagination as bringing things in the future to the present, while Ignatius’ 
imagination involved the Grace of God, with both the hope for having and the fear of 
losing.10 The other background had to do with the field of communication then to be 
troubled by the over-excitement of critical approaches to mass media communication.11 
This can be evidenced by Roland Barthes’ reading the Exercises as a “mantic art”, not far 
                                                   
8 See Thomas Walsh. Walter J. Ong S.J.: A Bibliography 1929-2006 (Saint Louis: The Ong Archive, 
2006).  
9 Ignatius, Exercises, 156 
10 See Hannah Arendt. Love and Saint Augustine. Edited by Joanna V. Scott and Judith C. Stark (Chicago, 
IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 9.  
11 See James W. Carey. Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society (New York: Routledge, 
1989/1992), Part I.  
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from modern game theories.12 For Barthes, the Exercises was a “dream factory” in which 
Ignatius catered his own powerful imagination, like a film director, to the mass who 
lacked it. With Ong’s essay, we may say that both Cartesian meditations and Barthes’ 
structuralism critique can be understood as lamenting the inadequacy of an oral cognition 
based tenaciously upon the way the spoken word works.  
Both Descartes and Barthes were suggesting that the true noetic activity should 
exist independently of any sensory perception – Descartes more radically in insisting on 
the “thinking self” alone, and Barthes more cunningly in suggesting that there were 
indeed four texts within the Exercises. For a convenient illustration, this is to say that 
when one touches the fresco of, let’s say, Fra Angelico’s the Annunciation,13 instead of at 
least meeting the author, one can only be certain of feeling the wall. Of course, such 
statement is not entirely wrong. In terms of sensory inputs exclusively, the fresco was 
visual-tactile, and the interpretative difficulty and joy was in the interpreter’s mind. 
However, as we have analyzed in chapter one, it is not that the interpreters are sensorily 
numb that they fail to be attentive to the fresco at the beginning; rather, the interpreters 
are often aware of the “there-ness” of the art piece, and by calling it “fresco” they have 
already communicated.  
Especially in Barthes, the image compounds in the Exercises were understood as 
landscape views that implied a certain method of seeing. Barthes contended that there 
were “four texts” in the Exercises, respectively between Ignatius and the director, 
between the director and the exercitants, between the exercitants and divinity, and 
between divinity and Ignatius. And those four texts constituted the indeterminacy of four 
                                                   
12 Barthes, Loyola, 44.  
13 See Christopher Lloyd. Fra Angelico (London: Phaidon Press Limited, 1992), 18.   
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interwoven codes of communication as an overarching structure of sender-receiver 
matrices, in which God was understood as a divine decoder, and a divine encoder (if the 
message comes from Him). Again, the problem of Barthes’ critique was that the signified 
was predetermined, which even if true, should be precisely because of an excessive 
accessibility to the rhetorical commonplaces. After all, what is the point of practicing the 
Exercises if the exercitants already knew if the sign came from God or from the devil? As 
Ignatius himself indicated, if sure of (the message) is from the devil, condemn it, and if 
unsure, decide it. 
In the next chapter, I shall examine the difference between the Ignatian meditation 
and the Cartesian meditation in greater detail. And keeping in mind the risk in connecting 
the Exercises to Meditations on First Philosophy, I will make those connections as 
carefully as crossing a winter river. For now, we may examine “St. Ignatius’ Prison-cage” 
section by section, given the varieties of topics in this essay.  
I.  
In the first section, Ong alerted us of a visualism reading of the Exercises. He 
pointed out that the “prison-cage” imagery was in fact different from other image 
compounds in the Exercises; in Ong’s own example, in the Second Addition at the end of 
the First Week, Ignatius advised,  
Similarly, in the second Exercise, making myself out to be a great sinner 
in chains, that is to say, that I move about as though encumbered with 
chains on my way to appear before the most high Eternal Judge, picturing 
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to myself as an example the way in which chained prisoners condemned to 
death appear before their temporal judge.14 
The above image compound that roughly moved from “a great sinner in chains”, to “... 
appear before the most high Eternal Judge” and to “chained prisoner condemned to 
death...” was in fact more of being sculptural than of being narrative. The imagery was 
close to the “heavy figures” in the Greek oral tradition about teaching the cultural-moral 
lessons to the young by making the imagery excessive (rather than repetitive).15 To be 
more specific, as much as the young in the Hellenistic culture was put on by the epic hero 
with the excessiveness of his character (Odysseus was more of bravado than of 
bravery),16 the above Ignatian “composite of places” also exceeded for the effect of 
weight so that the moral lesson can be memorized not entertainingly but painstakingly. 
Here, if we are concerned with the rhetorical excessiveness in the Ignatian image 
compounds on guilt consciousness, it may be a helpful reminder that we now know from 
contemporary pathological studies that the addicted are often aware that they are inside 
their own addiction.17 “Sins” are after all not problems that need solutions, but situations 
that must be overcome.  
To say this fondly, with modern psychology, we poked fun at the gambler’s 
saying to his wife “I will never ever gamble again” in that we were persuaded by 
                                                   
14 Also see Ignatius, Exercises, 48.  
15 See Ong, Orality, 69. 
16 This is a critique of Aristotelian virtue theories in finding the Golden mean between the excess and the 
deficiency. The oral poets indeed wanted to move beyond excessiveness for the power of story-telling in 
giving birth to the personas like Prometheus or Sisyphus.  
17 See Corey Anton. “Drugs as Environment: Being Inside What is Inside Us.” In Drugs and Media: New 
Perspectives on Communication, Consumption, and Consciousness, edited by Robert C. MacDougall (The 
Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012), 35. Also see Paul Watzlawick, Janet Beavin Bavelas 
and Don D. Jackson. Pragmatics of Human Communication: A Study of Interactional Patterns, Pathologies 
and Paradoxes (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1967).  
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Freudian psychologists that the excessiveness of the gambler’s expression was in itself 
symptomatic. From a Freudian perspective, if the gambler truly wanted to quit gambling, 
the determination should be better expressed silently in that “actions speak louder than 
words”. Here, Ong would question the silence of the expression – if determinations 
should be in total silence, why do we still say “actions speak louder than words”? Here, 
with an incomplete parallel to the Exercises, Ignatius was almost contending that when 
the gambler said, “I will never ever gamble again”, the saying itself should not be over-
determined by its own expressiveness. We simply don’t know if it is angel or the devil in 
the gambler’s saying. On this, a visualist tends to pay less attention to the diachronic 
evanescence of the spoken word (with the innate request for changes and differences), 
and insists on the visualized existence of the spoken word as problematic in itself. In this 
sense, Ong reminded us of a potential psychological phenomenology in the “prison-cage” 
emblem by dealing with the communicative difficulty of psychological complexities 
beforehand in the first prelude.  
II.  
In the second part, Ong reminded that “thing themselves can signify”.18 And he 
used the example of Baptism in which Ong suggested that water in fact meant both life 
and death, instead of meaning life alone. Here, an exploration into the theological 
background may help us better understand Ong’s concern.  
Informed by the German art historian Hans Belting of “the paradox of the 
crucifixion and the reality of the image”,19 the ways in which water meant both life and 
                                                   
18 Ong, Barbarian, 248.  
19 Hans Belting. Likeness and Presence: A History of the Image Before the Era of Art. Translated by 
Edmund Jephcott (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 269.  
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death should be more salient within the difficulty of representing the meaning of the 
crucifixion with an image. In Belting’s explanation, the double stream of water and blood 
that flowed from Christ’s pierced sides was an image compound that stood for Christ’s 
two natures – water as a sign of the divine nature and blood as a sign of the human 
nature. In other words, the difference between water and blood, when put together as one 
signifier with another signifier, was employed as a symbolic dynamism to deal with the 
paradox of the crucifixion. Simply put, different from the philosopher’s death as 
Socrates’ which was the end of his life in the polis, the death of Christ as a martyr was 
meant to complete the symbolic meaning of his life, with a built-in hope for the 
participation of Christians in the future. Therefore, water and blood in fact worked 
together to deal with the paradox of life and death and (future) life in Christ’s existential 
choice. Water can symbolize life and/or death, as much as blood can symbolize life 
and/or death; the “water-blood” imagery was an image compound that responded to a 
compound meaning.  
Moreover, the paradox of the crucifixion was indeed different from the modern 
existentialists’ insistence on the freedom in choosing one’s own death. The paradox came 
from the existential situation within the psychological movement of Christian martyrs. 
The real discernment is that choosing to die can complete one’s life, as much as choosing 
to live can complete one’s life. For a doctrinaire theologian to fix the meaning of water as 
life, and blood as death would in fact create more confusions than clarifications, and such 
fixation more or less came from the lavish uses of the signifier and the Signified (or 
Signifier and signified) model of semiotics with “dead” meanings. In short, in the case of 
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the “water-blood” imagery, there was a particular reason to not distinguish the temporal 
sequence within the diachronic order.  
As Ong also explained, the disagreement between Roman Catholicism and 
Protestantism on the meaning of the wine and bread in the Eucharist should further 
clarify. For the Roman Catholics, the wine and bread is the blood and body of Jesus 
Christ. The tautology should be true not only in terms of the phenomenology of homo 
ludens – when a child plays the role of a kangaroo in the theater, he becomes the 
kangaroo.20 More importantly, in terms of the noetic economy, the very attempt to fully 
explicate the meaning of the blood and body with metaphysical concepts would run its 
own risk of cancelling out the symbolic economy within the wine and bread. As a witty 
interpreter might remark: are the concepts explaining the wine and bread, or is the wine 
and bread explaining the concepts? For the Protestants, the wine and bread only happen 
to be the signifier for Christ’s blood and body, and falls short of being a competent sign. 
In this regard, the Protestants tend to consider the written word to be more complete a 
sign than the symbolic meaning of the wine and bread.  
Within this dynamic between the Roman Catholics and the Protestants, part of the 
issue here was about the phenomenology of play.21 Primitive orality may be understood 
as the collective childhood of mankind, and to poke fun at the inadequacy of the spoken 
word carries the risk of building a playground with no play. And another part of the issue 
had to do with that both words and things can signify. As I have illustrated with Fra 
Angelico’s painting, the perceptive order is that “this thing” precedes “calling it a 
                                                   
20 Johan Huizinga. Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949), 
25. Original work in Germany published in 1944.  
21 Ong, “Preface to Man at Play”, Reader, 345.   
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fresco”, while the communicative situation asks us to begin with taking “fresco” for 
granted, indeed as combining the word and the thing together. In this sense, the written 
word runs the risk of being too complete a sign in itself, with no more need for things.  
Therein, if indeed both the spoken word and the imago can be symbols (raw 
signs), Ong’s argument was that in the ritual of communication, the imago or the 
“archetype” in Jungian psychology should be much more effective than the metaphysical 
reasoning (as in Descartes’ meditations) when approaching the communicative power in 
religious symbols. Here, with Ong, we reach the first good reason in this dissertation for 
the emblem book writer to intentionally relate words (in particular, mottos) with images. 
And we may propose that in the Exercises, the “prison-cage” imagery belonged to the 
kind of emblems as “oral images”.  
As a site note, in terms of the effective persuasion, how we choose to 
communicate the meta-communicative level matters. For example, in the New 
Testament, Jesus was more than aware of human communication as generative rather 
than consumptive. In John 6:9, the symbol for the resource of human communication was 
“five barley loaves, and two small fishes”, notably as things themselves, which turned out 
to be enough for “five thousand men”.22 No wonder Ong said that,  
We are a far cry here from a scriptural or patristic age which was intensely 
aware that not only words but things themselves can signify, for we are 
victims of the tendency, which set in during the Middle Ages but was 
perfected only later, to reduce all symbolism with which the Scriptures 
                                                   
22The Bible: Authorized King James Version (Oxford University Press, 2008). 
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and Fathers abound to a kin of pious but ineffectual and rather irrelevant 
patter.23 
To extend Ong’s argument, it is only in the contemporary field of communication that we 
may have an American scholar like James Carey to define communication as: we are 
constantly using the unlimited resource of human communication (the spoken words are 
inexpensive, but the technologizing the word is costly) to negotiate and better distribute 
the limited materialistic resources on planet Earth.24 The powerful rhetoric in Carey’s 
polemic, if indeed as a phenomenological reduction of the phenomenological description 
in “five barley loaves, and two small fishes”, should be heuristic in understanding why 
the emblems needed a motto. Let us examine this in greater detail with Ong.  
III.  
In the third section, Ong examined the rhetoric and philosophy in the “prison-
cage” imagery. He said at the beginning, “St. Ignatius’ prison-cage is not part of the 
sacramental symbolism of the Church, but it seems to be a part of the world of 
symbolism into which the sacraments were inserted.”25 The question is then: what part of 
the world of symbolism (on the existentialist situation)?  
Within this question, it is perhaps no coincidence that the American personalists 
shared with Ignatius the intellectual habitus of using the “wilderness” imagery in 
communicating the existentialist’s situation.26 In the Exercises, the “prison-cage” as “in 
exile among brute animals” may even be considered as “classical” in the sense that 
                                                   
23 Ong, Barbarian, 249.  
24 James Carey. “Communication and Economics.” In James Carey: A Critical Reader, edited by Eve 
Stryker Munson and Catherine A. Warren (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 60.  
25 Ong, Barbarian, 249.  
26 Ong, Barbarian, 240.  
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Ignatius’ viewpoint was not far from Aristotle’s saying that “But who is unable to live in 
a society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast 
or a god: he is no part of the state.”27 To be more straightforward, both Aristotle and 
Ignatius presupposed communication, while they also left some room for Plato’s 
insistence on the “idea” as an appropriate term for purely cognitive beings (with no 
human body), which for Aristotle was “either a beast or a god” and for Ignatius, either “a 
devil or an angel” that precedes communication. To put this into a question: what is the 
pre-phenomenological or where is the beginning of a phenomenological perception?  
Now, Aristotle’s “a beast or a god” was closer to the Platonic ideal: if indeed for 
an animal, there is only “this-ness” without the problem of having to bring “this” into 
presence with communication while “this” is physically absent, an animal is outside the 
polis as much as it is beyond the polis. But given the innate difficulty of the Exercises as 
asking the exercitants to know something that they have not known yet, in comparison to 
Aristotle’s philosophical reasoning, Ignatius was more attentive to the beginning of a 
phenomenological perception that necessarily involves confronting the complexity of 
self-consciousness or simply the “I”. Therefore, Ignatius did not make the “prison-cage” 
imagery easy: “I” (the whole composite of body and soul) am the “prison”, and “I” am in 
exile among brute animals in which the “prison” becomes a “cage”. Ong had this better:  
The world outside the self is potential self, in that the self is continuously 
seeking to exist toward it, to assimilate it, but it will not assimilate, it will 
cooperate only negatively, giving force to the self by contrast. This world, 
marked off by the body, is inhabited by brute animals as symbols of pure 
                                                   
27 Aristotle. Politics (Oxford University Press, 1998), 11. 
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otherness, almost-selves which are nevertheless not selves at all. They are 
the un-contained. They are those beyond the pale, outside the prison-wall. 
Their presence shows why this prison is both stronghold and cage, 
partaking of the ambivalent situation of the human consciousness, where 
the notion of estrangement from others and that self-containment are 
complementary. The interplay of the two notions of self-perception and 
self-limitation thus produces the inevitable awkwardness in St. Ignatius’ 
picture, in which that which causes the soul embarrassment (the “prison-
cage) at the same time affords protection from the brute animals who 
would swallow man up in pure other ness.28  
From Ong’s elaboration on the philosophy of the “prison-cage”, in terms of the rhetorical 
part of “the inevitable awkwardness in St. Ignatius’ picture”, to say the least, in the actual 
practice of the Exercises, knowing that Ignatius did not make it easy, the exercitants had 
to examine the “prison-cage” imagery meticulously.  
As a side note, in order to understand the emblematical element in the “prison-
cage”, it should be worthwhile to take a moment to examine F. R. Leavis’ insight into 
Shakespeare’s built-in movements in Macbeth. And this should help us better understand 
both the Ignatian emblem and the interpretive method. The imagery under scrutiny 
follows.  
Macbeth: If we should fail, -  
Lady Macbeth:                     We fail!  
But screw your courage to the sticking place, 
                                                   
28 Ong, Barbarian, 252.  
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And we’ll not fail.29 
As Leavis reported, when the Arden editor of Macbeth tried to understand the 
emblematical “screw your courage to the sticking place”, he indeed experienced three 
interpretive stages. 1) At first, the editor considered the imagery as screwing the cord of a 
musical instrument to the right place, but the harmony of the adjusted musical instrument 
would not fit into the radical existentialism which Macbeth was cast into. 2) Then, the 
imagery was discerned as screwing a crossbow to the striking place, which should 
prepare the audiences with the upcoming violence by revealing the violent activities in 
Macbeth’s mind. 3) Eventually, the editor recognized that the crossbow should 
necessarily become a longbow, since Macbeth himself would have to hold the longbow at 
the sticking place all night for making the terrible decision (instead of the sticking place 
being mechanically held in place as with the crossbow).  
Here, if we may call “screw your courage to the sticking place” as the “crossbow-
longbow” imagery, this would not be far from Ong’s calling “the whole composite as in 
exile among brute animals” as the “prison-cage” imagery. Therein, we may notice Ong 
was an English professor who taught the Exercises similarly to Leavis’ teaching 
Macbeth, which indeed gave us a good impression of being at the frontier of literary 
criticism around the 1960s. More precisely, it should be said that both Ong and Leavis 
were in the hermeneutic tradition to which Ignatius also necessarily belonged – things 
themselves can signify, and in particular when signifying the existentialist’s situation.  
In terms of the interpretive method, as the Arden editor experienced three stages 
of development from “musical instrument” to “crossbow” and to “longbow”, it should be 
                                                   
29 William Shakespeare. Arden Shakespeare Complete Works (London: Arden Shakespeare, 1998), 780.   
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reasonable to deem that Ignatius also asked the exercitants to examine the imagery 
meticulously so that the exercitants would not stop at the initial misinterpretations – 
Ignatius reminded, “I say, the whole composite, soul and body.” And in terms of the 
emblematical element, in comparison to the awkwardness of the emblematics in the 
“prison-cage”, Shakespeare’s “crossbow-longbow”, though with more elegance to imply 
the hidden shift from “decision-making” to “decision-made” (the terrible existential 
situation into which Macbeth was persuaded), indeed shared with Ignatius the habit of 
using emblems or para-emblems on the existentialist’s situation. But Ong’s essay did not 
end here by concluding that since the existential situation must be communicated 
indirectly, it should be better communicated with emblematical metaphors with implicit 
patterns of development. Ong moved on to the difficulty of “media”.   
IV.  
In the fourth section, Ong eventually touched upon media ecology in saying that 
“the Ignatian image, like a television set, picks up a pattern which exists independently of 
it.”30 This sentence has many comprehensive difficulties, and the major one must be 
within “like a television set”, which is not without a McLuhanian sense of using one 
media (in this case, “television”) to understand its media archeological predecessor (in 
this case, “the Ignatian image”).31 But as stated, Ong was more cautious than McLuhan in 
using media analogies; in the above quote Ong must have a particular reason to highlight 
the media element in the Ignatian image. We should focus on revealing the rationale in 
Ong’s first statement on the media element of the Exercises in the field of media ecology.  
                                                   
30 Ong, Barbarian, 255.  
31 See Marshall McLuhan and Eric McLuhan. Laws of Media: The New Science (University of Toronto 
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From Evan Illich,32 we have learned that “tools” are different from “objects”. For 
a radical example, as Zhang contended, when a good rider “uses” the horse, he will not 
do anything contrary to the horse’s nature. The horse is simply moving within its own 
nature, and the rider is heading towards his destination bodily unhurried and spiritually 
firm. Therefore, as much as there is no horse being ride, there is also no rider on the 
saddle.33 To put this “man-horse” aphorism (notably an emblematical image) more 
straightforwardly, the defining character of a good tool is indeed that when we use it, the 
tool disappears into usage. And this is the case of many “convivial” tools we use in daily 
life. 
From Lewis Mumford, we then have the term “machine-tool” as Mumford’s 
teaching the complexity of “media” as a compound of “machine” and “tool”. For 
example, the bridge should be a “tool” when we use it. When we walk on the bridge, the 
bridge disappears into usage, and we are using the space provided by the bridge. But 
when we look at the bridge from some distance, the bridge then becomes a “machine” 
with its own automatism of traffic lights, lanes, cars and people passing through and etc. 
As Kenneth Burke fondly pointed out, the economical design of the bridge can be a huge 
psychological relief for a mind in troublesome thoughts34 – the real bridge can be the 
Platonic “ideal” if one is not on the bridge.  
To take a step forward, the “machine-tool” is the twofold direction of media: if 
the bridge is a “tool” when in usage and a “machine” when in examination, from “tool” 
to “machine” we focus on technological development, and from “machine” to “tool” we 
                                                   
32 See Evan Illich. Tools for Conviviality (New York: Harper & Row, 1980).  
33 McLuhan and Zhang, “Poetics”, 60.  
34 Kenneth Burke. Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose (University of California Press, 
1984), 83.  
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focus on human cognition and imagination. And this is the reason that the “crossbow-
longbow” metaphor (from “machine” to “tool”) would work. Were it from longbow to 
crossbow, Macbeth’s existential situation would be lost into the total passivity of being 
persuaded by Lady Macbeth.  
In Marshall McLuhan and his son Eric McLuhan, this kind of two-directional 
inner logic of the “machine-tool” was better captured in the “laws of media”. In 
particular, the McLuhans pointed out that it is not that from “tool” to “machine”, there is 
mere technological development; rather, this development simply asks for a different 
kind of imagination. For example, in Marshall McLuhan’s observation, the invention of 
the bicycle (a tool largely considered to be convivial in today’s urban communication) 
has already made the invention of the airplane possible, but it took another hundred years 
for the Wright brothers (who were bicyclists) to recognize the airplane as a para-
rhetorical variation and extension of the bicycle.  
Now, as stated, Ong was less interested in predicting machines in the future with 
today’s tools, and he was more interested in the existential implication from “machine” to 
“tool” (from “television” to “the Ignatian image”), which was more salient in 
Shakespeare’s “crossbow-longbow” but also implicit in Ignatius “prison-cage”. Therein, 
Ong allowed us to study the media element in the Exercises, with the caution that 
Ignatius did not dissect the symbolic meaning of things – Ignatius was after all a 
companion of Jesus who used things like “five loaves and two fishes” to remark on a 
communication theory strictly within communication. To say it fondly, if McLuhan was 
the head of media ecology, Ong was the heart of the field. At the end of the essay, Ong 
said,  
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After all, the abiding worth of the Spiritual Exercises lies here: not that 
they provide some sort of system independent of the self, of engagement, 
of making a choice, but that they are a technique of engagement, of 
making a choice which has never been made before and can never be 
made again. They confront the self and the real.35 
By “technique of engagement”, Ong set the standard high in terms of communicating 
communication – we shall communicate communication within communication. To 
conclude, it is good to have Fr. Ong to insist on this particular kind of emblem in which 
the author re-fuses to deconstruct communication.36 If indeed the Greek emblems are by 
nature hermeneutically constructive as there is nothing to deconstruct, modern emblem 
book writers had to choose how to communicate communication. With this, let us move 
onto Presence of the Word as phenomenological methods that entered into the diachronic 
order of the spoken word.  
Presence of the Word  
In the first chapter of Presence, Ong proposed that cultural and religious studies 
can be approached by studying the sensorium organization. Keeping in mind that Ignatius 
asked the exercitants to apply five senses into the mediations, what Ong meant by “the 
shifting sensorium”37 at the beginning of Presence may be examined in relation to the 
Exercises.  
From the previous section, we have reached a media ecological take on the word-
image dynamic. Simply put, to think of the image as the technological development of 
                                                   
35 Ong, Barbarian, 257.  
36 See Briankle Chang. Deconstructing Communication (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1996).  
37 Ong, Presence, 1.  
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the word (from tool to machine) involves a built-in ecology to in turn enable existential 
examinations on the spoken word (from machine to tool). On the Exercises, Ignatius 
lived in a time when it was meaningful to make a choice if to keep the image close to the 
word or to move directly into the written word. And this choice was relevant not only to 
the Reformation and the iconoclasm (the “picture storm”), but also to the humanists’ 
stronger grasp of the Greek rhetorical tradition. Therein, some sort of reorganization of 
rhetoric had to be undertaken in that there was a conundrum in assuming some “genuine 
interiority” within the Greek rhētorikē, while a Greek rhetorician would know nowhere 
else to be other than within the commonplace tradition.38 As Auerbach pointed out, how 
Homer should make sure the audiences always knew what he knew was because of the 
rich repertoire of “formulaic expressions” owned collectively within the Greek culture, 
and the oral poets like Homer simply had them better.39  
Of course, by “reorganizing rhetoric”, this is not to say the Christian humanists 
had to forcefully insert an interiority into rhetoric. First of all, as Havelock pointed out 
elaborately in the Muse, the early Renaissance was not the first time that the oral-
rhetorical tradition was reorganized, and more or less, rhetoric was indeed the outcome of 
“the Muses learned to write” in the sense of the consonant as the convivial tool within the 
technology of writing. The ancient Greek culture, if judging from Plato’s account for 
Socrates’ philosophical dialogues, was still quite an oral one. The citizens of the polis 
simply had little need to be alone. Moreover, it was only till modernity, at least judging 
                                                   
38 The modern portrait of a rhetorician to be a hero of social reformations might produce more confusions 
than real changes. For the hero, some commonplace must be questioned, while for the rhetorician, to 
persuade by poking fun at the commonplace would create a conundrum for being at the edge of the 
commonplace.  
39 Auerbach, Mimesis, 7 
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from Nietzsche’s writing that we felt somewhat rebellious against the Apollonian (the 
Greek god of education) public life as bright as the sun, from which we began to 
“deconstruct” the rhetorical tradition by categorizing art (and poetics in particular) into 
the realm of Dionysian unconsciousness.40  
In the context of the early Renaissance, there were multiple proposals for this 
reorganization of rhetoric in the shifting sensorium from writing (visual-tactile) to 
printing (exclusively visual), which were implied in works like the Exercises as a good 
example in itself. And given our analysis on the emblematical nuances in the “prison-
cage”, Ignatius inherited this intellectual habitus in which the word-image dynamic was 
not polemicized. Here, it may be specified that nowhere in Ignatius’ writing did he 
directly comment on the Reformation and iconoclasm. In this sense, the Exercises may be 
read strictly as a work on communication.   
Now, to move back to the first chapter of Presence which may be understood as 
Ong’s implicitly comparing the early Renaissance (in particular the Exercises) with his 
own historical moment, the phenomenon Ong observed was that: the well-trained ears in 
the 20th century, when being applied to cultural and religious studies, have been 
producing some very nuanced phenomenological work. For a brief literature review, this 
phenomenology of sound was the interpretative framework first employed by Albert Lord 
and Milman Parry at the frontier of doing anthropological work in Yugoslavia around the 
1930s. The framework was then developed by Eric Havelock in the 1960s to understand 
the triumph and the trouble of the Greek institutionalizing rhetoric. Around the same 
                                                   
40 In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche used “Apollonian and Dionysian” to pinpoint the true dialectics of the 
Greek culture, with “Apollonian” (the Greek god of sun) being the sun-bright clarity of the analytical mind, 
and “Dionysian” (the Greek god of wine) being the drunken ecstasy of the creative mind. Nietzsche 
categorized “art” into the realm of Dionysus.  
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time, Perry Miller (who was Ong’s teacher in Harvard) should be the first one to relate 
the American ethos to the “wilderness” imago in the framework of cultural studies.41 As a 
Jesuit, Ong simply joined in this phenomenology of sound by offering a built-in 
perspective on Catholicism and the American personalism (Ong was an American 
scholar). In many ways, Ong practiced the Exercises by teaching communication with the 
new discoveries in the “noosphere”.42 For example, in Fighting for Life, the newly 
discovered details in animal studies (which was then used to support human behaviorism) 
were used by Ong as supporting the rhetorical temper of communication in general.43 In 
Fighting, Ong was able to make an argument like the following: the industrial 
masculinity can be understood as the counterbalance to thousands years of the matrilineal 
society in the Paleolithic and Neolithic time – here, the rhetorical grandeur in the polemic 
between “industrial masculinity” and “matrilineal society” was powerfully heuristic, not 
without a good sense of being oratorical.  
Among contemporary scholars of media studies, some criticized Ong for 
promoting a theology of “secondary orality”, and the main critique was that electronic 
communication should not be reduced to a phenomenology of sound alone, since 
electronic media have triggered a wholesome change in information and 
communication.44 Keeping “the shifting sensorium” in mind, this kind of critique of 
secondary orality should be precisely the outcome of the choice made by the early 
Renaissance men to further exteriorize the presence of the word with the printing press. 
                                                   
41 See Perry Miller. The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961).  
42 Ong’s “sensorium” can be understood as complementary to Teilhard de Chardin’s “noosphere”.  
43 Walter Ong. Fighting for Life: Contest, Sexuality, and Consciousness (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1981). 
44 See Jonathan Sterne. “The Theology of Sound: A Critique of Orality.” The Canadian Journal of 
Communication 36 (2011): 207-255.  
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The tactile intimacy within the electronic media (e.g. computer keyboard, touchpad, 
earplugs and etc.) is more or less an emergency solution to the elimination of sound with 
the printing press. Today’s effort to reorganize the ratio of senses with the electronic 
media should be in a heuristic parallel to the early Renaissance men’s technological-
existential situation. Therein, in “Ritual and Movement as Communication Media”, 
Soukup provide a way to read Presence of the Word in comparison with Jacques Ellul’s 
Humiliation of the Word.45 And a comparison between Presence and Humiliation should 
clarify two different perspectives on the word-image dynamic arguably as extensions of 
the rationales and critiques of iconoclasm.  
It should be clarified beforehand that both Ong and Ellul were openly supportive 
of a rhetorical education. In Humiliation, Ellul specifically said that,  
A person who has been trained in rhetoric, in the strict sense of the word, 
can no longer learn in any other way. His thinking necessarily takes place 
in the world of reasoning, dialectic, analysis, and synthesis. This is not 
without its dangers, of course: we are aware that words can be abused. We 
know how an illusion allows us to take these symbols for reality, and how 
empty talk sometimes fails to be attached to anything concrete. Sometimes 
confusion between rhetorical reasons and reason exists. But these abuses 
in no way affect the authenticity of the intellectual mechanism that is 
formed by and for the word.46 
                                                   
45 Soukup, “Ritual and Movement”.  
46 Jacques Ellul. The Humiliation of the Word (William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1985), 210. 
Original work in French published in 1981. 
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But as Soukup emphasized, for Ellul, word and image belong to two separate realms of 
communication, and it is only within the Incarnation of Jesus Christ that these two realms 
with an innate conflict can be reconciled. In other words, one has to be as good as Christ 
in conquering the synchronicity of the poetic perceptions so as to conquer the situation of 
communicating communication strictly within the spoken word.47 For Ong, word and 
image, although with different ways to signify, belong to the same world of symbolism 
into which Jesus’ rhetoric and poetics were built. In other words, the presence of the 
word is both between man and man and between man and nature, or in Buber’s words, 
the twofold nature of “I-Thou” and “I-It”.48 
Now, Ellul had an important point of view. In the history of visual 
communication, word and image were often combined in monstrous ways. For example, 
in the Chinese saying “bird dies for food, and man dies for fortune”, the rhetorical 
argument in “man dies for fortune” was complemented by the imagery of “bird dies for 
food”. The imagery of “bird dies for food,” which came from the realm of reality, 
provided “evidences” for the bad argument of “man dies for fortune”, while the argument 
itself can find little support in the realm of words. More straightforwardly, the image runs 
the risk of being too real to the degree of cancelling out the “rhetorical process of 
dialectics, analysis, and synthesis”. If this was the rationale for iconoclasm, we should 
agree with Ellul that many common sayings should better be forgotten.  
On the other hand, as Soukup explained, the semiotics in Roman Catholicism is 
that the sign is composed of one signifier with another signifier. In other words, the 
                                                   
47  Kierkegaard made a similar argument in “Of the Difference between a Genius and an Apostle”. See 
Soren Kierkegaard. The Present Age. Translated by Alexander Dru (Harper Torchbooks, 1962).  
48 Martin Buber. I and Thou. Translated by Walter Kauffmann (New York: Touchstone, 1996). Originally 
published in 1970.   
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image cannot be the signified of the word in Roman Catholicism. And the semiotics of 
one signifier with another signifier was certainly the essence of McLuhan’s method of 
“probes”, as the two faces of Janus who was the Roman god of beginnings and endings.49 
Yet within Ong, one signifier with another signifier can also be understood as the 
beginning of a phenomenological perception in the presence of the word – not only in the 
kid’s communicative desire in catching the movement of a kangaroo (one signifier, the 
thing) by exclaiming “look, mom, a kangaroo (another signifier, the word)”, but also in 
the young adults’ existential situation of having to move things intellectually, otherwise 
in silent stillness, with the evanescence of the spoken word (one signifier, “I”) that lingers 
in the air for a moment so that the meaning can be caught by another man (another 
signifier, “You”).50 And the latter seems to be the essence of Ignatius’ asking the 
exercitants to use all five senses in meditating on something visible. With such dynamics 
between the emblematics in “something invisible” and the sensorium organization in 
“something visible”, let us move onto Ong’s work on Gerard Manley Hopkins’ 
appropriation of the Exercises. 
Hopkins, the Self and God  
If indeed the Spiritual Exercises (in itself more of a manual than of a literary 
work) may be understood as a particular kind of rhetorical organization that asked the 
exercitants to provide the content that the Exercises deserved, the Jesuit poet Gerard 
Manley Hopkins then provided the content of “Victorian particularism” within which 
                                                   
49See James Morrison. “Marshall McLuhan: The Modern Janus.” In Perspectives on Culture, Technology 
and Communication: The Media Ecology Tradition, edited by Casey M. K. Lum. (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton 
Press, 2006), 163–200. 
50 See Calvin Troup. “Walter Ong in the Present Moment of Truth.” Explorations in Media Ecology 11. 3/4 
(2013): 243.  
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Hopkins wrote his poems with a “panegyric accuracy” in detailing the natural, historical 
and spiritual details.51 In the second part of Hopkins, Ong contended that Hopkins’ 
particularism was a distinctive praxis of the Exercises. Ong said,  
Ignatius’ particularist prescriptivism in the Spiritual Exercises represents 
not simply a religious phenomenon but an advanced analytic 
consciousness in some general way en route to Victorian particularism. 
But the Victorian particularist state of mind, as has been seen, 
characteristically concerned itself not so much with methodological or 
procedural details as with exactly articulated attention to physical 
particularities and to interior states of mind, both of which intrigued 
Hopkins. Is there anything in the Spiritual Exercise that would encourage 
precisely these concerns. There is, and certain effects are spectacularly 
evident in Hopkins.52 
This “spectacular evidence” was not only in that Hopkins wrote poems to practice the 
Exercises, but more importantly, unlike the Exercises was sometimes understood as a 
“memory theater” in silence, Hopkins’ particularism was unequivocally vocal. The poet 
himself indicated that some of his poems were meant to be read aloud, and in particular 
with a “sprung rhythm”.53 This phenomenology of sound in Hopkins’ poems (even in the 
“terrible sonnets” that Hopkins wrote in his late Dublin years) should be significant for 
Ong to consider Hopkins as a powerful interpretive entrance into the Exercises. 
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53 See Ong, Reader, 111.  
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To be more specific, Hopkins embodied the Exercises and made the Ignatian 
images more vocal. The emblems in Hopkins’ poems should be good case studies for the 
Ignatian meditation, especially as counterparts to the Cartesian meditations. The 
American personalists often used “journals” as a form of philosophical thought, it can be 
neglected that Descartes’ mediations, in which the enquiring self overlapped with the 
narrative self, were more prevalent in American personalism.54 More straightforwardly, 
with “journals”, there was an innate bias towards meditating on something visible. On 
this, Ong provided some of Hopkins’ personal notes when mediating on the Ignatian 
“composite of places”.  
Now, in the previous section, we have noticed the dynamic between meditating on 
“something visible” and meditating on “something invisible” in the first prelude of the 
First Exercises. In Hopkins, this dynamic between the visible and the invisible in 
Ignatian images simply became more understandable. As Ong reported, when Hopkins 
meditated on “something visible” as in the Last Supper where Ignatius asked the 
exercitants to “see the persons at the Supper”, to “listen to their conversation” and to “see 
what they are doing”, Hopkins noted,     
All the places are at some point of the compass and we may face towards 
them: so every real person living or dead or to come has his quarter in the 
round of being, is lodged onewhere and not anywhere, and the mind has a 
real direction towards him. We are to realise this here of ‘the persons of 
the Supper’: as we have got the orientation of the room, its true 
                                                   
54 See Henry Bugbee. The Inward Morning: A Philosophical Exploration in Journal Form (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1976).    
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measurements and specifications, probably furnished it and so on, so now 
we are properly to people it and give it true personallings.55 
On “something visible”, Hopkins’ interpretation was not emblematical, and more of a 
general order of perception from the scene to the agent. Ong’s point here was that 
Hopkins did not consider describing the physical details in conflict with the “peopling” of 
the scene; the scene was more or less the witness for the agent.56 Though not 
emblematical, Hopkins’ imagination had a sculptural gesture – especially as in “every 
real person … is lodged onewhere and not anywhere, and the mind has a real direction 
towards him” – which can be attributed to the merit of the movable types for 
remembering the “peopling” by positioning them in particular places one after another.  
However, from movable types to the printing press, it became more difficult to 
distinguish sculptural weight from visual cliché due to the copia of the printing press. 
With such difficulty, it was a common practice among Renaissance painters to craft a 
small landscape that receded into the background, behind the main body of the painting. 
And we may call this “the built-in landscape” or “the painting within the painting”. 
Therein, the effort to catch the background details within the smallest scale can certainly 
be understood as a built-in antidote to becoming a visual cliché that imposed the main 
theme of the imagery upon the viewers. We may call this “cogito interruptus”57 in the 
sense that a powerful interruption to the topoi could be helpful to the interpretative 
process. But by crafting such a perspective beyond which the human eyes can reach, the 
                                                   
55 Ong, Hopkins, 74  
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more on the scene, the less on the agent. This is part of the New Criticism element in Burke, as for Gerard 
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painter indeed asked the viewers to pay attention to two things at a time – the event and 
the landscape, almost to the degree of the event’s “speaking” to the viewers and the 
landscape’s “whispering”. It is noteworthy that around the same time of Renaissance, the 
Chinese painters would exchange the figure and the ground – the person was often built 
into the landscape. When in comparison, the vocal and personalistic element in Hopkins’ 
“peopling” the room should be salient.  
In Hopkins, Ong also had critical concerns with the visual clichés of the printing 
press which could be even more repetitive than the oral poets’ formulaic expressions that 
still required improvisation in front of the audiences. As Ong observed,  
Emblem books, which greatly influenced many literary genre (Daly), 
presented individual illustrations in woodcuts or mental engravings 
accompanied by detailed commentary pointing out the particular persons 
or animals or objects or actions in a given print from which moralizing or 
other useful conclusions were to be drawn … emblem books were a new 
genre because they are a print product: they require that the graphic 
presentation be the same in every copy so that the text, which is the same 
in every copy, has exactly the identical texts … so that soon the text is 
referring to details that are not present or are present in impossibly altered 
form.58 
In the above quote, Ong almost considered the emblem as the product of the movable 
types, and the emblem book as the product of the printing press. Ong cautioned that the 
text in the emblem book could be even more vulnerable to the repetitive pattern of the 
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printing press, especially given the comic nature of the emblem in which the Renaissance 
realism was not a necessary component.59 The question could be then: if the moral wit 
within the emblem book was particularly vulnerable to the printing press, was there any 
proto-media ecological concern among the emblem book writers, and in particular in 
Hopkins’ using the emblems?   
This question may allow us to deem that if indeed part of the emblem book 
writers’ intention was precisely to be the counterpart of Renaissance realism, they were 
more likely to be aware of the essential effort as emphasizing the imagerial symbolic 
economy weakened by the copia of the printing press. Not far from the comic book 
writers today, the emblem book writers were to challenge the repetitive dullness 
augmented by the printing press, though without the comic book writers’ desire to mock 
at the redundancy of orality.60 In other words, the early emblem book writers almost 
demanded a proto-phenomenological approach to the commonplace imageries in order to 
avoid visual clichés. 
This shared situation among users of the emblem should help us better understand 
Hopkins’ emblems. Again in Ong’s report, on the Principle and Foundation in the 
Exercises, Hopkins noted,   
Within a certain bounding line all will be self, outside of it nothing; with it 
self begins from one side and ends from the other. I look through my eye 
and the window and the air; the eye is my eye and of me and me, the 
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windowpane is my windowpane but not of me nor me. A self then will 
consist of a centre and a surrounding area or circumference, of a point of 
reference and a belonging field, the latter set out, as surveyors etc say 
from the former; of two elements, which we may call the insert and the 
outsetting or the display.61  
And in the Principle and Foundation, Ignatius’ writing was:  
Human beings are created to praise, reverence, and serve God our Lord, 
and by means of doing this to save their souls. / The other things on the 
face of the earth are created for the human beings, to help them in the 
pursuit of the end for which they are created. / From this it follows that we 
ought to use these things to the extent that they help us towards our end, 
and free ourselves from them to the extent that they hinder us from it. / To 
attain this it is necessary to make ourselves indifferent to all created 
things, in regard to everything which is left to our freewill and is not 
forbidden. Consequently, on our own part we ought not to seek health 
rather than sickness, wealth rather than poverty, honor rather than 
dishonor, a long life rather than a short one, and so on in all other matters. 
/ Rather, we ought to desire and choose only that which is more 
conductive to the end for which we are created.62 
Hopkins’ take on the Principle and Foundation turned out to be the best kind of 
hermeneutic phenomenology on the “prison-cage” imagery. He almost felt it naturally to 
relate the logos in the Principle and Foundation (which Ignatius crafted carefully) to the 
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mythos of the “prison-cage” imagery in the first prelude of the First Exercise. To say the 
least, Hopkins’ emblem, especially as in “the eye is my eye and of me and me, the 
windowpane is my windowpane but not of me nor me”, made Principle and Foundation 
less vulnerable to doctrinaire readings. Ong compared Hopkins’ particularism with the 
modernist Jesuit, George Tyrell’s, note on the Principle and Foundation. And Tyrell 
wrote,   
Not only must we perforce think of the spirit or real self, in terms of the 
body or apparent self, but we must also think of its timeless and indivisible 
action in terms of those appearances to which its action relates.63  
In Tyrell, the interpretation was rendered too assertively without the same kind of 
discernment that Hopkins communicated with the emblematical imagery.  
Moreover, it may be clarified that Hopkins’ emblem was indeed different from 
the Romanticists’ who also resorted to the daily experience for poetic moments. In his 
note on Principle and Foundation, Hopkins’ everydayness had a clear contention that “I” 
am, after all, within my senses and not the things: unlike the Romanticists such as 
Wordsworth’s “I wandered lonely as a cloud” in which Wordsworth chose not to 
distinguish “I” from the “cloud”, Hopkins felt it indispensable to specify that “the eye is 
my eye and of me and me, the windowpane is my windowpane but not of me nor me.” To 
put this more straightforwardly, different from Wordsworth’s bias towards perceiving the 
phenomenology of word as between man and nature, Hopkins problematized the subject-
object interplay by confronting himself respectively within the senses and without the 
things. And this self-confrontation was the very emblematical part in Hopkins’ 
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meditation – the compound image of the “of-me-and-me” eye and the “not-of-me-nor-
me” windowpane.  
With this kind of complexities in Hopkins’ using emblems, in Hopkins, Ong 
called for more research to relate the Ignatian “composite of places” to the emblem book 
in the Renaissance. Ong said,  
The composition of place likewise has a general cultural matrix, but one 
not at all so old. It is not biblical or classical: early cultures do not attend 
with this conscious clinical objectivity to specific visual details, and they 
certainly do not verbalize careful visual descriptions. Roland Barthes 
associates the composition of place with the “view” paintings becoming 
current in Ignatius’ day, such A View of Naples - although Ignatius is not 
particularly interested in landscape as such, but rather in physical 
surroundings as bearing on persons, who are his basic interest … So far as 
I know, the patent correspondence between features of Ignatian prayer and 
emblem books has never been studied or even previously adverted to. 
Interestingly, Ignatius was Spanish and the Spanish Netherlands were a 
major center of emblem book publishing.64  
In the quote above, Ong almost contended that the “composite of places” was indeed the 
“new media” in Ignatius’ time, and the difficulty of visualizing the emblem never 
occurred to the biblical writers and the Grecian emblem writers – they simply used the 
written words. But for the emblem book writers in Renaissance, this visualization should 
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be a complex representational difficulty, especially with the discovery of “view” or 
methods of seeing in general. 
To extend Ong’s concerns with visualizing the emblems, if we may consider 
Hopkins’ compound image of the “of-me-and-me” eye and the “not-of-me-nor-me” 
windowpane as a phenomenological description with the intention to be 
phenomenological, this phenomenological description on the experience of “I see through 
the windowpane” more or less had to be followed by a phenomenological reduction so as 
to make an argument for the merit of being rhetorical. This moral-phenomenological 
reduction in using the emblem as a “metaphor” with a signified meaning should be even 
more complex than visualizing the emblem straightforwardly. For example, I have in 
mind that at the end of The Abolition of Man, C. S. Lewis also borrowed from the 
symbolic meaning of “seeing through a window”. Lewis wrote,  
The whole point of seeing through something is to see something through 
it. It is good that the window should be transparent, because the street or 
garden beyond it is opaque. How if you saw through the garden too? It is 
no use trying to see through first principles. If you see through everything, 
then everything is transparent. But a wholly transparent world is an 
invisible world. To “see through” all things is the same as not to see.65 
In the context of weighing the dynamic between science and truth, Lewis used the 
phenomenological complexity in “seeing through the window” to make the argument that 
one should not see through all things. The discernment was then: “am I seeing through 
this for a reason” which was necessarily a reduction of the phenomenological perception. 
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Since the emblem originally had a variety of different meanings, to choose one signified 
from the pool of meanings should be an ethical choice in itself. In comparison to Lewis, 
Hopkins seems to carry the intention of maintaining the original phenomenological 
complexity in using the emblem.   
Conclusions 
To conclude, in this chapter we have examined three keynote publications of 
Ong’s more direct work on the Spiritual Exercises from 1954 to 1986. Within roughly 
thirty years of work, Ong started with being interested in the media-mandala element of 
the Exercises that was “like a television set”, and ended by pointing this media element 
towards the emblem book in the early Renaissance. For the current project, Ong’s work 
was significant to understanding the First Week of the Exercises as the birth of a strong 
moral consciousness, with the beginning of a phenomenological perception being 
communicated emblematically.  
Of course, more reviews can be done to extend Ong’s appropriation of the 
Exercises, to list a few, from the critique of American personalism that the American 
personalists simply could not get rid of the “things” as the phenomenology of “I-it”,66 to 
the critique of the intellectual bluntness in Jonathan Swift whose political satire should be 
the symptom of a overly reduced English emblem tradition,67 and to the critique of 
“cyclicism” in secondary orality with which the poetic structure was understood as the 
miniature of the repetitive nature of the world – such as the wheel of the nature from 
spring (birth), to summer (youth), to fall (sick), to winter (death) and to spring again 
(rebirth) – while the poetic-phenomenological perceptions were much more driven by the 
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particularities.68 As the critical urgency itself indicated, Ong as a Catholic thinker was 
deeply concerned with how to rightfully reorganize the dynamic between 
phenomenological complexities (sensus) and the noetic economy (nous).   
To say it radically, Ong’s work was to extend St. Ignatius’ difficulty in the 
Exercises of teaching the exercitants to know something that they have not known yet, 
which was similar to the built-in difficulty in orality studies of having to understand 
orality with literacy. In both cases, the emblematics should be a necessary awkwardness 
of the mind at the edge of knowing, within which the rhetorical contingency had a real 
reason to exist.  
With this, we may end this chapter with one of Ong’s own emblems in Orality on 
the situation of knowing:  
Thinking of oral tradition or a heritage of oral performance, genres and 
styles as ‘oral literature’ is rather like thinking of horses as automobiles 
without wheels. You can, of course, undertake to do this. Imagine writing 
a treatise on horses (for people who have never seen a horse) which starts 
with the concept not of horse but of ‘automobile’, built on the readers’ 
direct experience of automobiles. It proceeds to discourse on horses by 
always referring to them as ‘wheelless automobiles’, explaining to highly 
automobilized readers who have never seen a horse all the points of 
difference in an effort to excise all idea of ‘automobile’ out of the concept 
‘wheelless automobile’ so as to invest the term with a purely equine 
meaning. Instead of wheels, the wheelless automobiles have enlarged 
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toenails called hooves; instead of headlights or perhaps rear-vision 
mirrors, eyes; instead of a coat of lacquer, something called hair; instead 
of gasoline for fuel, hay, and so on. In the end, horses are only what they 
are not. No matter how accurate and thorough such apophatic description, 
automobile-driving readers who have never seen a horse and who hear 
only of ‘wheelless automobiles’ would be sure to come away with a 
strange concept of a horse. The same is true of those who deal in terms of 
‘oral literature’, that is, ‘oral writing’. You cannot without serious and 
disabling distortion describe a primary phenomenon by starting with a 
subsequent secondary phenomenon and paring away the differences. 
Indeed, starting backwards in this way—putting the car before the horse—
you can never become aware of the real differences at all. 
If indeed the situation of having to perceive the “horse” from the “wheelless automobile” 
(as a machine-tool imagination that implies both the movement from tool to machine, and 
the movement from machine to tool) was not far from the situation of having to 
understand the “oral image” from the Ignatian emblem (as a phenomenological analysis 
that both moves towards phenomenological interpretation and moves back to the original 
phenomenological description), we should simply examine the Ignatian emblem as 
meticulously as possible. With this, let us move towards the next chapter, with the second 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Quill Pen within the Emblem Book: Further Explorations into the “Prison-
cage” Emblem 
In the previous chapter, I have reviewed Ong’s appropriation of the Spiritual 
Exercises, in particular the way Ong could help us better understand the emblematical 
nuances in Ignatius. With Ong, my arguments were that: 1) the “prison-cage” was 
emblematical not only in the sense that the imagery formed a rhetorical generality for the 
well-known difficulty of decision-making, but more importantly, this image compound 
provided phenomenological accounts for making a decision that has never been made 
before. And the rhetorical connection within was between man and man, and with a 
strong demand for an even more intense personalism. 2) In the light of Hopkins’ note on 
the Principle and Foundation, the mythos in the “prison-cage” was also complementary 
to the logos in Ignatius’ dialectical reasoning in Principle and Foundation. As Ong 
pointed out, this kind of dialectical movement could be understood with St. Thomas 
Aquinas’ presenting an argument in the form of “question, objection and reply to 
objection” in Summa Theologica in that Aquinas knew no other way but in imitation of 
dialogues.1 3) Within the framework of semiotic phenomenology,2 we should be able to 
examine the ratios between and among phenomenological description, reduction and 
interpretation within being emblematical. Here, to take the example of the media 
ecologists, McLuhan favored the phenomenological interpretation in almost challenging 
the audiences by asking, “do you know that you know?”, and Ong preferred to be 
                                                   
1 Ong, Hopkins, 17.  
2 See Richard L. Lanigan. The Human Science of Communicology: A Phenomenology of Discourse in 
Foucault and Merleau-Ponty (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1992), 21.  
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phenomenologically descriptive in examining the situation of “I am trying to know”. In 
this chapter, we shall also take a closer look at the history of consciousness within 
considering the “prison-cage” as a phenomenological reduction of Ignatius’ original 
narrative. The point is to highlight the three stages of making an emblem – from “motto”, 
to “image” and to “epigram” as a built-in semiotic-phenomenological perception.  
Accordingly, in chapter three, I want to further develop Ong’s exploration into the 
media-communication dynamic in the Ignatian emblems. The “prison-cage” emblem 
should be a good case study for the beginning of a phenomenological perception since the 
First Week of the Exercises was also the birth of a strong moral consciousness. Ignatius 
felt it naturally to teach the beginning of a phenomenological perception with the moral-
phenomenological reduction.  
In this chapter, I will start with a comprehensive introduction to the Spiritual 
Exercises. Then, after exploring into the meaning of the image compound (as the built-in 
dynamic between semiotics and phenomenology), I shall move to the second probe and 
the third probe into the “prison-cage” emblem, respectively in the realms of rhetoric and 
hermeneutics, and rhetoric and poetics. Eventually, I will close the chapter with 
Kierkegaard’s distinguishing the genius (giving birth to) from the apostle (the messenger 
in moral errands) in order to better understand the orality-and-literacy difficulty in 
Ignatius’ being in-between the commonplace and the frontier for using the emblematics. 
Therein, I outline six keynote characteristics of the “prison-cage” emblem in preparation 
for chapter four.  
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A Comprehensive Introduction to the Spiritual Exercises 
The Spiritual Exercises came from Ignatius’ own conversion from the life of a 
soldier to his deciding to live a spiritual life in total dedication to God. Gradually as it 
worked out, the Exercises became a common praxis in the Society of Jesus with a built-in 
dynamic of meditating into action. The little book Spiritual Exercises then became the 
“teacher’s manual” for the directors of the Exercises, a role mostly played by Ignatius 
himself before the foundation of the Society (and during the early years).  
The full Exercises require more or less thirty successive days to complete, with 
the exact length depending on the exercitants’ various experiences in living the spiritual 
life. Ignatius organized the Exercises into four weeks, with the length of each week being 
also adjustable to the exercitants’ various situations. The four-week Exercises follow four 
major themes: mediations on sins and the consequences, contemplations on the 
incarnation and the life of Jesus, mediations on his passion and death, mediations on his 
resurrection and ascension and eventually with the unitive “Contemplations for Attaining 
Love”. For those exercitants who are well experienced with the Exercises, they may 
perform the Exercises by himself, often with an abridged version in eight successive 
days.  
For those of us who firstly read the Exercises as a book, there were some 
interpretive difficulties. Ignatius wrote the Exercises as a portable manual for the 
directors’ referential uses and not for the exercitants to read. His concise way of writing 
could make the book seemingly rather dry, if in comparison to, let’s say, the literary 
affections in St. Augustine’s Confessions. Antonio de Nicolas, a contemporary 
commentator on the Exercises, had this fondly that Ignatius must have written the book 
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“not with a pen but with a hammer”.3 The conciseness of the Exercises can certainly be 
attributed to the fact the Exercises came from Ignatius’ own reflective notes, along with 
his deciding to live the spiritual life. In this sense, the genre of the Exercises could be 
understood with an incomplete parallel to those scholarly work based on a powerful 
thinker’s personal notes, though the Exercises was of course a complete work.  
Ignatius’ manuscripts of the Exercises were in Spanish, and occasionally with the 
Basque language.4 The vulgate version of the Exercises was printed and published in 
1548, with Ignatius’ own approval and usages.5 Here, it should be noteworthy that the 
writing of the Exercises was further complemented by the art form the printing press. The 
degree of the structural clarity of the Exercises would be unimaginable for Christian 
writers in pre-typographic cultures.6 Although as an early printing man (the printing press 
was about eighty years old when the Exercises was published), Ignatius maintained the 
habits of writing in the chirographic culture; for instance, many titles of the Exercises 
were simply the beginning words of the opening paragraph. Therein, it should be 
reminded that Ignatius wrote and edited the Exercises over an extensive period of time, 
along with his own spiritual growth. The book was only later edited and printed for better 
visual retrievals. For example, the “points” in the Exercises were therefore not to exhaust 
all the possible topics with a given subject (divisions and sub-divisions); rather, the 
rhetorical connections between the “points” came from the diachronic development of 
Ignatius’ own life of the mind.7 Such interpretive spaces gave birth to those hermeneutic 
                                                   
3 De Nicolas, Imagining, 103.  
4 As De Nicolas contended, “Letter g=” in the Exercises could be the first letter of the Basque word guar 
that means today. See De Nicolas, Imagining, 330.  
5 See Ignatius, Exercises, 9 for Ganss’ elaborations on the 1548 Vulgate version of the Exercises.  
6 See Ong, Hopkins, 66.  
7 See Ong, Hopkins, 68.  
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work on the Exercises almost as an elaborative response to the Exercises – Karl Rahner’s 
[Notes on the] Spiritual Exercises may be a good example as another distinctive 
appropriation of the Exercises.8  
The Exercises are different from the Eastern meditative tradition, mostly in that 
they are embedded within the diachronic phenomenology of the word. As stated, a Zenist 
would choose to not differ cause from effect in claiming that the phenomena are cause 
and effect to each other, while Ignatius had to deal with the genuine uncertainty in the 
grace of God as fundamentally unpredictable.9 In the Christian meditative tradition, the 
distinctive characteristic of the Exercises is that the Exercises pivot on the making of a 
decision: in the Second Week, notably in the mid of the Exercises, the exercitants are 
asked to make the election for the important choices in their minds. Here, it is noteworthy 
that as an early Renaissance man, Ignatius was unknowing to the Romanticists’ 
trivialization of daily spirituality, but the Exercises was not without a sense of modern 
existentialism in Ignatius’ paying a good deal of attention to the exercitants’ making 
choices in the ordinary life, for instances, when the exercitants have to choose between 
priesthood or layman, marriage or single, and etc. Moreover, as shown in “The 
Deliberation on Poverty”, Ignatius himself made the decision that the Jesuits should have 
no personal financial possession, which should be a good equivalent of contemporary 
leadership studies.10 It may also be clarified that the Exercises are not exclusively about 
making the decisions that have never been made before; they are also about making 
                                                   
8 See Karl Rahner. Spiritual Exercises. Translated by Kenneth Baker (New York: Herder and Herder, 
1965).  
9 See Ong, Hopkins, 66.  
10 See Ignatius of Loyola. Spiritual Exercises and Selected Work. Edited by George E. Ganss (New Jersey, 
Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1991), 217-228.  
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decisions that “renew” and revitalize the spiritual life. And the uncertainty in changing 
the decisions remains.  
To raise an incomplete but heuristic parallel to the intellectual sphere, the election 
in the Exercises can be understood as the genuine risk of scholars’ making choices in 
living the intellectual life. In the intellectual sphere, bad choices were made for a variety 
of different reasons. Scholars could make bad decisions due to lacking enough 
information (e.g. Sartre’s open admiration for the Chinese cultural revolution); having 
too much sympathy (e.g. the modern Chinese Confucianists’ entanglement with the 
Chinese Communism Party),11 or having too little sympathy (e.g. Heidegger’s joining in 
the Nazi Party). In the Exercises, Ignatius was deeply aware of the real difficulties in 
making the election, sometimes for not having enough information, other times for 
having “too much” or “too little” emotion and etc. In particular, within Christian 
mysticism, Ignatius knew that the existences are often problematically expressive, on 
which he included “Rules for Discernment of Spirits” at the end of the Exercises.  
Today, we know better some of the literary influences on the Exercises.12 In 
particular, since his conversion, Ignatius had read diligently The Imitation of Christ by 
Thomas a Kempis at the frontier of the Devotio Moderna as the ascetical movement in 
the Low Countries in the fifteenth and sixteenth century. And the Exercises itself was 
within the Devotio Moderna. The characteristics of the Devotio Moderna should certainly 
help us better understand the historical moment to which Ignatius responded. As cited by 
Ong, Ricardo Garcia Villoslada listed ten of these characteristics:  
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The Devotio Moderna was 1) Christocentric, focusing more on Christ’s humanity 
than on the divine nature and attributes – hence the “imitation” to which human 
beings are called. It stressed 2) an affectivity allied with rationality rather than 
with what would much later be styled “enthusiasm”. It sought to introduce some 
kind of 3) method into meditation and life generally, and thus was to some degree 
monastic. It stressed 4) self-knowledge and obligation, in a way suggesting the 
strong Stoic influence that marked much late medieval and, even more, 
Renaissance thought, religious and other. Its concern with mysticism had a strong 
5) moralistic cast, stressing self-abnegation and effect – more Stoic influence, 
though combined with biblical. It was 6) anti-speculative: knowledge was 
inconsequential and indeed useless without fear of God. “I would rather feel 
compunction than know how to define it.” The Imitation of Christ states. It was 7) 
deeply interiorized and subjective in focus: external works and ritual were far less 
important than intention, reflection and inner fervor. It favored 8) solitude and 
silence. The Devotio Moderna encouraged 9) Bible reading for devotional 
purpose, not for scientific research. It was 10) anti-humanistic to the extend that it 
despised not only mere human values but also secular knowledge generally.13 
In this project, we may consider the Devotio Moderna as the context for Ignatius’ feeling 
naturally to teach phenomenological descriptions with moral-phenomenological 
reductions. In the Exercises, Ignatius tried to help the exercitants to understand Christ’s 
own making the decisions in his life and death. In many ways, the desire to be artistic 
also found its own expression in the diachronic phenomenology of the word. The 
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Exercises was truly valuable in understanding the early stage of a hermeneutic 
phenomenological method that coincided with the development of the printing press.14  
The Meaning of a Compound Sign 
In chapter two, we have noticed that the “prison-cage” was Ong’s effort to teach 
the meaning of Ignatius’ compound image by revealing the built-in rhetoric in the image 
compound. As a reminder, the original imagery in the Exercises was a “compound sign” 
with multiple signifiers that moved from “my soul”, to “this corruptible body”, to “in a 
prison”, to “in exile among brute animals”, and to the strong postscript of “I mean, my 
whole self as composed of soul and body.” If for Ong to call this compound image 
“prison-cage” was to highlight the built-in rhetoric, we should be able to notice the inner 
dynamic within the Exercises between “perceiving existentially” (which came as a 
compound of phenomena) and “communicating rhetorically” (within the diachronic order 
of the word). As I have contended with the framework of semiotic phenomenology, the 
Exercises was proto-existential with real difficulties between and among 
phenomenological description, phenomenological reduction, and phenomenological 
interpretation.  
For this section, in concerns with the meaning of the compound sign, we may then 
understand the Ignatian “composite of places” as a compound sign with multiple 
signifiers in search for a more definitive meaning. And we may start with a compound 
sign not from the Exercises but from the Autobiography in which Ignatius openly recalled 
one of his own discernments of the spirits. And the compound sign from the 
Autobiography follows.  
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While in this hospice it often happened that in broad daylight he saw 
something in the air near him. It gave him great consolation because it was 
very beautiful – remarkably so. He could not discern very well the kind of 
thing it was, but in a way it seemed to him to have the form of a serpent 
with many things that shone like eyes, though they were not. He found 
great pleasure and consolation in seeing this thing, and the oftener he saw 
it the more his consolation grew. When it disappeared, he was 
displeased…15 
As Ignatius was unsure if the sign was from the devil or from God, he then performed a 
discernment of spirits with five points. The basic text follows.  
FIRST… one day while saying the Office of Our Lady on the steps of the 
same monastery, his understanding began to be elevated so that he saw the 
Most Holy Trinity in the form of three musical keys. This brought out so 
many tears and so much sobbing that he could not control himself… 
SECOND. Once the manner in which God had created the world was 
presented to his understanding with great spiritual joy. He seemed to see 
something white, from which some rays were coming and God made light 
from this. But he did not know how to explain these things, nor did he 
remember too well the spiritual enlightenment that God was imprinting on 
his soul at the time.  
THIRD. At Manresa too, where he stayed almost a year, after he began to 
be consoled by God and saw the fruit which he bore in dealing with souls, 
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he gave up those extremes he had formerly practiced, and he now cut his 
nails and his hair. One day in this town while he was hearing Mass in the 
church of the monastery mentioned above, at the elevation of the Body of 
the Lord, he saw with interior eyes something like white rays coming from 
above… 
FOURTH. Often and for a long time, while at prayer, he saw with interior 
eyes of the humanity of Christ. The form that appeared to him was like a 
white body, neither very large nor very small, but he did not see any 
distinction of members. He saw it at Manresa many times. If he should 
way twenty or forty, he would not dare judge it a lie. He has seen this 
another time in Jerusalem and yet another while traveling near Padua. He 
has also seen Our Lady in a similar form, without distinguishing parts …  
FIFTH. Once he was going out of devotion to a church situated a little more than 
a mile from Manresa: I believe it is called St. Paul’s, and the road goes by the 
river. As he went along occupied with his devotions, he sat down for a little while 
with his face towards the river, which ran down below. While he was seated there, 
the eyes of his began to be opened; not that he saw any vision, but he understood 
and learnt many things, both spiritual matters and matters of faith and of 
scholarship, and this with so great an enlightenment that everything seemed new 
to him.  
…  
After this had lasted for a good while, he went to kneel before a nearby cross to 
give thanks to God. There, the vision that had appeared to him many times but 
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which he had never understood, that is, the thing mentioned above which seemed 
very beautiful to him, with many eyes, now appeared to him. But while before the 
cross, he saw clearly that the object did not have its usual beautiful color, and he 
knew very clearly with a strong agreement of his will that is was the devil. Late it 
would often appear to him for a long time; and by way of contempt he dispelled it 
with a staff the used to carry in his hand.16 
At the first glance, the above exercise that Ignatius himself practiced seems to be a 
structural solution to the first sign in discernment which came with the imagery of a 
“flying serpent with many eyes”. The following five points – as a compound image that 
moved roughly from “three musical keys”, to the “white rays”, to the “white body” and 
eventually to “not that he saw any vision, but he understood and learnt” – served as the 
counterpart to the first sign so that at the end of the exercise, Ignatius could “dispel it 
with a staff he used to carry in his hand”, knowing that the first sign came from the devil. 
In short, it was seemingly that the divine signs themselves conquered the first sign from 
the devil within Ignatius’ discerning efforts. It should not be surprising that the above 
image compound from the Autobiography caught the attention of many contemporary 
rhetoricians and semioticians. For example, in Boyle’s Loyola’s Acts, she considered the 
“flying serpent with many eyes” to be Ignatius’ playing the cultural riddle with the 
signified being the “peacock”, and the peacock imagery (as half snake and half bird) was 
commonplace then to remember one’s committing the pivotal sin of vainglory.17  
However, on a second thought, without neglecting that the Autobiography was 
dictated by Ignatius to his assistant, Gonçalves da Câmara who wrote the Autobiography 
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arguably with a preference to rhetorical grandeur,18 we should at least presuppose the 
genuine uncertainty of the first sign which was the flying serpent imagery. It is 
noteworthy that throughout the five-point exercise, the flying serpent imagery itself did 
not appear, which was certainly efforts to keep the flying serpent imagery as the “daemon 
on the shoulder” that Ignatius himself could not see until the end of the exercise. In other 
words, the uncertainty of the first sign only gradually became the moral reduction of 
either imp on one shoulder or angel on the shoulder. More straightforwardly, if Ignatius 
already knew if the sign came from God or from the devil, the five points exercise, even 
in autobiographical recollections, would be rather redundant as post-eventful rejoices. 
Yet given the kind of suspicion from the first glance, we should firstly focus on the 
difficulty in the orality of the compound sign, and in particular the Muses within.  
The Orality of the Compound Sign 
The Japanese writer Haruki Murakami, in his novel Norwegian Wood, offered a 
narrative account for how a modern girl would discern if a boy’s romantic love was 
true.19 And the discerning process was that: to start, the girl would ask the boy to bring 
her an apple, and when the boy brought the apple to her; then, the girl would ask the boy 
to instead bring her an orange, and the boy brought the orange to her; at the third time, 
the girl would ask the boy to instead bring her a strawberry, and the boy brought the 
strawberry to her. Eventually, the girl could decide to love the boy a hundred times more 
than the three-part miniature of the “Hercules’ labors” that the boy just completed. 
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If my comparing the Ignatian discernment of spirits to the psychological 
movement of a modern girl’s may be excused, both situations indeed had the same 
difficulty with the evanescence of the orality. The particular radicalness in Murakami’s 
story was that the signifiers in the girl’s discerning process should not have any meaning. 
This lack of the signified was not only in the sense that the compound sign of “apple, 
orange and strawberry”, along with the errands, only happened to be the signifiers of the 
boy’s love; more importantly, the compound sign was also the girl’s hidden protest 
against the indeterminacy of love in that none of the “apple, orange, strawberry” could be 
an adequate sign for love. In other words, the meaning of the compound sign was entirely 
within the girl’s psychological movement, along with the boy’s errands.  
In many ways, Murakami’s story was a structural solution to Shakespeare’s 
writing, “O, swear not by the moon, th’ inconstant moon, that monthly changes in her 
circle orb. Lest that thy love prove likewise variable”20 as Juliet’s lamenting on the 
incompetence of the common sign for love. And it is noteworthy that the girl’s 
discernment in Murakami’s story was more existentially complex than Juliet’s yearning 
for a better sign – not only the former had good doubts for the common sign for love, but 
she also tried to conquer the evanescence of the spoken word by de-signing an 
independent discerning process with signifiers whose meanings were equivalently 
evanescent.  
Murakami’s story on a modern girl’s discerning method should be heuristic in 
understanding the difficulty of orality, because our girl was not to poke fun at the way the 
spoken word works. Her existential situation was much more complex than one’s saying 
                                                   
20 William Shakespeare. The Arden Shakespeare Complete Works (London: Arden Shakespeare, 1998), 
1018. 
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“blah, blah, blah” as a contempt for the redundancy of orality. As stated, the “apple” 
momentarily became the signifier for love as the beginning of a phenomenological 
perception, which was in parallel to the evanescence of orality. With today’s acute 
awareness in sexuality and consciousness, we may even say that the girl deconstructed 
and reconstructed the forward movements in Hercules’ labors: if indeed the meaning of 
Hercules’ labors was that each labor should be able to claim its own realm of sovereignty, 
the girl then built an inner rhetorical connection into the labors, as counter-movements to 
the psychological blind spots in the boy’s identifying himself. With this kind of difficulty 
within orality, we may better understand the significance of the Muses as the counterpart 
to the Greek education based on rhetorical movements – Apollo, as the Greek god of 
education, found himself in combative collaborations with the local nymphs.21  
Understanding the Flying Serpent Imagery  
If indeed we may understand the Muses as counterparts to the rhetorical 
movement (rather than part of the rhetorical education), the images in Ignatius’ five-point 
exercise to discern the flying serpent imagery should be better understood as efforts to 
build counterparts to the Greek rhetoric into the Christian commonplace imagery. The 
flying serpent imagery was in the dynamic between “making a common sign with the art 
of public speaking” and “making a decision by examining even the slightest 
psychological movement inside”.  
Contemporary critiques of the rhetorical movement in Ignatius’ images often went 
too conveniently into attacking the knightly romance in Ignatius, with which imageries 
like the “flying serpent with many eyes” were then considered to be the same as the 
                                                   
21 See Wyman H. Herendeen. From Landscape to Literature: The River and the Myth of Geography 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1986), 68.  
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Greek epic writers’ mnemonic tool of the “heavy” figures.22 And the element of New 
Criticism within was that: just like Hercules’ twelve labors in which each labor should 
claim its own realm of sovereignty, in Ignatius’ discerning the flying serpent imagery, the 
five points exercise had to be almost “military” in the sense that the continuity and the 
completeness of the signifiers should not be disturbed. Therein, the Ignatian compound 
sign was criticized to be some ontological determinism. However, if only we may pay 
attention to the changes of the meaning of the compound sign in the interpretative 
process, such critique of Ignatius’ being “military” necessarily fell short in that the signs 
in knightly romance often remained the same.23 Erich Neumann, in The Origins and 
History of Consciousness, had it precisely that “the hero myth” was the stage before “the 
transformation myth”.24 In other words, the very ability to use a compound sign that in 
itself changes should be the phenomenological basis of the Ignatian emblem.  
Now, instead of contending that the Signifier (the flying serpent) should be more 
meaningful than the signified (the peacock) as a Jungian Signifier-signified exchange, we 
should focus on a more complete stages of semiotic phenomenology in the Ignatian 
emblem from description, to reduction and to interpretation, regardless of Da Câmara’s 
assistance on the Autobiography with rhetorical decorum. This pattern of 1) discovering a 
difficult sign, 2) followed by one signifier with another signifier in the process of 
discernment, 3) with the decision if the sign came from God or devil, indeed coincided 
with the built-in stages of development of the birth of a strong moral consciousness in the 
First Week of the Exercise. In this sense, the “prison-cage” was Ignatius’ leaving the 
                                                   
22 Ong, Orality, 68.  
23 Auerbach, Mimesis, 139.  
24 Erich Neumann. The Origins and History of Consciousness. Translated by R. F. C. Hull (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1970).  
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work of semiotic phenomenology to the exercitants. The connection to the tripartite of the 
emblem (“motto”, “image”, and “epigram”) can be quite salient here.  
It should also be noted that the structural approach to the Exercises can be traced 
to Gaston Fessard’s guiding question in The Dialectics of the Spiritual Exercises. Fessard 
asked, “how can [one] get the four weeks and three ways to coincide?”25 And to put it 
differently, the question was that: if indeed the Exercises followed the spiritual growth 
from purgative, to illuminative and to unitive, why didn’t Ignatius directly teach “the 
three ways”, rather than asking the exercitants to practice four weeks of actual exercises? 
In other words, the “four weeks” could not ensure the “three ways”. It is possible for 
someone to practice four weeks of exercises without experiencing the grace of God. In 
this question, Fessard was very attentive to the dynamic between the temporal-diachronic 
order and the spatial-architectural order in the Exercises.  
As Fessard himself reported, back to the 1930s, his solution was of an a priori 
reduction which was not necessarily of Hegelian dialectics (though Fessard openly 
resorted to Hegel’s work), but certainly contending that the contingency of the “four 
weeks” must be conquered by the ontological stages of the “three ways”.26 For the 
current project, Fessard’s being at the frontier of reading into the Exercises should 
highlight Ignatius’ insistence on approaching the first sign in the temporal-diachronic 
order. Even in discerning the flying serpent imagery in the Autobiography where the “old 
Ignatius” could confidently say that the “young Ignatius” made the right choice, the 
                                                   
25 See Édouard Pousset. Life in Faith and Freedom: An Essay Presenting Gaston Fessard’s Analysis of the 
Dialectics of the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius. Translated and edited by Eugene L. Donahue (St. 
Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1980), xxiii.  
26 Fessard mentioned that “in the introduction of 1931, it is more a question of Descartes, as the father of 
modern philosophy, than of Hegel.” See Pousset, Faith and Freedom, xxiii.  
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perceptive order was still well maintained. In this sense, the compound sign in the 
emblem, regardless of the amount of interpretive clues being built in, should be based 
more on the diachronic order of the spoken word than on the synchronic view. Keeping in 
mind this kind of “transforming” the evanescence of the spoken word into the 
emblematics, we shall move to the second probe into the “prison-cage” imagery.  
“Prison-cage” and “Carcass-lion”: The Second Probe into the Ignatian Emblem 
 
In this section, I want to understand better the relations between the diachronic 
phenomenology of the spoken word and the emblematical or para-emblematical imagery. 
In the initial probe into the Ignatian emblem, I have argued that the “prison-cage” was 
innately an oral image with a built-in bias towards “ritual and movement”,27 for a 
comparative insight, I should then choose an almost sculptural imagery from the Old 
Testament without movements. Let us start with the “prison-cage” imagery again.  
In his endnotes on the Exercises, George Ganss pointed out that the “prison-cage” 
imagery came from the symbolic economy of scholasticism. In Ganss’ explanation,  
The description of human beings as composed of body and soul was 
commonplace terminology of the scholasticism which Ignatius studied at 
Paris for 3 1/2 years; and philosophers and preachers alike often spoke of 
the “corruptible body”. Mark 1:13 states that Christ was in the desert, 
tempted by Satan “among the beasts.” It is easy to see how these ideas, so 
commonplace in his day, had a direct influence on Ignatius. In his search 
for a vivid image to stir up the shame and confusion he counsels the 
retreatant to pray for in the second prelude immediately below, he 
                                                   
27 Soukup, “Ritual and Movement”, 9.  
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imaginatively combined the above notions, probably without reflecting 
where he first learned them. His image was effective for his purpose.28 
Ganss emphasized “commonplace” twice in the above quote and he contended for the 
effectiveness of the “prison-cage” imagery, from which it should be safe to say that 
Ganss welcomed us to examine the rhetorical element in the Exercises. After all, if 
rhetoric can get the content it deserves, half of the problem is solved. But there is this 
other half of the problem within being rhetorical itself that Ganss referred to Ong’s essay 
“St. Ignatius’ Prison-cage” that the ways in which the implicit “cage” cancelled out the 
effectiveness of the explicit “prison” were indeed at the edge of the commonplace 
tradition. To put Ganss’ argument differently, it was the merit of scholasticism that 
allowed Ignatius to be poetically creative in the sense that everybody in Ignatius’ time 
knew the “prison-cage’ imagery well, and Ignatius simply had it better in the Exercises; 
more precisely, the “prison” imagery was evidently in the commonplace, and with the 
help of the emblem, Ignatius had the “prison” imagery better as the “prison-cage”. 
Therein, the interpretative effort was both in the classical hermeneutics based strictly on 
the original text, and with a literary criticism kind of work that sit on top of the original 
content. Granted by Ganss’ welcoming the rhetorical perspective in hermeneutics, we 
may take a compound image from the Old Testament to further examine the word-image 
dynamic in the “prison-cage”. And the compound image in 1 Kings 13:24-25 should be a 
good choice. The biblical text follows:  
                                                   
28 Ignatius, Exercises, 155 
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And when he was gone, a lion met him by the way, and slew him: and his 
carcass was cast in the way, and the ass stood by it, the lion also stood by 
the carcass. And behold, men passed by, and saw the carcass cast in the 
way, and the lion standing by the carcass, and they came and told it in the 
city where the old prophet dwelt.29  
In the above image compound, at first, there were movements that were not hard to 
follow with the verbs – from “gone”, to “met”, to “slew”, to “cast”, and to “stood by”. 
But after “behold”, the imagery turned to be static: if there were movements, why was the 
lion still there after slaying the young prophet and why didn’t the men in the city run 
away from the lion? A particular kind of surrealism with non-movements seems salient: 
why a proto-emblem here? To answer the question, Ong’s hermeneutic-
phenomenological approach should be helpful indeed.   
As Ong phenomenologically reduced the imagery of “prison, valley, and among 
brute animals” to the “prison-cage” in order to understand the rhetorical element, we may 
also reduce the compound image of “the carcass cast in the way, and the lion standing by 
the carcass” to the “carcass-lion” to first of all highlight the incompatibility between 
“carcass” and “lion”. But we should not rush into claiming the “carcass-lion” to be 
rhetorical, because unlike the “prison-cage” which was a prelude to the meditations on 
sins, there was no clear upward or downward movement in 1 Kings 13.  
In 1 Kings 13, the worst kind of drama between two good men just happened. 
Since the hospitality of the old prophet did not come from God, the young prophet was 
                                                   
29 The Bible: Authorized King James Version (Oxford University Press, 2008).  
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slew by the lion, and the tragedy was brought to an end with the old prophet mourning 
and trying hard to not forget the young prophet. With the “carcass-lion” imagery, the 
“existential absurdity” in the young prophet’s sudden death had a persuasive power that 
was difficult to explain.  
As a further comparison between the “carcass-lion” and the “prison-cage”, unlike 
the “prison-cage” imagery that tried to catch a psychological movement “like a television 
set”,30 the “carcass-lion” was to be synchronic, almost like two photographic cameras 
working on the same event. Although the “carcass-lion” had a strong call for memory in 
being almost sculptural, the powerful presence of the “lion” indeed cancelled out the 
effectiveness of the “carcass” by turning the tragic event to be surrealistic. In short, the 
“carcass-lion” made 1 Kings 13 difficult to comprehend, as if the imagery “fought back” 
when one tried to approach the story hermeneutically.  
Furthermore, it may be noted that if merely for the sake of memorizing the 
tragedy, to make a sculpture on “the lion stood by the carcass” should work better than 
the spoken or the written words. But perhaps because the Old Testament writers felt 
themselves to be totally within the tragedy, a distanced moral reduction was simply not 
available to them. Now, with the modern mindset, one might say that 1 Kings 13 lacked 
the element of “crisis communication” to prevent similar tragedies from happening in the 
future. However, the “carcass-lion” was an oral image precisely in the sense that the 
narrative implied both the lingering “carcass-lion” and its evanescence – what a poor lion 
if it were going to be posed in a sculpture with the young prophet’s carcass forever! 
                                                   
30 Ong, Barbarian, 255.  
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Therein, we may start to consider the “carcass-lion” to be rhetorical in the sense of the 
plantation of a movement by burying the movement like a seed. And it is only in 
contemporary times that we began to recognize the significance of the nomadic scriptural 
culture as essentially moving forward by writing the words down, and against the 
medium.31 The Old Testament writers must hold the writing tool very firmly.  
On this dynamic between the Greek sculptural memory and the Hebrew oral 
memory in which the images had different difficulties to appear strange, Auerbach’s 
insight on the strong personalism in the Old Testament should be a good interpretative 
entrance. As Auerbach explained,  
This becomes still clearer if we now turn to other person in the dialogue, 
to Abraham. Where is he? We do not know. He says, indeed: Here I am - 
but the Hebrew word means only something like “behold me”, and in any 
case is not meant to indicate the actual place where Abraham is, but a 
moral position in respect to God.32 
To extend Auerbach’s argument, we may say that there were indeed two kinds of 
“behold” in the Old Testament: one as in Abraham’s “moral position in respect to God” 
(the invisible), and the other as in the “carcass-lion” proto-emblem with confrontational 
resistances to the very happening of the tragedy (the visible). By neglecting the 
personalism basis in the “carcass-lion”, some modern semioticians went too conveniently 
into suggesting that the lion was the signifier of God so as to indicate the young prophet 
                                                   
31 See Eric McLuhan and Peter Zhang. “Media Ecology in a Jazz Mode.” China Media Research 13.4 
(2017), 62.  
32 Auerbach, Mimesis, 8.  
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was slew by no one else but the lion. Again, such rationalism was over-determined by the 
Signifier-signified model in suggesting that the Signifier should be more rhetorically 
effective than the signified.  
For this project, a better interpretation could be in the framework of semiotic 
phenomenology. We may say that the “carcass-lion” was exclusively within 
phenomenological description, with one signifier (the carcass) and another signifier (the 
lion) that refused to be phenomenologically reductive. To be more specific, the meaning 
of the “carcass-lion” was genuinely uncertain: was the author protesting the existential 
absurdity in the worst kind of “good men’s drama”, or was he holding the young prophet 
responsible for his blindness to the old prophet’s vainglory – we would never know the 
particular arguments. Therein, the proto-emblematical element in the “carcass-lion” can 
be considered as proto-rhetorical in the sense that the author felt the exegesis for some 
rhetorical effect to contend with the happening of the tragedy, while ended up with 
finding no particular argument. And in this sense, the “carcass-lion” can be understood as 
an argument filled with pathos, though still at the edge of the diachronic phenomenology 
of the word.  
In Mimesis, Auerbach rightfully concluded that “what [the Old Testament writers] 
produced, then, was not primarily oriented toward ‘realism’ (if succeeded in being 
realistic, it was merely a means, not an end); it was orientated towards truth.”33 Here, we 
may add that when the writing appeared to be “surrealistic”, it was still orientated 
towards the truth. The word-image dynamic can be put as: mythos combats logos, but 
                                                   
33 Auerbach, Mimesis, 14.  
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ends up with complementing the contentiousness of logos. To put this in the McLuhanian 
way, effect here can be the content in a way that content can never be.  
As a site note, we are perhaps too familiar with the Grecian concern with “fate” as 
the “spoken” word, about which we have known well from Shakespeare’s effort to be 
more existentially accurate in describing Macbeth’s radical situation with the “crossbow-
longbow” imagery. Yet within the “carcass-lion”, the author of 1 Kings 13 was indeed 
proto-existential in being concerned with the “speaking” word in the strict sense of a 
diachronic phenomenology, unknowing to rhetorical expectations.34 And it may be 
clarified that in 1 Kings 13, the author was not to give up the effort to be more 
existentially accurate: the “carcass-lion” tried to resist the existence of the tragedy, while 
this resistance ended up being even more expressive. In other words, the accuracy was 
already in the author’s using the words. Here, it is conventional to say that the Old 
Testament writers contended with God, but within the “carcass-lion”, there was a 
particular kind of word-image dynamic in which the existentialism was built upon the 
very dynamic between word and image.  
A lot more can be said on the dynamic between the Grecian logos as the spoken 
word and the Hebraic dabar as the presence of the word,35 and it is certainly beyond the 
capacity of this dissertation to criticize the iconoclastic movement within the Old 
Testament images. But the basic point is that: it was not that the Christian thinkers 
exploited the Greek rhetoric for more effective persuasion; the theologians (e.g. St. 
Thomas Aquinas) were often at the frontier of dealing with the orality-literacy dynamic.  
                                                   
34 In the Exercises, Ignatius shared this difficulty of the “speaking” word within the grace of God.  
35 See Ong, Presence, 316-324.  
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Once again, for the Greek, rhetoric was primarily of public speaking, and the 
Greek emblems had a playful basis more approachable to the modern mind. This can be 
exemplified by the waxwing of Epicurus (the risk in the pursuit of living an intellectual 
life) or Athena as Zeus’ brainchild who came from the spilt of Zeus’ head (the 
intellectual birth-labor) – multiple arguments can be made on the meaning of those 
emblems, and none of them can be deemed as “wrong” interpretations. If indeed the 
Greek emblems were “artistic”, the Grecian artists then resorted to the unlimited resource 
of human communication, with the alphabetic joy in talking itself. We have known well 
that the temporal flow of the alphabets was the very basis of a democratic society.36  
On the other hand, with the Christian thinkers’ intense concerns with the Person, 
to use the alphabet to examine the inner movement, though both in time, was in fact not 
easily compatible with the outward movement of the Greek rhetoric. As a partial solution, 
it would be rightful to indicate that there were indeed two kinds of rhetoric – the “rhetoric 
playful” and the “rhetoric serious”, and one needs to constantly shift from one to the 
other.37  
Now, in terms of the Exercises, we say Ignatius tried to conquer rhetoric from 
within in the sense that he refused to draw a line between the playful rhetoric and the 
serious rhetoric – after all, this line was a rhetorical invention in itself. Therein, it should 
be more understandable that Ignatius would both ask the exercitants to catch even the 
slightest psychological movement, and he would manage the symbolic economy with the 
                                                   
36 See Robert K Logan. The Alphabet Effect: A Media Ecology Understanding of the Making of Western 
Civilization (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 2004).  
37 See Thomas J. Farrell. “Secondary Orality and Consciousness Today”. In Media, Consciousness and 
Culture (Sage Publications, 1991).  
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polemic between the army of angels and the army of Lucifer’s. For Ignatius, it was not 
that the images cannot be artistic; rather, it was that they had to be true.  
In comparison with the proto-emblematical “carcass-lion”, the “prison-cage” 
emblem was close be a modern communication theory, not only in the sense that Ignatius 
kept some communicative distance in referring to the existentialist’ situation, but more 
importantly in the sense that Ignatius paid more attention to the dynamic between action 
and meditation, if indeed essentially as the dynamic between the Grecian rhetoric and the 
Hebraic word. Moreover, if only we may notice the built-in existentialism in the 
“carcass-lion”, Ignatius’ contribution to a more phenomenological existentialism can be 
put as: he made self-consciousness more examinable; after all, it was “I” (the exercitants) 
who was able to reconcile the Greek rhetoric with the Hebrew word.  
To conclude, in both the “carcass-lion” and the “prison-cage”, the second 
signifiers, respectively of the “lion” and the “cage”, indeed generated some genuine 
uncertainty for the first signifiers; without the second signifiers, the “prison” and the 
“carcass” could easily fall into the cliché of “the sorry soul in the prison” or some 
rationalism account for the divine authority. And from “carcass-lion” to the “prison-
cage”, Ignatius made phenomenology more examinable in existentialism. If indeed we 
may consider this cognitive necessity of having two signifiers to be a particular kind of 
“moral consciousness” that aimed to be true, how could Ignatius teach us better the 
coincidence between the desire to be artistic and the birth of a strong moral consciousness 
in the First Week of the Exercises? With this question, let us move to the third probe into 
the “prison-cage” emblem.  
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 “Prison-Cage” and “I-Thou”: The Third Probe into the Ignatian Emblem 
In the previous section, I have examined a proto-emblem in the Old Testament 
and contended that the “carcass-lion” was a particular kind of phenomenological 
description that could not be reduced into rhetorical arguments – in trying to “see”, the 
author (and the audiences) of 1 Kings 13 ended up having to “listen”. In the age of 
“secondary orality”, although artists were openly rebellious in aiming at being “visual”, 
often times such visualism attempt still ended up being even more “oral” – to take 
McLuhan’s example, cubism became the very art form of newspaper columns, as a 
powerful medium to connect two separate events together in the global village.38  
The “oral image” was never lost, and in many ways, it has become more 
prominent in contemporary times, though the built-in word-image dynamic (such as in 
the “carcass-lion”) was reconciled to be more “irenic”.39 Therein, Martin Buber’s “I and 
Thou” should be an important counterpart to this irenic turn. For this project, “I-Thou” as 
a particular kind of oral image deserves detailed examinations since “I-Thou” was only 
possible with careful reflections on the situation of the spoken word. If indeed the current 
status of the poetics has become a competition for the most powerful turn away from 
rebelling against the oral tradition, the voice in Buber’s “I and Thou” should have 
particular significances.  
It should be clarified beforehand that to highlight the voice in “I-Thou” is not to 
indicate that there is no vocal element in the “prison-cage”. If we may recall, the voice in 
                                                   
38 McLuhan, Understanding Media, 13.  
39 Ong’s term “irenic” can be understood as a pedagogical response (in particular, speech and writing as 
self-confrontations) to Neumann’s “mass man and the phenomenon re-collectivization”.  
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the “prison-cage” was most noticeable with Ignatius’ reminding the exercitants, “I mean, 
the whole self as being composed of soul and body” – the speech element was not 
carefully planted, but a powerful amendment.  
Therein, we have the first dynamic between “I-Thou” and “prison-cage”: unlike 
Ignatius’ borrowing from the biblical imagery, “I-Thou” aimed to be almost exclusively 
within the realm of poetics so as to deal with the existentialist situation more directly – to 
supplement “I-Thou” with the imagery of two men sitting face-to-face with each other 
would be rather unnecessary and indeed harm the symbolic economy. On one hand, the 
economy and the directness of “I-Thou” in providing access to the “namelessness of the 
self”40 was simply not available to Ignatius as an early Renaissance man. On the other 
hand, it is precisely this lack of access to modern existentialism that makes Ignatius’ 
postscript, “I say, the whole self as being composed of soul and body” enticing and 
powerful indeed. Given the complexity of this issue on the voices in the images, a 
parallel between “prison-cage” and “I-Thou” should help us better understand the 
Ignatian emblem as being at the edge of the commonplace, and the Buberian three-word 
poem “I and Thou” as strictly within the realm of poetics. A particular kind of dynamic 
between rhetoric and poetics can be perceived here, and to examine, we may begin with 
the opening section of I and Thou. Buber wrote,  
Primary words do not signify things, but they intimate relations, 
Primary words do not describe something that might exist independently 
of them, but being spoken they bring about existence. 
                                                   
40 I use “namelessness” in reference to the beginning of Tao Te Ching: “you may name the Tao, but Tao is 
not the ordinary name”. Gerard Manley Hopkins had this existential phenomenology better as “the selfless 
self of self”, without the metaphysics of the Tao.  
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Primary words are spoken from the being. 
If Thou is said, the I of the combination I-Thou is said along with it. 
If It is said, the I of the combination I-it is said along with it. 
The primary word I-Thou can only be spoken with the whole being. 
The primary word I-it can never be spoken with the whole being.  
There is no I taken in itself, but only the I of the primary word I-Thou and 
the I of the primary word I-It. 
When a man says I, he refers to one or other of these. The I to which he 
refers is present when he says I. Further, when he says Thou or It, the I of 
one of the two primary words is present.  
The existence of I and the speaking of I are one and the same thing. 
When a primary word is spoken the speaker enters the word and takes his 
stand in it.41  
The above quote was composed with the poetic structure of Buber’s philosophical 
anthropology; it was poetic mostly in the sense that the act of knowing was implicitly 
kept: without Buber’s claiming to reveal the thinking process, the reader may still 
perceive that sometimes Buber began to know, and other times he knew better, and when 
Buber was fully conscious of the meaning of his thinking, he said it aloud – “the 
existence of I and the speaking of I are one and same thing.” In the quote above, Buber 
was by no means shy of rhetorical movements, and the argument moved forward. To 
make the point clear, we may add several transition words to the original text:  
Primary words do not signify things, but they intimate relations,  
                                                   
41 Martin Buber. I and Thou (Second Edition). Translated by Ronald Gregor Smith (Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, 1962), 1-2.  
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[In other words] Primary words do not describe something that might exist 
independently of them, but being spoken they bring about existence.  
[To again put it differently] Primary words are spoken from the being.   
If Thou is said, the I of the combination of I-Thou is said along with it.  
[Not too far from this] If It is said, the I of the combination of I-it is said 
along with it.  
[But it should be clarified that] The primary word I-Thou can only be 
spoken with the whole being.  
[while] The primary word I-it can never be spoken with the whole being.  
[This is because] There is no I taken in itself, but only the I of the primary 
word I-Thou and the I of the primary word I-It.  
[Therefore] When a man says I he refers to one or other of these. The I to 
which he refers is present when he says I. Further, when he says Thou or 
It, the I of one of the two primary words is present.  
[Let us say that] The existence of I and the speaking of I are one and the 
same thing. 
[In particular, in the realm of human communication] When a primary 
word is spoken the speaker enters the word and takes his stand in it.  
For a well-trained scholar, the added transition words may appear rather unnecessary, but 
the point here is not about the intellectual habit of building logical orders into the 
argument; rather, it is that regardless of the dialectical movement of his thinking process, 
Buber chose to present the argument affirmatively in the realm of poetics.42 Maurice 
                                                   
42 John Durham Peters called Marshall McLuhan a “grammarian” for the same reason that McLuhan often 
presented the argument affirmatively. If Peters were right, the only dialectical movement in McLuhan’s 
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Friedman had this wonderfully by titling his own book on poetics The Affirming Flame 
which should be a good metaphor for Buber’s poetic rendering of rhetorical utterances.43 
And the effect of Buber’s making the argument in a poetic way was certainly that the 
affirmative movements in fact asked the readers to examine the section more carefully in 
order to be able to discern Buber’s beginning to know (description), his knowing better 
(reduction), and his being fully conscious of the meaning of his poetic utterances 
(interpretation). In Buber, we have also noticed a built-in semiotic phenomenological 
way of moving intellectually.  
Moreover, not far from Ignatius’ strong reminder, “I mean, the whole self as 
being composed of soul and body”, Buber ended his thinking with a strong moral note, 
“when a primary word is spoken the speaker enters the world and takes his stand in it” 
which made it clear that this section was not about the problem of existence as 
necessarily expressive, but about the birth of a strong moral consciousness – “I” take my 
stand in “I-Thou”. As a further comparison between “prison-cage” and “I-Thou”, both 
Ignatius and Buber indeed provided the phenomenological interpretations as their own 
powerful moral amendments. In terms of the tripartite of the emblem, we may consider 
such moral amendment to be the equivalent of the “epigram”.  
Now, at the beginning of I and Thou, we have noticed a heuristic collaboration 
between rhetoric and poetics which may be best explained with Aristotle’s blueprint for 
rhetoric. For Aristotle, a rhetorician did not have to move back and forth dialectically; in 
Rhetoric, Aristotle granted rhetoric to be the “counterpart of dialectics”.44 In other words, 
                                                   
work was the notion of “extension and amputation”. See John Durham Peters. “McLuhan’s Grammatical 
Theology.” Canadian Journal of Communication 26. 2 (2011).  
43 Maurice S. Friedman. The Affirming Flame: A Poetics of Meaning (Prometheus Books, 1999).  
44 Aristotle. The Rhetoric and the Poetics of Aristotle (New York: The Modern Library, 1984), 19. 
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unlike in a logical discussion in which the conversation must move back and forth, in 
rhetoric, with Aristotle’s highlighting its function in political communication, the speaker 
may enjoy the privilege of being monological, though still governed by the art of public 
speaking.45 As Arendt had it in The Human Condition, in the Greco-Roman world the self 
in the public sphere was often portrayed as a “daemon on the shoulder” that only the 
other citizens could see.46 Here, the myth of communication is that the existential self 
coincides with the political self in the public sphere, and most likely in no other place. To 
put this differently, within rhetoric, as the closure of the consonants was meant to be 
opened to reach more audience, the public speaker often ended up demanding a dialogue 
even more intensely. In fact, one could go so far into arguing that the Greek rhetoric was 
the first phenomenology of a dermatological “scar” in the sociological sense of two 
men’s being able to disagree with each other. To put this with a McLuhanian emblem, the 
technology of writing (that enhanced rhetoric) was to plant the dragon’s teeth that further 
“bite” and “divide”.  
Therein, with the rhetoric of Buber’s “I-Thou” if indeed close to Aristotle’s 
blueprint for communication in the polis, we may happily include the Spiritual Exercises 
to be Aristotelian in three ways. 1) There was a strong call for action in the Exercises. 
Ignatius was known for insisting the Exercises as a meditative process towards action, 
and he indeed expelled those who merely wanted to meditate out of the Society. 2) 
Similar to Aristotle’s defining rhetoric as “the faculty of observing in any given case the 
available means of persuasion”,47 Ignatius asked the exercitant to examine the details 
                                                   
45 Aristotle continued to say, “it thus appears that rhetoric is an offshoot of dialectic and also of ethical 
studies.” Aristotle, Rhetoric and Poetics, 25.  
46 Hannah Arendt. The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 179.  
47 Aristotle, Rhetoric and Poetics, 24.  
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with the whole sensorium organization in the First Week, which should help the 
exercitants discerning rightfully. 3) As Aristotle’s hope in rhetoric was to persuade the 
Greek citizens to make better political choices, the Jesuit motto “for the greater glory of 
God” (which was crafted by Ignatius) was to make the election in living a spiritual life 
that necessarily involved choosing one way over the other. In short, Ignatius’ “prison-
cage” and Buber’s “I-Thou” had their claims in Aristotelian rhetoric.  
The Frontiers of the Poetics  
However, as in examining the “prison-cage”, we have tried hard to reconcile the 
eccentric imagery of the “cage” to be at the edge of the commonplace, in examining 
Buber’s “I-Thou”, the dynamic between being in the commonplace and being at the 
frontier could be even more difficult since “I-Thou” did not provoke an imagery. “I-
Thou” was strictly in the realm of poetics by referring to no thing but the dialogic 
relationship.  
To better understand the rhetoric-poetics dynamic in “I-Thou”, we have to draw a 
line between a “rhetorical poet” and a “poetic rhetorician” to highlight “I-Thou” was 
more poetical than rhetorical. In terms of a poetic rhetorician, in Poetics, Aristotle valued 
Homeric epics over other kinds of Greek poetics in that Homeric epics imitated human 
actions.48 As stated, in the chirographic ancient Greece, Hercules’ twelve labors were to 
promote the psychology of “flow”49 – one labor after another, and each labor should 
claim its own realm of independent achievement.  
In Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity, Walker explained the problem of a “poetic 
rhetorician” in greater details. Walker was clearly concerned with rhetoricians’ exploiting 
                                                   
48 Aristotle, Rhetoric and Poetics, 224.  
49 Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi. Beyond Boredom and Anxiety (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1975), 36.  
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the poetics in ancient Greece, as well as the contemporary narrowing rhetoric down to 
being merely concerned with the persuasive power of the speech. Walker said it 
straightforwardly,  
What we today call poetry continues generally to be thought of as a 
discourse that expresses, dramatizes, represents, or “models” states of 
subjectivity, or that adumbrates complex “meaning”, rather than offering 
argument/persuasion. This tends to be true even for contemporary critics, 
and poets, who want to envision (and practice) poetry as viable medium of 
ideological contestation, or as a means of promoting social change … such 
views often depend on an extraordinarily narrow and inadequate 
conception of what “argumentation” is.50 
Walker’s statement should be helpful to understand the poetics in Buber’s “I-Thou” as 
well as in Ignatius’ “prison-cage”, and the question can be put as: what is the poetic 
“argumentation” indeed? This question then asked us to examine different kinds of Greek 
poetics other than the Homeric epics. Here, we may use the example of Sappho to whom 
Walker also referred. And the point is to extend the dynamic between mythos and logos 
to the dynamic between Eros and logos, not necessarily with Barthes’ crudely fusing 
Sade, Fourier, with Loyola, but more in the sense of Arendt’s discussion on “caritas” and 
“cupiditas” in St. Augustine.51 It should be a good reminder that the Exercises involved 
the genuine uncertainty of “grace” – in particular, the joy of having, the fear of losing, 
and the desire to be able to have it again.  
                                                   
50 Jeffery Walker. Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity (Oxford University Press, 2000), vii.  
51 Hannah Arendt. Love and Saint Augustine. Edited by Joanna V. Scott and Judith C. Stark (The 
University of Chicago Press, 1996), 18.  
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In Eros the Bittersweet, Anne Carson explored into the “alphabetic edge” of love 
as a four-letter word whose best expression is the three-word sentence, “I love you”.52 
Carson pointed out that when the Greek poets tried to express “love as bittersweet”, 
unlike Homer’s inventing Helen to signify the actions of Eros and wrote “I will come to 
hate you as terribly as I now love you” with an explicitly polemic structure, Sappho 
wrote, “Eros once again limb-loosener whirls me sweet-bitter, impossible to fight off, 
creature stealing up” with a built-in polemic of sweet-bitter.53 Now, as Walker would 
challenge us: was Sappho not making an argument with a more accurate presentation of 
the rise of Eros and the fall into love? With Walker, the term “rhetorical poet” should be 
helpful in understanding the argument in Sappho’s “sweet-bitter” as both psychologically 
real and narratively grounded. And the same idea of “argumentation” should also be true 
in “I-Thou” and “prison-cage”. To say it radically, personalism was to argue that Homer 
was a rhetorician and there were multiple Homers, and Sappho was a poet and there was 
only one Sappho. 
Not far from Walker’s contention, Carson had some good reasons to teach the 
“Dionysian side” of Greek poetics in opposition to the Apollonian Homeric epics, given 
that Homer’s “I will come to hate you as terribly as I now love you” was indeed a non-
phenomenological reduction of Sappho’s original phenomenological description. Homer 
simply made it easy by focusing on the actions alone. In many ways, within the 
“bittersweet”, Sappho’s trying to catch even the slightest psychological movement was 
not at all far from Ignatius’ asking the exercitants to discern carefully within the “prison-
                                                   
52 Anne Carson. Eros the Bittersweet (Princeton University Press, 2016), 53-61. 
53 Carson, Bittersweet, 3. 
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cage”, though part of the “prison-cage” did belong to the commonplace imagery. In terms 
of the dynamic between being in the commonplace and being at the frontier, Ignatius’ 
difficulty was to find the interface between the commonplace and the frontier, and 
Sappho’s difficulty was to find ways to be at the edge of the frontiers.  
Here, to clarify, I am not to blur the difference between the Greek poets’ concern 
with mankind’s fate, embodied in human actions, and the Hebrew poets’ concern with 
Yahweh as the cosmic “fate within fate”. In fact, from the “carcass-lion”, to the “prison-
cage” and to “I-Thou”, there was arguably a history of moral consciousness with Buber’s 
not borrowing from the symbolic world of things as a pinnacle for staying strictly within 
the realm of poetics as dialogic communication.54 My point is that: by noticing the 
similarities respectively between “carcass-lion” and “prison-cage”, between “prison-
cage” and “sweet-bitter”, and between “prison-cage” and “crossbow-longbow”, as well as 
the robust difference between “prison-cage” (the word-image dynamic) and “I-Thou” (the 
fundamental difference between “I-Thou” and “I-it”), we have reached the point of being 
able to argue that Ignatius had good reasons to borrow from the media-communication 
dynamic so as to make the Exercises more adaptable to the Renaissance men. As stated, 
the emblem book had a long tradition that can be perceived as roughly from the proto-
emblem as in “carcass-lion”, to the para-emblem as in “Icarus’ waxing”, to the emblem 
as in the “crossbow-longbow”, and to the post-emblem as in the McLuhanian habitus of 
making a moral statement. To call “prison-cage” intrinsically as an “emblem” was to 
                                                   
54 Buber’s I-and-Thou, as a three-word poetic argument that was neither of enthymeme nor of syllogism, 
was by all means at the frontier of conquering the contemporary situation of the poetics. In many ways, “I-
Thou” was only possible when we became more conscious of both the Greek rhetoric and the Hebrew 
word.  
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indicate that between the Greek para-emblem which could afford many points of view55 
and the Shakespearean emblems that inherited the witty fabrics of Latin commonplaces, 
Ignatius’ using the emblem in the Exercises was indeed very distinctive for both being 
able to afford multiple viewpoints, and at the interface between the commonplace and the 
frontier. The question was then: in Ignatius’ Exercises, was there a Jesuitical emblem 
book tradition that can teach us better the situation of the emblematica in contemporary 
times? I will try to answer this question in chapter four with the field of emblem studies.  
As a site note, it should be emphasized that good phenomenological reductions 
mattered. In this project so far, I have considered James Carey’s definition of 
communication as “the limited resource on Earth versus the unlimited resource of human 
communication” as a phenomenological reduction of the biblical imagery of “five loaves 
of bread and two fishes” that were enough to feed five thousand men. And I have 
contended that the “prison-cage” was a phenomenological reduction of Ignatius’ original 
narrative, which was Ong’s effort to highlight Ignatius’ built-in rhetoric. I have also 
argued that Homer’s “I will come to hate you as terribly as I love you” was a non-
phenomenological reduction of Sappho’s “sweet-bitter” for Homer was a rhetorician who 
started with the rhetorical generality of mankind, rather than the existential situation of 
the person. If to conclude, the essence of phenomenological reductions may be 
understood as a hermeneutic habitus to rightfully use the rhetorical organization in 
revealing the poetic myths. On the constructive side, good phenomenological reductions 
often followed the history of consciousness to make the original symbolic meaning of 
                                                   
55 For example, Albert Camus’ essay “The myth of Sisyphus” indeed came from modern men’s sympathy 
with Sisyphus, which would be unknowing to the ancient Greek citizens.  
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things (e.g. “five loaves of bread and two fishes”) more examinable in the noosphere as 
sensus (e.g. Carey’s rhetorical-polemic structure) with nous (e.g. Carey’s trying to define 
“communication”). On the critical end, semiotic phenomenology enabled us to question 
the legitimacy in Homer’s signifying “I” where “I” indeed had no real significance.  
Kierkegaard’s Account for the Realm of Truth and the Realm of Reality  
Before moving to chapter four, we may try to better understand this particular 
kind of dynamic between the commonplace and the frontier in Ignatius as the founding 
father of the Society of Jesus. On this, in Of the Difference between a Genius and an 
Apostle, Kierkegaard made a radical point that should be heuristic to the discussion 
here.56 In his essay, Kierkegaard wanted to draw a clear line between a genius (“give 
birth to”) and an apostle (“the messenger” in moral errands). At the very beginning, 
Kierkegaard said,  
[The priests] talk in exalted terms of St. Paul’s brilliance and profundity, 
of his beautiful similes and so on – that is mere aestheticism … This kind 
of thoughtless eloquence is quite as likely to celebrate St. Paul as a stylist 
and an artist in words … As a genius St. Paul cannot be compared with 
either Plato or Shakespeare, as a coiner of beautiful similes he comes 
pretty low down in the scale, as stylists his name is quite obscure … As an 
Apostle St. Paul has no connexion whatsoever with Plato or Shakespeare 
…57 
                                                   
56 Soren Kierkegaard. The Present Age and Of the Difference between a Genius and an Apostle. Translated 
by Alexander Dru (Harper & Row, 1962).  
57 Kierkegaard, “Genius and Apostle”, 90.  
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In the above quote, if in comparison with Auerbach’s reconciliation that be it realism (or 
surrealism), the biblical writers were orientated towards the truth, Kierkegaard’s 
argument was much more radical and even anti-rhetorical. He was almost contending that 
the apostle should remain in the oral tradition by keeping a noble distance from the 
overtly rhetorical organizations. Kierkegaard continued to say,  
An Apostle is not born; an Apostle is a man called and appointed by God, 
receiving a mission from him. An Apostle does not develop in such a way 
that he successively becomes what he is … For to become an Apostle is 
not preceded by any potential possibility; essentially every man is equally 
near to becoming one. An Apostle can never come to himself in such a 
way that he becomes conscious of his apostolic calling as a factor in the 
development of his life. Apostolic calling is a paradoxical factor, from 
which first to last in his life stands paradoxically outside his personal 
identity with himself as the definite person he is. A man may perhaps have 
reached years of discretion long ago, when suddenly he is called to be an 
Apostle. As a result of this call he does not become more intelligent, does 
not receive more imagination, a greater acuteness of mind and so on; on 
the contrary, he remains himself and by that paradoxical fact he is sent on 
a particular mission by God.58 
Here, it must be pointed out the above quote in itself was a powerful interpretation of 
Ignatius’ deciding to be an apostle; Kierkegaard challenged our attempt to engage with 
the “media” element in the Exercises. But we may now understand that Kierkegaard was 
                                                   
58 Kierkegaard, “Genius and Apostle”, 92.  
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not anti-rhetorical: his argument was that in becoming an apostle, rhetoric, once as the 
political identity of the person, should finally get the real content that it deserves. 
Therein, Kierkegaard suggested that the only legitimation an apostle could have was that 
“he is sent on a particular mission by God.” In other words, any penetrative insight for 
the effect of persuasion would violate the being of an apostle who stayed exclusively in 
the oral tradition. In the vicinity of media ecology, Jacques Ellul’s Humiliation of the 
Word held the same ground with Kierkegaard. And as we have analyzed in chapter two 
with Soukup’s essay, if Ignatius was an apostle strictly in the sense of Kierkegaard’s 
telling a genius from an apostle, the nonce “prison-cage” was then Ignatius’ momentarily 
earning the right to merge the two incompatible roles together. And this once-only art 
experiment in the Exercises eventually gave birth to Matthew Ricci’s way of relating 
Chinese characters with biblical imageries and Gerard Manley Hopkins’ emblematical 
mysticism. 
Now, Kierkegaard, in protecting and promoting the oral tradition, had some good 
reasons to assign rhetoric and poetics to each other’s strict and specialized function. With 
Kierkegaard, we are indeed cautioned that not all emblems are good communicative 
resources. Again, to take the example of a Chinese idiom, such as “a fine fowl perches 
only on a fine tree, and a virtuous minster serves only a virtuous master”, the critique is 
not necessarily that this para-emblem gives an unethical advice for political disloyalty; 
rather, it is that: since the poetic meaning of “a fowl on a tree” is used to support the 
rhetorical argument of “serving only a virtuous master” which would be hard to support 
otherwise, we almost have to be critical of the rhetorical utterance, especially with this 
arranging the poetic symbol before the rhetorical utterance.  
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In Poetics, Rhetoric and Logic, Wilbur Samuel Howell elaborated on this 
difference between rhetoric and poetics. Howell indicated,  
The simplest way to describe the difference [between rhetoric and poetics] 
is to say that the words which makes up the rhetorical utterance lead the 
reader to the states of reality, whereas the words making up the poetic 
utterance lead the reader to things which stand by deputy for the states of 
reality.59  
Howell maintained rhetorical utterance as “mimetic discourse” and poetic utterance as 
“non-mimetic discourse”. Not far from Kierkegaard’s central concern with the realm of 
“truth” and the realm of “reality”,60 Howell paid more attention to the different ways in 
which words and things can signify: words signify by making a statement, and things 
signify as “stand by deputy” or when words are unsure of what to signify. In other words, 
the symbolic meaning of things may be strictly para-rhetorical as the poet’s way of 
making an “argument” in not knowing where to start. To put this differently, poetic 
arguments are phenomenological descriptions that should be reduced 
phenomenologically, but may not be ready to be phenomenologically reduced.  
Therein, as a site note, contemporary defenses of the poetics often came from the 
rhetoricians – for examples, Kenneth Burke “perspective by incongruity”61 and Umberto 
Eco’s “cogito interruptus”62. With “incongruity” and “interruptus”, Burke and Eco each 
explained one particular function of the poetics if being put into good uses in rhetoric. 
                                                   
59 Wilbur Samuel Howell. Poetics, Rhetoric and Logic: Studies in the Basic Discipline of Criticism (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1975), 223-224.  
60 This is to relate Kierkegaard to Ellul’s differing “the real” from “the true”.  
61 Burke, Permanence and Change, 89.  
62 Eco, Hyperreality, 211.  
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And of course, for a rhetorician to draw a good line between rhetoric and poetics was 
inevitably a rhetorical movement in itself. In this sense, the way Kierkegaard pointed out 
the difference between a genius and an apostle was in itself an act of giving birth to 
future discourses that started with a strong existentialism note. But we should not attack 
Kierkegaard’s rhetorical organization, since it was heuristic indeed to call Ignatius of 
Loyola an “apostle” or a great man, and to call Gerard Manley Hopkins a “genius” or a 
hero.  
On these post-Romanticism issues around whether a contemporary poet could 
borrow from the symbolic meaning of things, in Personalism and Wilderness, Ong 
indeed offered some critique of the American personalism by questioning the whisper 
that the American personalists heard in the wilderness, and Ong was particularly critical 
of relating the whisper of nature to the whisper of things.63 Therein, Ong often cited 
Buber as at the frontier of personalism in our time for Buber’s phenomenological poetics 
as dialogic communication. In this sense, Kierkegaard’s telling the apostle from the 
genius may fall short, since it was both Buber’s genius and his being in the errand of 
morality that made “I and Thou” to be the frontier of 20th century existential thinking 
(and it still is in the 21st century). After all, orality and literacy can only be a “dynamic”, 
but not a “divide”. As Ong would say, the good poet was not ahead of his own time, but 
he was deeply in time.64 
Therein, we have a good reconciliation on Kierkegaard’s differing “apostle” and 
“genius” in the history of consciousness. Again, roughly from “carcass-lion”, to “prison-
                                                   
63 Ong, Barbarian, 236-239.  
64 Ong, “Hopkins’ Sprung Rhythm and the Life of English Poetry”, Reader, 120.  
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cage”, and to “I-Thou”, there was a history of moral consciousness in which the desire to 
be artistic coincided with the birth of a strong moral consciousness.  
Now, to conclude this chapter on the Ignatian emblem, we have reached the 
following characteristics of the “prison-cage” emblem.  
1) In the First Week of the Exercises, a strong desire to be artistic and the birth of 
a strong moral consciousness overlapped in the “prison-cage”.  
2) “Prison-cage” aimed at a more precise representation of the existentialist 
situation.  
3) The media element in the “prison-cage” was Ignatius’ efforts to make the 
Exercises more adaptable to the Renaissance men, as well as Ignatius’ hoping 
the exercitants to be more resourceful in terms of the structures of meditation.  
4) “Prison-cage” still wanted to conquer the word-image dynamic from within 
(with the “carcass-lion” in mind).  
5) “Prison-cage” left the semiotic phenomenology work to the exercitants, and 
called for hermeneutic duty for the exercitants to read more carefully (with “I-
Thou” in mind).  
6) “Prison-cage” could be intellectual materials in the history of consciousness 
for future thinkers’ further elaborations.   
With these characteristics of the “prison-cage” emblems listed, we may now move to 
chapter four to examine the Ignatian emblem in the field of emblem studies. Again, the 
guiding question is: in Ignatius’ Exercises, was there a Jesuitical emblem tradition that 
can teach us better the situation of the emblematics in contemporary times? And keeping 
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in mind that emblems themselves did not ensure cultural prosperities, was there a theory 
of the media-communication dynamic in the Exercises?  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
From Oral Images to the Art of Emblems: The Final Probe into the “Prison-cage”  
Emblems were compound images in the Western imagerial thinking tradition, 
with which arguments could be made in imaginative ways. With those complex signs, 
rhetoricians were able to find intellectual materials by reflecting upon the ways “things 
themselves can signify”,1 which in turn constituted the joy and the wit in the social fabric 
of the commonplace tradition. More straightforwardly, the emblematics can help us better 
understand the innate dynamic between “common things” and “common sayings” as two 
parts of the locus communis.2  
Textual uses of the emblematics can be traced back to antiquity.3 Yet to call the 
compound image “emblem”, mainly as a visual form of art, should refer more 
specifically to the Renaissance emblem book culture that started from Andrea Alciati 
(1492-1550). Alciati was an Italian jurist whose Emblemata (1531) was considered to be 
the first emblem book.4 It is noteworthy that Alciati, as a legal humanist, was already 
well aware of the relations between jurisdiction (the faculty of judgment) and literary 
imagination.5  
                                                   
1 Ong, Barbarian, 248. 
2 This is to extend the locus communis tradition in order to highlight Ong’s argument that “things 
themselves can signify”. The way things can signify (synchronic and intimately silent) is not always 
compatible with the way words can signify (diachronic and acoustically eventful). See Ong, Interface, 149 
for the original two realms of locus communis. 
3 The essence of the emblematics was phenomenological reduction with an underlying moral force. In this 
dissertation, I call the Hebraic emblematics “proto-emblems” to indicate they were more genealogically 
related to the Renaissance emblem book culture than the “para-emblems” of the Grecian emblematics. 
However, it should be noted that the Ignatian emblems had both Hebraic and Grecian characteristics.  
4 See Anna Marie Roos. “The Hawstead panel: Applied Emblematics, Walter Ong, and the Discourse of 
Women in Early Modern England.” In Of Ong and Media Ecology: Essays in Communication, 
Composition, and Literacy Studies, edited by Thomas J. Farrell and Paul A. Soukup (New York: Hampton 
Press), 197.  
5 See Martha C. Nussbaum. “Poets as Judges: Judicial Rhetoric and the Literary Imagination.” University of 
Chicago Law Review 62, 4 (1995): 1477-1519. I was informed by Pat Arneson, “Nussbaum and the poet-
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Since St. Ignatius of Loyola was Spanish, and since Spanish Netherlands were a 
main field of emblem book publishing,6 Ignatius was certainly within this media 
environment and its intellectual milieu.7 This should be well evidenced by the “prison-
cage” emblem in the Exercises that I have examined from a variety of perspectives in the 
previous chapters. After the foundation of the Society of Jesus, the Jesuits took the 
leadership in publishing emblem books. During the first half of the seventeenth century, 
the Jesuits produced some 1,700 of emblem books of which 500 were first editions. This 
has been strongly evidenced by Daly and Dimler who compiled a complete Jesuit series 
of emblem books.8 In their more recent work The Jesuit Emblem in the European 
Context, Daly and Dimler provided a comprehensive bibliographical review on the 
emblem books written by the Jesuits, with explorations into a Jesuitical appropriation of 
the emblematics and a Jesuit theory of symbols and signs.9 In this chapter, without 
neglecting the Jesuits’ protecting and promoting the emblem book, I should focus more 
on the Ignatian emblems in the Exercises.  
Before the probing, it may be pointed out that the common definition of an 
emblem as the tripartite of “motto, pictorial image, and epigram” indeed indicated that 
the emblem book was already a well developed form of art in the Renaissance. In this 
project, I have used semiotic phenomenology (“image” as phenomenological description, 
                                                   
judge: Considerations for jurisprudence,” Paper presented in 3rd Biennial Philosophy of Communication 
Conference, Pittsburgh, PA. June 2017.  
6 Ong, Hopkins, 70.  
7 See Ong, Hopkins, 60. Ignatius was influenced by the Renaissance humanists, but he himself indicated 
that he found Erasmus’ work to be “leaving him spiritually cold”. There were differences between the legal 
humanists’ “faculty of judgment” and the Ignatian “discernment of spirits”. 
8 See Peter Daly and Richard Dimler. Corpus Librorum Emblematum: The Jesuit Series. Vol. 1 (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1997). Also see Daly and Dimler. Corpus Librorum Emblematum: The 
Jesuit Series. Vol. 2-5 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000-2007).  
9 See Daly and Dimler, The Jesuit Emblem.  
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“motto” as phenomenological reduction, and “epigram” as phenomenological 
interpretation) in trying to reveal some of the real reasons for this three-part structure (or 
more precisely, three stages of phenomenological perceptions). Yet as careful readers 
must have noticed, in the Exercises the Ignatian emblems were textual, without the 
visualized “pictorial image”. The question is then: why shall we still consider the Ignatian 
compound images as “emblems”, rather than “para-emblems”?  
Here, it may be clarified that Ignatius, though living in the historical period with 
the Reformation and the iconoclasm movement, was not biased towards the logos or the 
imago.10 In fact, the Ignatian emblems in the Exercises may be considered as “classical” 
in the sense that Ignatius still wanted to conquer the word-image dynamic within the 
diachronic phenomenology of the spoken word. Moreover, given that the stages of the 
spiritual growth (from purgative, to illuminative and to unitive) were complete in the 
Exercises, I have contended that Ignatius simply left the work of phenomenological 
reduction and phenomenological interpretation to the exercitants. The Exercises was not 
a-theoretical as phenomenological descriptions without phenomenological reductions and 
interpretations.  
To be more specific, for Ignatius, the dynamic between the “visible” and the 
“invisible” was built in. In the first prelude of the First Exercise, history, as in the events 
of Christ’s life, was considered “visible”. When “meditating on something visible”, 
Ignatius asked the exercitants to encompass as many sense data as possible in the form of 
conscious experience. Yet when “mediating on something invisible”, Ignatius indeed 
                                                   
10 It is fond to note that in today’s marketing communication, we use the term “logo” in fact to describe 
both the logos (the written word) and the imago (the emblematical kind of image). This kind of 
“emblematical residues” may indicate the influence of the iconoclasm movement on the commercial mind.  
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asked the exercitants to make the emblems themselves by phenomenologically reducing 
the original “composite of places” to the rhetorical organization as in Ong’s “prison-
cage” emblem. With the rhetorical organization, the exercitants could then complement 
the emblematics with the “epigram” (a moral postscript), by phenomenologically 
interpreting the arguments just made as in the rhetorical organization within the “prison-
cage” emblem. This should be best evidenced with the rhetoric-poetics dynamic in 
Gerard Manley Hopkins’ poems. For example, Hopkins ended one of his late poems with 
“mine, O thou lord of life, send my roots rain”11 after his contending with God – the 
rhetorical organization worked in a way that the final line (the “epigram”) cancelled out 
all the effectiveness of the arguments just made. Here, the point is that: when some 
exercitants, like Hopkins, examined the existential situation (the “invisible”) with the 
kind of particularities in examining history (the “visible”), the dynamic between the 
“visible” and the “invisible” then generated some real difficulty for this exercitant to be 
able to still maintain some noetic economy.12  
With the above clarifications, we may start the final probe into the “prison-cage”. 
The general argument of this chapter, as indicated in the title “from oral images to the art 
of emblems”, is that: with the “oral images” of the proto-emblems (as in the “carcass-
lion” imagery), the author(s) knew no other way but to conquer the word-image dynamic 
within the diachronic phenomenology of the spoken (speaking) word; yet in becoming a 
“form of art”, the emblems in the Renaissance (as in the “prison-cage” imagery) could 
                                                   
11 For the full poem, see Gerard Manley Hopkins. Gerald Manley Hopkins: The Major Works. Edited by 
Catherine Phillips (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 183. 
12 See Hopkins, The Major Works, 290-300.  
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then be applied with more existential accuracy and critical reflectiveness, though the 
“medium” no longer had to be built into the “message”.13  
Accordingly, I will start with some reflections on applying semiotic 
phenomenology into the Ignatian emblems. Semiotic phenomenology can help us better 
understand that: to say the Ignatian emblems were composed of multiple signifiers is not 
to indicate that there is no demand for the signified; rather, the exercitants must form a 
sign (make an election) with the signified being conquered within the signifiers 
themselves. Then, I will offer a tentative definition of the Ignatian emblem as “one 
signifier with another signifier”14 by highlighting the difficulty of phenomenological 
reductions in the emblematics. Therein, I use an early American semiotician, Frederick 
A. Rauch’s work to examine the nuances between and among “symbolical” (raw 
symbols), “emblematical” (contingent symbols/signs), and “semiotical” (common 
signs).15 Eventually, the final probe into the “prison-cage” emblem will focus on the 
dynamic between phenomenology and personalism within the historical development of 
the emblematics.  
Reflections on Applying Semiotic Phenomenology into the Ignatian Emblem 
At the end of chapter three, we have reached six characteristics of the “prison-
cage” emblem, and the main argument is that the Ignatian emblem should be examined 
within the history of consciousness. In this section, I want to elaborate on this “history of 
                                                   
13 Once again, this is to highlight the moral implications in Marshall McLuhan’s appropriation of the 
emblematics. With the spoken (speaking) words, the medium is innately the message.  
14 See Soukup, “Ritual and Movement”.  
15 See Thomas A. Sebeok. Semiotics in the United States (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
1991), 10. 
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consciousness” by reflecting upon the ways in which the current project has been 
working with semiotic phenomenology.  
Semiotic phenomenology came with a built-in dynamic between semiotics (in 
concerns with the obligation to signify and the meaning of the signs and symbols) and 
phenomenology (in concerns with the obligation to start with phenomenological 
description when meanings are yet uncertain). With this dynamic, from the perspective of 
a semiotician, rhetoric was about the obligation to make arguments as the essence of 
intellectual movements, and from the perspective of a phenomenologist, rhetoric was 
more about recovering and re-discovering the rhetorical contingency (within the 
enthymeme and within the emblematics) whose phenomenological birthplaces could be 
long lost or forgotten. When examining the rhetoric of the “prison-cage” emblem, this 
dynamic between semiotics and phenomenology was applied to understand, respectively, 
1) Ignatius’ adding “cage” (another signifier) after “prison” (the first signifier) in search 
for a more definitive sign, and 2) the original rhetorical contingency within the “prison” 
imagery as a biblical commonplace, renewed by the “cage” imagery.  
Within the history of consciousness, the semiotics-phenomenology dynamic was 
reconciled and synthesized into the stages of development from phenomenological 
description, to phenomenological reduction, and to phenomenological interpretation.16 In 
Communicology: The New Science of Embodies Discourse, Isaac Catt and Deborah Catt 
emphasized semiotic phenomenology to be focusing on the interrelated domains of 
                                                   
16 Lanigan, Communicology, 17.  
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communication, including the intrapersonal (corporeal-self domain), interpersonal (self-
other domain), social (group-organization domain), and the cultural domain.17  
Accordingly, on the intrapersonal level, when exploring the “prison-cage” 
imagery, I was indeed hit by the synchronicity of the meanings of the “prison-cage”, 
simultaneously as the biblical commonplace, as the hermeneutic difficulty to discover 
Ignatius’ original narrative as emblematical, and as potential appropriations of the 
Ignatian emblematics in today’s media environment. Semiotic phenomenology then 
offered ways to deal with this all-at-once complexity by establishing the perceptive order 
as from the commonplace, to the emblematics, and to the meaning of the emblematics in 
the current historical moment. Therein, I learnt to be phenomenological by roughly 
following the “order of experience” and the “order of analysis”18 within 
phenomenological description, reduction and interpretation, although it may be cautioned 
that the intrapersonal domain could be close to the speculative introspection with a hint of 
Cartesian meditations. Rather than starting with “having the idea”, I had to bracket the 
status of “having”, and start with examining “the idea” critically.  
On the interpersonal level, this dissertation was built upon Walter Ong’s 
appropriation of Ignatius’ Exercises, Gerard Manley Hopkins’ appropriation of the 
Exercises, Matthew Ricci’s appropriation of the Exercises, as well as Ong’s call for 
future research on Ignatius’ using the emblem in the Exercises to which I responded. On 
the social level, as stated in the first chapter, the current ware of interest in the Exercises 
                                                   
17 Isaac E. Catt and Deborah Eicher-Catt, “Communicology: A Reflective Human Science.” In 
Communicology: The New Science of Embodied Discourse, edited by Isaac E. Catt and Deborah Eicher-
Catt (Madison, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2010), 19.  
18 Lanigan, Communicology, 20. In this project, the “order of experience” is to move from “tool” to 
“machine” in tracing the technological development of media, and the “order of analysis” is to move from 
“machine” to “tool” in understanding the human imagination in the rhetoric and philosophy of 
communication technologies.  
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was still part of the ongoing debate between the structuralists (e.g. Peter Ramus, Roland 
Barthes, Jacques Derrida) and the phenomenologists (e.g. Ignatius of Loyola, Marshall 
McLuhan, Walter Ong) on the very notion of “structure”.19  
On the cultural level, towards which this dissertation heads in concerns with a 
particular kind of intercultural communication between English alphabet and Chinese 
ideography, semiotic phenomenology then provided the meta-meta-cultural framework of 
Phenomenology Description (as the way perceptions began in all cultures), 
Phenomenology Reduction (as the way all cultures have managed the noetic economy of 
perceptions in moral orders), and Phenomenological Interpretation (as the way all 
cultures must wake from their own “dogmatic slumber”, partly by rediscovering the 
phenomenological description, partly by understanding the difficulty in moral-
phenomenological reductions, and partly by still choosing to complete the thinking 
process with an underlying moral force).  
Within this meta-meta-cultural framework, the meta-cultural framework may also 
follow the stages of development from phenomenological description to reduction and to 
interpretation, which was often studied with the media-communication dynamic.20 In the 
current project, within the Judeo-Christian emblematics, the meta-cultural framework 
then roughly moved from the “carcass-lion” imagery as the most powerful kind of 
phenomenological description in which the author refused to reduce and dared not to 
                                                   
19 See Jacques Derrida. “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Science.” In Writing and 
Difference, translated by Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). To take the example of 
the tool of a tea cup, for Derrida, the cup is what it is, but we use what it is not – the Buddhism contention 
is that there is no cup. For McLuhan, the cup is the medium, and we are in the environment provided by the 
cup – the phenomenon of using the cup should be examined phenomenologically. McLuhan was not a 
poststructuralist in that he did not exclude the metaphysics of the tea cup. For McLuhan, all technologies 
are innately communication technologies.  
20 In Communicology, Lanigan moved from radio, to painting and to television.  
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interpret, to the “prison-cage” imagery as Ignatius’ teaching phenomenological 
perceptions with moral-phenomenological reductions (the Exercises pivoted on making 
the election), and to “I-Thou” as Buber’s phenomenological interpretation on the 
situation of the spoken word by staying strictly within the realm of poetics as dialogic 
relationship. And it is within the meta-meta-cultural and meta-cultural framework that we 
may understand better the culture of the Renaissance emblem book to which the 
Exercises belonged and responded.  
In The Human Science of Communicology, Lanigan’s elaboration on semiotic 
phenomenology should be very helpful in better understanding the real difficulty of the 
“prison-cage” emblem. As Lanigan explained,  
“Communication” (information per se) in this information theoretic view 
is a choice made in a given context and it is susceptible to an either/or 
logic of digital selection. Here, the process of signification as the 
“reduction of uncertainty” provides a referential practice (probably as a 
signifier), but no referent (signified). In fact, we should realize that the 
formal and operational procedures of information theory require a 
symbolic equivocation of the signifier and signified in the conception of 
the sign. (italicized mine) From a postmodern perspective, then expression 
and perception are collapsed into the operational concept of representation 
and it empirical manifestation as the symbol in speaking and writing.21  
The postmodern implication of the Exercises (with image compounds like “prison, valley 
[of tears], and among brute animals”) was indeed that Ignatius “deconstructed” (cut it 
                                                   
21 Lanigan, Communicology, 14. 
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open) the binaries in the making of decisions.22 With Lanigan, we may say that “the 
discernment of spirits” should be difficult, because the “reduction of uncertainty” is 
essentially the situation of a signifier without a signified, in search for a more definitive 
meaning (a sign). Without the existential effort to search for a sign, the ritual of 
communication can fall into being phenomenological description without reduction and 
interpretation, as raw symbols in which, as stated, one takes his or her own risk in 
understanding and misunderstanding the watermark on the wall as in the shape of a holy 
cross. Lanigan continued to say,  
According to Bourdieu, the methodological problem of analysis is the 
theoretical problem of hexis (L. habitus), i.e. the problematic of habit in 
which the choice made (consciousness) demands that its own context 
(experience) be taken as thematic. This way of formulating the issue of 
analysis is strictly phenomenological. A problematic is a description of a 
phenomenon from which essential characteristics are abstracted as the 
criteria for defining that concrete example of phenomenon.23 
With Lanigan, “the making of decisions” (choice of contexts) and “making the decision” 
(context of choices) in the Exercises can have theoretical implications. To take the 
example of Matthew Ricci’s appropriation of the Exercises, Ricci’s difficulty in making 
the decision to do missionary work in China was that: the cause (having the idea to do 
missionary work in China) indeed coincided with part of the effect (actually going to 
China to do missionary work). In order to discern the cause and the effect, Ricci had to 
                                                   
22 The structuralists’ and post-structuralists’ readings of the Exercises tended to ignore that the Exercises 
involved making a decision that has never been made before.  
 
23 Lanigan, Communicology, 14. 
  122 
understand the status of having the idea of doing missionary work in China,24 and by 
making the decision to go, this election then required Ricci to be even more conscious of 
his experience. This was the dialectical movement of “from experience (of a strong desire 
to do missionary work in China) to consciousness (the making of decisions: to go or not 
to go)”, and “from consciousness (making the decision to go) to experience (the actual 
missionary work in China)”. In the above quote, Lanigan used the term “hexis” (the 
Greek word for the status of “having”) to emphasize this bodily-phenomenological 
necessity to problematize the coincidence of cause and effect. Again, the real vice here 
would be for Ricci “to just go to China” without any discerning effort. In Lanigan’s 
further examinations,  
The validity of the eidetic realization can be checked by locating the 
original phenomenon or one like it as an empirical actualization in 
experience. Thus with the eidetic notion of hexis, the empirical practice of 
habit becomes a message that is communication theoretic. The meaning of 
the message is [?] in the communication theoretic sense of an embodied 
choice of context that is manifest in an analogue logic of both/and 
selection. Here, the process of meaning as the “constitution of 
intentionality” (conscious experience) provides a referential practice (i.e. 
possibility) as its own reflective referent (i.e. the sign as signifier and 
signified).25  
                                                   
24 In the Husserlian tradition, in order to examine “having the idea” phenomenologically, one must bracket 
the part of “having”, and starting with tracing the birthplaces of “the idea” critically. In the Heideggerian 
tradition, “having the idea” itself has phenomenological difficulties in that part of the past (“have had the 
idea”) indeed coincides with the future (carrying out the idea). 
25 Lanigan, Communicology, 14. 
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From the quote above, Lanigan offered a powerful explanation of the performative nature 
of the Exercises as an embodied communication theory. To continue the example of 
Ricci’s, the meaning in choosing to do missionary work in China was essentially the birth 
of a sign, where the signifiers were able to find a signified within. In other words, Ricci 
“conquered” the situation of having the signifiers without the signified. As a side note, 
this kind of spiritual exercises should be indispensable for the missionaries – if a foreign 
environment cannot be conquered directly (such as by revolting the local government), 
the cross-cultural difficulties must be conquered from within.  
To conclude, semiotic phenomenology was truly a human science in being able to 
employ information theories in meaningful ways in order to study the networks of 
genuine communication. Yet in the above elaborations on semiotic phenomenology, 
Lanigan explained little the transition from the difficulty of a signifier without a signified, 
to the birth-labor of a sign in which one should find the signified within the signifiers. 
Again, as Soukup reminded, semiotics in Roman Catholicism can be put as: one signifier 
with another signifier,26 which was rooted in the missionaries’ situation of having to 
constantly negotiate between two worlds. In McLuhan, this was the essence of “probes” 
that granted information to be communication at the first place.27 In Ignatius, one 
signifier with another signifier could be the real reason for the “composite of places” to 
exist. If indeed the emblematics was innately one signifier with another signifier on the 
halfway towards being fully conscious, in the following section, I want to extend 
                                                   
26 Soukup, “Ritual and Movement”.  
27 For McLuhan, “probes” do not necessarily have to give birth to a sign; however, organizing the “probes” 
does necessarily require some kind of structure which involves the act of signifying.  
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Lanigan’s work by focusing more on the dynamic between semiotics and phenomenology 
in the name of “communicology” that implies the unifying efforts.  
The Stage of the “Emblematical”: Phenomenological Accounts for the Life of a Sign 
In the previous section, I have contended that the “prison-cage” emblem was 
Ignatius’ effort to communicate the existential situation in the making of decisions and 
making the decision. To be more specific, when the exercitants had an experience (e.g. 
Ricci’s having the idea of going to China to do missionary work), being aware of this 
experience, they were existentially “prisoned” for having a signifier without a signified in 
the urgent need for a sign. In making the election, the exercitants became conscious that 
they must be even more conscious of the actual experience in carrying out the decision. 
Therein, the existential “prison” began to be conquered with the signified being planted 
into the signifier itself – the “prison” became a “cage” with the hope for a reunion, from 
having to be “divided” in making the decision. In short, Ignatius’ “prison-cage” emblem 
was a powerful mimesis of the existentialist’s situation. With the Ignatian emblem, in this 
section, I shall explore into an alternative definition of the “emblem”, not structurally (as 
in “motto, image, epigram”), but within the stages of development in the life of a sign.28  
In Semiotics in the United States, as Sebock reported, Frederick A. Rauch, who 
was one of the pioneers of American semioticians, wrote in the 1840s that “it 
[imagination] is at first symbolical, then it becomes emblematical, and finally 
semeiotical.”29 Here, Rauch’s account for the stages of development of human 
imagination, from “symbolical”, to “emblematical”, to “semeiotical”, provided some 
                                                   
28 By “life”, I mean the “ecology” in the eco-nomos as the noetic economy of the mind.  
29 Sebeok. Semiotics, 10.  
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phenomenological accounts for the emblematics as the middle stage in the history of 
image-making. Rauch’s full explication follows:  
It is symbolical, then the object by which it represents a thought, and the 
thought itself are homogeneous. Darkness cannot be the symbol of light; 
but “when a genius with an inverted torch is placed as a monument upon a 
grave, it is symbolical. For there a life has been extinguished, a light on 
eye, beneath that monument the dead lies without life, without light – the 
light of torch and the light of life are homogeneous. On the other hand, the 
productions of imagination are emblematical when the form and content 
become inadequate to each other, or are heterogeneous. The feeling of 
thirst and a glass of beer on a tavern sign have nothing homogeneous; the 
sign is therefore, not the symbol of thirst, but its emblem. Yet there is still 
a relation between them; or if a relation no longer exists, the imagination 
works semiotically. Here the form intended to represent certain contents 
does not in the least resemble them; it therefore represents something 
entirely different from itself; the imagination determines that a thing 
independent of its fitness shall signify or indicate a certain thing, though it 
bears not the slightest relation to the thing signified. Two triangles, for 
instance, put into each other, are in many countries used as signs before 
beer-houses; there is certainly no relation between two triangles and beer. 
If the things used as symbols and emblems continue to have an existence, 
whether we place contents in them or not, the sign loses importance when 
the thought signified is drawn from it, or when it is no longer used 
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significantly. Many signs which we daily make can be understood by no 
one except ourselves, the boy, for instance, breaks down a few branches 
near where he has discovered a bird’s nest; this is to him an indicative 
sign, but not to us, hence we can attach no importance to these broken 
branches.30  
In the above quote, Rauch provided a three-stage pattern of development for human 
imagination. In examining the emblematics as a semiotician, Rauch was interested in the 
life of a sign within which one of the stages was notably “emblematical”. As Sebeok 
considered Rauch to be a true pioneer of American semiotics, in the 1840s, there was 
already a built-in dynamic between semiotics and phenomenology in Rauch’s account. 
With Rauch’s “symbolical, emblematical, and semeiotical” (in relations to Peirce’s 
“icon/index/symbolical”),31 it is safe to say that the American semioticians have been 
very attentive to the orality of a sign that “picks up” a pattern of development which can 
exist independently of the movement of the spoken words. And it should be noted that 
Rauch was well aware of the vulnerability of the emblematics if being used arbitrarily – 
“if a relation no longer exists, the imagination works semiotically.” Given the good 
complexities in Rauch’s defining the “emblematical”, I shall examine Rauch’s statement 
in greater details.  
The first example Rauch used was counter-intuitive; he considered “the inverted 
torch upon the grave” to be “symbolical” and not yet “emblematical”. To be more 
specific, Rauch considered the movement from “torch”, to “light”, to “life” and to 
“death” as within the commonplace tradition – the dis-familiarization in the “inverted” 
                                                   
30 Sebeok, Semiotics, 10 
31 Sebock, Semiotics, 10.  
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did not necessarily problematize the commonplace tradition. Here, we may add that “the 
inverted torch” should work better than “the extinguished torch”. The former indicated 
that the life of the genius would continue to be influential after the death. The euphemism 
worked well because “the inverted torch” was a more accurate representation of the life 
in the genius’ death. (This is similar to the existential accuracy in the Shakespearean 
“crossbow-longbow” imagery.) In short, the imaginative and the real are “homogenous” 
here – the author of the compound image of “the inverted torch upon the grave” simply 
had the topoi of the “death of the genius” better as the “life in the death of the genius”.  
In the second example, Rauch was critical of using “the glass of beer” on a tavern 
sign as the emblem for the feeling of thirst. Yet, instead of condemning the 
heterogeneous relation between the place of the tavern and the bodily feeling of thirst, 
Rauch still considered “the glass of beer” on a tavern sign to be emblematical. Here, the 
critique was about the act of singling out one signifier from a pool of equally competent 
(and incompetent) signifiers – a rhetorician may point out that the more accurate 
representation should be the category itself, such as in the American way of saying “I 
need a drink”. In other words, it was not the types of drink that needed to be discerned, 
but the bodily feeling of thirst that one responded to. Again, the deconstructive argument 
could be: one can only be sure of the bodily feeling of thirst as the signifier (whose 
incompleteness in the need for a drink disqualifies it from being a sign). “The glass of 
beer” on a tavern sign should fall short in being the rightful signified, as much as the 
imagery of the glass of wine. However, Rauch’s point was that although all particular 
kinds of drink should work (and not work), “the glass of beer” simply worked out to be 
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the common sign. And it was this kind of representational accident32 that could be 
deemed as “emblematical”.  
The third example Rauch used should be the most heuristic one to the current 
project. Rauch reminded that “two triangles” used to be the emblem for beer-houses. The 
relations between “two triangles” and beer-houses were formerly emblematical, and 
turned to be semiotical when the original perception could no longer be remembered.33 
Here, it is particularly noteworthy that from “the glass of beer” to “two triangles”, Rauch 
indeed pointed out a general pattern of development within the emblematics. “The glass 
of beer” was close to be “symbolical” and “two triangles” was close to be “semeiotical”, 
but both were still qualified to be “emblematical”. To extend Rauch’s insight, the 
questions are then: what was indeed the original phenomenological perception in relating 
“two triangles” to the beer-houses, and why were “two triangles” more emblematical than 
“the glass of beer”? To explore into the questions, it should be worthwhile to raise the 
example of the two stages of being emblematical in the river imagery, from the emblem 
of the “wavy line” to the emblem of “two drops of water”.  
With the early American semioticians’ fascination with the Native Americans’ 
natural signs,34 the Native Americans’ sign for the river was commonly drawn as the 
“wavy line” which indicated the rapid movement of the water that made the river rough 
and risky. With Rauch’s general pattern of the development of the emblematics, the 
“wavy line” was an early emblem for the river, which was close to being “symbolical” as 
the “wavy line” was still a realistic representation of the rapid movement of the water, 
                                                   
32 To say “accident” is not to say “randomness”; “accident” indicates an unexpected eventfulness.  
33 The emblem of the “two triangles” can be connected to the symbolic system of the alchemy. Also see 
Carl Jung, Psychology and Alchemy.  
34 Sebock, Semiotics, 14.  
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although the “wavy line” was heterogeneous to the danger of the rough river – were the 
“wavy line” imagined as a “snake”, in Rauch’s terms, the “snake” would be “symbolical” 
and homogenous to the danger of the river.35  
Inter-culturally, the Chinese ideography for the river-related Chinese characters 
was composed of “two drops of water”,36 with the first drop of water dripping downward 
and the second drop moving upward. In order to convey the senses of downward and 
upward movements, the “two drops of water” then appeared vertical, which was different 
from the horizontal perspective of the “wavy line”.37 Within Rauch, “two drops of water” 
could be understood as a late emblem for the river, which was close to be “semeiotical” 
since the second, upward-moving drop of water was surrealistic and offered a 
phenomenological interpretation on the meaning of the river as the anti-naturalistic 
movement of the human life, although “two drops of water” was still emblematical in that 
the first drop of water was a realistic representation of the river’s flowing downward in 
nature. Therein, the designer of the “two drops of water” indeed made a powerful 
argument on the dynamic between the way of nature and the way of human life.  
Similar to the development from “the glass of beer” to “two triangles”, there was 
a general pattern of development in being “emblematical” from the “wavy line” to “two 
drops of water”. Here, one may say that the upward movement of the “two triangles” was 
strictly a rhetorical hope for the spirit-lifting discourses in beer-houses, since a more 
                                                   
35 The early American semioticians were already well aware that the Native Americans’ natural signs were 
“signs” of cultures, not raw symbols.   
36 The ideograph of the “two drops of water” (with one stroke moving downward and one stroke moving 
upward), like the two strokes of the dialectical movement (with one stroke moving towards the left and one 
stroke moving towards the right) should be within the Chinese writing system, long before the simplified 
Chinese.  
37 Eric McLuhan once pointed out that the ancient Egyptians knew well how to play with the “perspectives” 
by dis-familiarizing gestures of hands. See McLuhan and Zhang, “Poetics”, 64-65.  
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dialectical representation should be with one triangle moving upward, and the other 
triangle moving downward. As Aristotle granted rhetoric (as political discourses) to be 
the counterpart of courtroom debates, the rhetorical movement had good reasons to move 
forward (and upward), rather than to move dialectically.  
From “symbolical” to “emblematical”, and from “emblematical” to “semeiotical”, 
Rauch’s phenomenological accounts for the emblematics highlighted two movements, 
with the latter movement revealing the meaning of things in the rhetorical hopes for 
human communication.  
Eventually, in the fourth example on “the boy’s broken branch”, Rauch fondly 
remarked that human imagination allowed both more personal and more interpersonal 
connections. With Rauch, “the edge of the commonplace” could be perceived as: it was 
common for boys to break branches to signify a spot, but it was also personal that the 
sign only worked for the boy himself. Simply put, the sign of the broken branch was used 
by the boy.  
To conclude Rauch’s phenomenological accounts for the emblematics, Rauch, at 
the frontier of American semiotics in the 1840s, defined the emblematics as one of the 
three stages of development in the human imagination from “symbolical”, to 
“emblematical”, and “to semeiotical”. With Rauch, the “emblematical” could be 
understood as the middle stage in the life a sign, and when a sign reached the stage of 
“semeiotical”, the “emblematical” meanings could be forgotten, sometimes for the sake 
of cleaning out some rooms for phenomenological interpretations and other times with 
particular vulnerabilities to being used as propagandas.  
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Moreover, Rauch probed into the emblem artists’ contribution to dealing with the 
symbolic meaning of things as hermeneutic entrances into the meaning of human 
communication – the pragmatics of communication in the emblematics can be precisely 
to understand communication. Furthermore, Rauch touched upon the emblem artists’ 
reflection on human communication as the counterpart to the way nature works (e.g. the 
upward-moving drop of water). It should be noted here that in the modern field of 
communication studies, it was with Teilhard de Chardin that human communication was 
clearly understood as the antithesis to the evolution in the biosphere – this was very 
different from the American personalists’ listening to the whisper from the book of 
nature.38  
With Rauch’s defining the “emblematical”, I shall move towards a comprehensive 
review on the historical development of the emblematics with the field of emblem 
studies. With this review, I try to understand the Ignatian emblem as distinctively meta-
communicative by understanding human communication (one signifier with another 
signifier) as the antithesis to the information systems of the world (infinite signifiers in 
the shape of an Ouroboros).  
A Brief Historical Review of the Emblematics  
Antiquity  
As stated, textual uses of the emblem can be traced back to antiquity. In this 
project, as I have considered the “carcass-lion” compound image in 1 Kings 13:24-25 to 
be a proto-emblem, it should be noted that the topoi of lion-and-kingship (Kingship) was 
within the biblical commonplace. For example, in 1 Kings 10:19-20, the author was by 
                                                   
38 See Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. The Phenomenon of Man (Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2008). 
Original work in French published in 1955.  
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no means image-shy in using the visual symmetry of “the twelve lions on each end of a 
step on the six steps”. The point here is that: when the author(s) used the emblem, being 
emblematical required him or her to be at the edge of the commonplace, not to be 
rebelliously visual, but to complicate the interpretative process since meaningful 
understandings were complex indeed. Again, the original image compound in 1 Kings 13: 
24-25 was:  
And when he was gone, a lion met him by the way, and slew him: and his 
carcass was cast in the way, and the ass stood by it, the lion also stood by 
the carcass. And behold, men passed by, and saw the carcass cast in the 
way, and the lion standing by the carcass.  
Till 1 Kings 20:36, the “carcass-lion” imagery was then used more directly as a learned 
lesson: “then he said to him, ‘Because you have not obeyed the voice of the lord, behold, 
as soon as you have gone from me, a lion shall strike you down.” And the same was true 
in 2 Kings 17:25 where the author wrote, “and at the beginning of their dwelling there, 
they did not fear the Lord. Therefore, the Lord sent lions among them, which killed some 
of them.” The question is then: why did the “carcass-lion” emblem only occur once 
throughout the two books of Kings? With the field of emblem studies, examining the 
emblematics allows us to understand such myth of communication as proto-
phenomenological.  
To explore into the question above, in today’s term, one may say the author(s) of 
two books of Kings was not without a habitus of using the “existential absurdity” in 
sudden deaths to communicate a particular kind of moral force, which can be understood 
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as a proto-existential perception of the very unpredictability in living the nomadic life.39 
But again, it must be clarified that the author did not make the “carcass-lion” imagery 
beforehand, so that the image compound could be used as moral reductions later. Rather, 
within this proto-emblem, the birth of a powerful moral consciousness coincided with a 
strong desire to be artistic.40 And the author(s) seemed to be conscious of that the 
emblematics should not be used lavishly.  
In the field of emblem studies, the habitus of the author(s) of the two books of 
Kings in not using the “carcass-lion” imagery excessively might explain the situation of 
the emblematics as being at the edge of the commonplace tradition. Case studies for 
studying biblical proto-emblems were difficult to identify.41 And in terms of the myth of 
communication, the emblematics has been used as supportive materials whose 
significance was to be complementary to the logos. As Ong had it, the interpretative 
formula was: “mythos complements logos”.42 But this was not to suggest the emblematics 
as logo-centric in that the emblem also completed the contentiousness of logos. As 
evidenced in the “carcass-lion”, the author knew how to build the word-image dynamic 
into the narrative. In turn, such built-in dynamic between word and image should 
highlight the Western imagerial thinking tradition in which mythos also combats logos 
within the diachronic phenomenology of the “speaking” word.  
                                                   
39 The act of writing is essentially the pen’s moving against the medium (the parchment or the paper), with 
the thoughts moving forward.  
40 Like the “prison-cage” emblem, the proto-emblem of the “carcass-lion” was more of an “artful event” 
than of an “eventful art”. By “artful event”, I mean that the spoken words are innately eventful.  
41 The “carcass-lion” imagery was brought to my attention from Ailing Zhang’s fond remark on the 
“lovability” of the Old Testament writers’ occasional self-repeating and self-refuting. See Hu Lancheng. 
JinShengJinShi [This life, these times] (Beijing: China ChangAn Press, 2013).  
42 Ong, Barbarian, 9.  
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In comparison with the strong moral consciousness in the biblical proto-emblems, 
the Grecian emblems or para-emblems, such as in Icarus’ wax-wing or as in Athena from 
the split of Zeus’ head often had more definitive meanings. As stated, the Grecian para-
emblems were only concerned with the action of living an intellectual life, without 
probing into the inner movements. To take the example of Athena from the split of Zeus’ 
head, as soon as the action of mankind’s giving birth to an idea was caught, both the 
birth-giver and the idea were then rhetorically generalized into being “Zeus” and 
“Athena” – the author(s) had no intention to be personalistic. Homeric poets were 
concerned with communicating mankind’s shared situation in giving birth to an idea 
laboriously.43 
In this sense, the Grecian para-emblems can be understood as the most democratic 
kind of phenomenological description without reduction and interpretation. The openness 
of the Grecian emblematics, as the so-called “collective childhood of human 
imagination”, invites phenomenological approaches. A good example here could be 
Camus’ The Myth of Sisyphus, in which Camus concluded with a phenomenological 
interpretation of a modern man’s sympathy and empathy with Sisyphus.44 Such personal 
connection with Sisyphus would be unknowing to the Grecian writers, and with Camus, 
modern painters could always highlight Sisyphus’ strong muscle to make the argument 
on the meaning of the existential absurdity in Sisyphus’ eternal ordeal of laboring.  
Now, in chapter three, with Anne Carson’s accounts for Sappho’s “bittersweet”,45 
I have briefly addressed the dynamic between Eros and logos in the emblematics. The 
                                                   
43 Also see Arendt, Condition, 192-199. 
44 Camus, Sisyphus.  
45 See Carson, Eros, 3-9. 
  135 
problem is raised as: was “bittersweet” emblematical or anti-emblematical in the sense 
that the poetics in Sappho was to catch the psychological movement as e-motions, 
without resorting to any symbolic meaning of things? Here, it may be clarified that at 
least for Aristotle, psyche is not the inward aspect of being. The Greek had no word for 
the “self” until Plotinus (AD 203 -270).46 In other words, it was not that Sappho was a 
proto-feminist to employ the synchronicity of Eros (that opposed the Homeric rhetorical 
“flow”47 in “I will come to hate you as terribly as I love you”) in defense of the poetics 
against the Apollonian dazzling sun-brightness.48 Rather, in Aristotle, psyche is “what 
sustains an animate being in a particular kind of movement – psyche is in that 
movement.”49 To put this differently, Eros in Sappho was close to the girl’s discerning 
romantic love in Murakami’s story: the synchronicity of Eros, along with the built-in 
diachronic attempt in the “bittersweet”, had to do with the rhetoricians’ discerning “all 
possible means of persuasion” with a feminine kind of meticulousness that stayed within 
orality, while the discerning process demanded some existential distance from the oral 
tradition.  
Ever since the antiquity, the Western mind, with the so-called “divided self”, has 
been constantly dealing with the sometimes painful situation of having to communicate a 
synchronic moment in the diachronic phenomenology of the spoken word.50 On a bright 
note, this alphabetic bias towards being narrative was the basis of the liberal temper of 
ancient Greece, which constituted the bodily joy in “talking” itself. Moreover, with the 
                                                   
46 Ong, Hopkins, 19.  
47 I use “flow” in reference to “the psychology of flow” as the exclusively forward-moving rhetoric in 
Hercules’ twelve labors.  
48 Also see Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy.  
49 Patočka, Body, 154-156.  
50 It may be reminded that in the history of ethos, the Greek ethos was more synchronic with multiple layers 
of meanings, and the Roman ethos was more diachronic that could be built in time.  
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Judeo-Christian tradition, the “presence of the word” then brought out a profound 
philosophy of time in which a deep personalism was built into history.51 However, 
perhaps as the side-effect of over-masculinizing rhetoric in the educational history, the 
poetic synchronicity (with built-in diachronic attempts in the act of communicating) was 
refrained into the private realm of psychology. Again, to say “there was only one Sappho 
(with both individualism and personalism) while there were multiple Homers” is to 
indicate that the innate difficulty in being emblematical has been present since the 
antiquity – both as part of the commonplace and at the edge of the commonplace.  
The Middle Ages 
In the medieval period, the individuality and the personalism in the emblematics 
continued to develop. This development can be examined not only with the heraldry, the 
alchemists’ symbolism, and the signs for public places (in Rauch’s example, “two 
triangles” as an alchemical emblem for beer-houses), which shared the main function to 
“divide” and to “differ”, and therefore formed a preliminary perception of the individual 
identity of things that was para-scientific and proto-existential; but more importantly, the 
emblematics started to be applied to the imago (as portraits or icons of the persons in 
Christian history), which formed the art of the “living painting” that “talked” to the 
audiences.52  
Before examining the rhetorical elements in the “living painting”, it may be 
clarified that in the Middle Ages, a good difference between word and image was kept in 
the cultural sphere. As indicated by Rauch’s example of the “two triangles”, the 
                                                   
51 Again, the Christian theologians had some real difficulty in reconciling the synchronicity in One God and 
the diachronic phenomenology in the Three Persons. This difficulty then gave birth to perceiving 
personalism as the counterpart to the natural law.  
52 See Belting, Likeness, 261-281.  
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signboard for beer-houses in medieval times did not use the written words, but the 
emblematics to distinguish the beer-houses from other public places. The written word 
was not used because it was rather unnecessary for the signboard to signify itself. A 
modern signboard that reads “Beer House” was indeed a comic representation by 
portraying the signboard to say “look, ‘I am’ a beer-house” which was symbolically 
misrepresentative (the signboard is not the actual beer-house) and mnemonically 
burdensome (nobody is speaking, but the oral residue still calls attention for human 
communication).  
With the innate difference between word and image, the imago, in employing the 
emblematics into the new icon of the persons in Christian history, aimed at conquering 
the word-image difference by combining poetics (as the inner psychological movements) 
with rhetoric (as verbal expressions that exist) in meaningful ways. Here, the distinctive 
characteristic of the emblematics as “Western” can be highlighted by comparing the 
Chinese ideography (also as para-emblems) with the new icons in the Middle Ages. A 
comparison between the Chinese character for “goodness” (好 or “hao”) and the icon of 
Virgin Mary in Göreme, Cappadocia (Tokali Kilise, 10th century) should clarify.  
The Chinese character for “goodness” was composed of two ideographs – the 
ideograph for “woman” (女) on the left and the ideograph for “child” (子) on the right. In 
terms of semiotic phenomenology, the meaning of “hao” came from the moral-
phenomenological reduction of the original phenomenological description on the 
commonplace of “mother and child”. However, though the designer of “hao” wanted to 
persuade the users the meaning of “goodness” by resorting to the aesthetics within the 
topoi of “mother and child”, there was no poetic movement in this Chinese character that 
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asked for participations with the psychological movements of the mother.53 Similar to the 
Grecian para-emblems, it would be unknowing for the ancient Chinese to be empathic 
with the “woman” in the Chinese character for “goodness”. And it was not that the 
ideographic writing system allowed no room for poetic particularities;54 rather, it was that 
the designers of the Chinese characters were well aware of their own spatial “bias of 
communication”55 towards meeting the communication demand of the ancient Chinese 
empires, with the help of rhetorical generality. 
On the other hand, with the new icon of Virgin Mary in Göreme, an emblematical 
kind of poetic particularity was built into the imagery. The audiences were provided with 
the inner movement of St. Mary. As Belting observed,  
In the icon, her meditative gaze is anticipating the sorrows to come. The 
device of anticipation (prolepsis) produces a synopsis of two feelings and 
two times places, when in a text famous at the time, the Virgin addresses 
Christ: “Then I touched with my lips your lips as sweet as honey and as 
fresh as dew. Then you slept on my breast as a child, and now you sleep as 
a dead man in my arms. Once I took care of swaddling clothes and now of 
your shroud…Once I lifted you up in my arm when you skipped and 
jumped like a child, and now you lie [motionless] in them like the dead.”56 
                                                   
53 I should note the Chinese calligraphy for “好” here. In the cursive script, “the mother and the child” in 
“hao” can be written within one stroke (as if the woman reaches out her arm to the child, and the child 
became part of the woman’s arm), but in the regular script, “the mother” and “the child” are two 
ideographic parts.  
54 For example, Ricci simply added the poetic particularities within the memory palace.  
55 See Harold Innis. The Bias of Communication (University of Toronto Press, 1991). Originally published 
in 1951.  
56 Belting, Likeness, 285.  
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From the above quote, again, the notion of a “rhetorical poet”, rather than a “poetic 
rhetorician” should be emphasized to better understand the personalistic basis in the 
emblem. It should not surprise us that the inner movement of Virgin Mary was provided 
with texts – the new icon was formed by employing the emblematics, with a more 
personalistic imago that worked with the psychological movements in the logos. Though 
not without formulaic expressions like the “honey-sweet lips”, the “motionless limbs”, 
and the “silent mouth and the closed eye”, the new emblematical icon indeed challenged 
the rhetorical generality by asking the audiences to enter into Mary’s psychological 
movements as a particular person that “I” tried to understand.57 As a side note, it should 
be within the “Western drama” (with a rhetorical temper) to use baby Jesus’ bouncing 
against his mother to imply his grown-up sacrificial devotions.  
By meaningfully relating rhetoric with poetics, at the end of the Middle Ages, the 
“dialogue with the images” gradually became a method of meditation that the emblem 
artists in the Renaissance inherited,58 and in terms of the emblem book culture in the 
Renaissance, the Ignatian emblem itself should be the best kind of example. The 
historical development of the emblematics enabled Ignatius to use the emblem 
phenomenologically as the birthplace of a strong moral consciousness in the First Week 
of the Exercises.  
Renaissance  
Writing in the early Renaissance, Ignatius already used the emblem in a very 
complex way. We should now realize that in the First Exercise, the way Ignatius 
                                                   
57 Belting understood this as the rhetorical technique of “character studies”, but in this case, rhetorical 
analysis must be incomplete given the Grecian-Hebraic dynamism.  
58 Belting, Likeness, 409-431.  
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designed the emblem of “in exile among brute animals” (the “cage”) as the prelude to 
asking the exercitants to apply the whole sensorium into the meditations on sins, 
indicated quite a developed Western imagerial thinking tradition. Ignatius’ philosophical 
thought, with the inclination to be phenomenological, started with understanding the 
animal as the pre-linguistic mode of being (in contrast to the linguistic mode of human 
beings), and moved towards practicing the human sensorium organization as bodily 
entrances into the world, along with the birth of a strong moral consciousness.  
To be more specific, the “prison-cage” emblem was Ignatius’ nuanced argument 
that the presence of the animal should be different from the presence of human 
existence59– for the animal, the presence must always be of the immediate (without the 
necessity for meditation) synchronicity that things are merely “there”, without concerns 
for the being of things in which the symbolic meaning of things lies, but for human 
beings, the presence involves both the presence of the current moment (the speaking 
word) and the presence of the presence (reflections on the spoken word). With the 
“prison-cage” emblem, Ignatius did not make the first prelude easy, in concerns with this 
innate dynamic between the presence of the current moment (the world as it is; visible) 
and the presence of the presence (the worldliness of the world; invisible).  
In this project, I have emphasized several times that Ignatius had many good 
reasons to design the first prelude as the very preparative prelude throughout the First 
Week, particularly in terms of being able to tell the nuanced difference between two 
things similar (the “prison” and the “cage”). It is very noteworthy that the moment of 
election came after the First Week, more precisely in the middle of the Second Week, 
                                                   
59 In today’s evolutionary terms, the presence of the animal was one stage of the development towards the 
presence of human existence, with tensions of rhetorical variations built into these stages.  
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whence the exercitants, being prepared by the “prison-cage” emblem, should be well 
aware of that election involves an active hope for something to happen (rather than in the 
sense of the natural law that for example, a seed of watermelon shall grow into a 
watermelon). Therein, when making the election, “discernment” is needed not only in 
that a powerful imagination of the future can have a face (as the strong personalism or 
inter-personalism in making the decision) that appears differently with the movement of 
our being situated in the world,60 but also in terms of a preliminary phenomenological 
perception of the self. After all, it is “I” who hope an event in life to happen. In other 
words, “I” am no longer hidden in the symbolic meaning of things (waiting to be 
discovered); “I” am revealed in choosing to engage with the world within which “I” 
confront “myself” via the worldliness of the world.  
Much more can be said about the imagerial thinking in the “prison-cage” emblem; 
the main point is that: as evidenced in Ignatius’ using the emblem, in the early 
Renaissance, the invention of the emblem book provided a way to recollect and to reflect 
upon emblems from the previous ages, and therefore, protected and promoted the 
emblematics to be an important part of the Western imagerial thinking tradition. The 
distinctive value of the emblematics should be well understood by Ignatius’ asking the 
exercitants to practice the actual exercises – Heidegger’s phenomenology of Dasein (ex-
istence) might be more elaborative on the existential philosophy within the Exercises,61 
but for Ignatius, instead of directly teaching the three stages of the spiritual growth, he 
asked the exercitants to perform four weeks of spiritual exercises. The emblematics 
                                                   
60 Potacka. Body, 138.  
61 It may be noted that in 1909, Heidegger joined the Jesuit order as a novice, and spent weeks in a Jesuit 
seminary before studying theology at the University of Freiburg.  
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provided Ignatius with one way to challenge the exercitants with a preliminary 
phenomenological self-confrontation, rather than self-discovery.  
Ignatius was within the emblem book culture in Renaissance. It should be no 
coincidence that the major “rebirth” of the emblematics came along with the invention of 
the emblem book in the early Renaissance. The emblem book, as a product of the printing 
press, provided the emblem artists ways to reflect on the emblematics in the re-collective 
form of a book. The art of the emblem was then reborn as a carefully reflected way of 
making arguments. Literate reflections on the emblematics were then built into the “oral 
images”. A good example here could be that the Roman myth of Cupid (a 
personification) should be a good para-emblematical remark on the lack of subjectivity 
(existential blindness) in Eros.62 When a Renaissance humanist, like Otto Van Veen 
(1556-1629), re-created an emblem of love with “two Cupids’ shooting arrows at each 
other”,63 not only Veen continued the Grecian concern for the rhetorical generality in the 
emblematics (we do not know which two particular lovers were fighting, but as long as 
the action of a combative love was captured, the communicative agents were generalized 
into being two Cupids), but more importantly, Veen offered a critical reflection on the 
lack of subjectivity in Eros as in fact the lack of inter-subjectivity. This kind of 
emblematical wit in Veen’s “two Cupids” was characteristic of the Renaissance emblem 
book culture.  
                                                   
62 The Chinese character for erotic love is “色” that shared a similar technological metaphor in Cupid’s 
arrows with the ideograph of a “knife” (刀) on the upper part. 
63 Otto van Veen. Amorum Emblemata ... Figuris Aeneis Incisa  (Antwerp: Venalia apud Auctorem, 1608), 
8. Available from https://archive.org/details/amorumfigurisaen00veen/page/8 at the courtesy of the Getty 
Research Foundation.  
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Accordingly, in Presence and Likeness, Belting considered the Reformation and 
the iconoclasm movement to be more of the Church’s concerns with using the image 
(rather than words) when a strong personalism was demanded.64 In the cultural sphere, if 
indeed Veen’s Amorum Emblemata could be an epitome of the humanists’ emblem 
books, today’s scholars of emblem studies should have good reasons to focus on the 
Renaissance emblem book as an important part of the cultural vitality in the Renaissance. 
On the other hand, within the Church, the emblems’ relations to the history of moral 
consciousness could not be overstated. Though the emblematics was not necessarily 
biblical (Hebraic) or classical (Grecian), the Christian emblem artists were at the frontier 
of finding new ways to communicate the moral force in communicating with the 
emblematics. A good example here could be Fra Angelico’s (1395-1455) The Mocking of 
Christ (1440)65 in which he used a para-hieroglyphic emblem in portraying the violence 
of “hands” as a phenomenological interpretation on the lack of personalism in the act of 
humiliating the Christ. And given that many of Angelico’s emblems (often in the form of 
frescos) were used particularly for meditations, he had good reasons to make those 
emblems difficult, because of the existentialist’s situation when a monk was in 
meditation. In the early Renaissance, not all emblems were of religious communication, 
but the best kind of Christian emblems demanded the best kind of hermeneutic effort, for 
the kind of phenomenological intricacy exemplified in Angelico’s criticizing the lack of 
personalism emblematically.  
Modernity  
                                                   
64 Belting, Likeness, 460-469.  
65 Lloyd, Angelico, 90.   
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The modern field of emblem studies came from the leisure of the classists,66 with 
whom the social fabric of Latin was still part of the scholarly environment and woven 
into the intellectual sphere. More straightforwardly, the significance of emblem studies 
could not be compared to the classists’ decades of training in Latin and with Greek as the 
satellite, but the emblems were still an important part of the intellectual milieu. For 
example, Ezra Pound, who was considered a “modernist” and was indeed well trained in 
philology, tried to “translate” the communicative architecture of the Chinese characters 
into poems. Pound’s effort was a playful challenge if indeed the scholars then were not 
unfamiliar with the emblematical tradition – after all, Mathew Ricci performed the 
ideography-emblematics experiment at the high time of the Renaissance. Yet in today’s 
media environment, Pound’s playful experiment with the emblematics and the Chinese 
ideography could seem rather “modernistic”, strange and eccentric.  
However, within this modernism, regardless of Pound’s dis-familiarizing the 
emblematics and his understandings and misunderstandings of the Chinese characters, 
Pound’s critique of a reduced Western imagerial thinking tradition was more relevant to 
the field of emblem studies than to the field of critical mass media studies. At the 
birthplace of emblem studies, Henry Green, notably a Shakespearean scholar writing in 
the 1860s, was among the first group of classists who were critically aware of this loss of 
a Latin-based emblematical nuances in modern imageries. Green said, 
We have not far to seek for a sufficient reason why the old emblem writers 
have been almost forgotten. The best of them, the founders and early 
masters in this school of poetry wedded to pictorial embellishments, 
                                                   
66 See Peter Daly. The Emblem in Early Modern Europe: Contributions to the Theory of the Emblem (New 
York: Routledge, 2016).  
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excelled as Latinists, and sometimes ran wild amidst the conceits which 
Latin is so fitted to express. Their later imitators in the modern languages, 
without generally possessing their depth or their brilliancy, have followed 
them especially in quaint fancies, and thus have repeated and magnified 
their faults. Hence, as Latin was more and more disused among scholars, 
and as the modern languages, under skilled and vigorous cultivators, threw 
aside mere witticisms and affectations, men's minds grew beyond the 
pleasures of tracing out resemblances between pictures and mottoes.67  
Not far from Pound’s radical critique, Green’s critical examination was to alert of the 
emblematical residues that were often commercially vulgar and morally doctrinaire. 
Along with Green, in the vicinity of media ecology, McLuhan’s first book The 
Mechanical Bride was a deconstructive and reconstructive critique of the emblematical 
nuances’ being exploited by the “industrial folklorists”. Here, we should not be shy in 
revealing the strong moral concern in McLuhan’s first book;68 McLuhan’s faith in 
communication was also that: such cultural sensitivity to visual rhetoric should in turn 
give birth to the American ethos of being even more attentive to the meaning of structure 
(the visible) as where communication happens (the invisible).    
Close to Green and McLuhan as English professors, this merit of being attentive 
to structure and communication may be best taught by Frank Raymond Leavis (who was 
McLuhan’s teacher in Cambridge). With Leavis, not only we were well informed of the 
moral implication in English emblems that the Shakespearean emblems (e.g. the 
                                                   
67 David Graham. “‘Piece out Our Imperfections with Your Thoughts’: Lessons from the History of 
Emblem Studies.” Emblematica 22 (2016): 10.  
68 See Peters, “McLuhan’s Grammatical Theology” for a misreading of McLuhan’s moral concerns.  
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"crossbow-longbow") asked the readers to experience stages of interpretations,69 but 
more importantly, Leavis was truly at the frontier of teaching the meaning of structure in 
English poetry. Here, a good example can be the way Leavis taught the poem Composed 
upon Westminster Bridge by William Wordsworth (1802). In Leavis’ meticulous 
examinations,  
It seems a very generalized particularity, one easily attained. And yet we 
should by now be aware of a decided superiority in this sonnet that makes 
it a poem of some interest; so that some further inquiry is necessary. The 
clue presents itself in the unobtrusive adjective "smokeless". Though 
unobtrusive, it is far from otiose; obviously as it looks, it does more than it 
says. (Italicized mine) It conveys in fact both its direct force and the 
opposite, and give us locally in its working the structure of poem. For this 
poem ... has a structure, and what this now becomes place.70 
As Leavis continued to elaborate on this “structure”,  
Looking back, we realize now that “like a garment” has, after all, a 
felicity: it keeps the City and the beauty of the morning distinct, while 
offering to the view only the beauty. Any muffling or draping suggestion 
the simile might have thrown over the “ships, towers, domes, theatres and 
temples” is eliminate immediately by the “bare” that, preceding them, get 
the rime stress (so justifying, we now see, the "wear" that it picks and 
cancels). They 
                                                   
69 Scholars of emblem studies emphasized the emblematica as more of a process of interpretations than of 
the structuralized persuasiveness of the impresa.  
70 Leavis, Principle, 118.  
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                                                        lie  
Open.71 
From the quote above, Leavis’ revealing the emblematical co-presence of the city’s 
“lying open” and “wearing a garment” (with the keyword as “smokeless”) was best 
illustrated by his own structuring: “They ... lie ... Open”. To the limit of this research, 
Leavis was the only critic who taught the meaning of poetic structure in this way.   
Essentially, the technique of Leavis’ discernment was to reveal the built-in 
emblematics within the structure of English poetry. From Leavis, we may better 
understand the early Shakespearean scholars (e.g. Henry Green) who had good reasons to 
be critically concerned with a reduced emblematical tradition. We may also better 
understand that the noetic economy in an emblematical particularism was not about 
examining all the details (all the signifiers) of a sign, but about raising a questioning and 
questionable particularity that implied the change of a sign (one signifier with another 
Signifier). For a convenient illustration, if being visually represented, the “crossbow-
longbow” emblem would look like both a crossbow and a longbow. In order to avoid 
such visual overlap that confused, the poets chose to use the emblematics to communicate 
this co-present change in a diachronic order. With the good complexity in such 
hermeneutics, it should be no surprise that in modernity, Shakespeare’s careful readers 
tended to devote a good deal of attention to the emblematical tradition, with scholarly 
interests in its former richness.  
Post-modernity  
                                                   
71 Ibid.  
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Now, the paradox within the “co-present change” should be part of the “self-
other” and “self-same” dynamic in selfhood after postmodernity, with the existential 
overlap of how did “I” change but will remain the same. Yet as Ong constantly reminded 
the “present moment”, it is only in the contemporary time that we may understand the 
true dynamic within the first prelude of the Exercises as Ignatius’ setting two 
particularisms (the particularism of history and nature, and the particularism of human 
communication) in combative movements.  
To be more specific, in understanding post-modernity as various kinds of post-
Romanticisms,72 the birthplace of any particularism implied an intentional rebellion from 
the rhetorical generality, with the innate difficulty that this particularism must still keep 
some noetic economy. There have always been two kinds of particularism: one about 
examining all the details of an event (signifiers ad infinitum, the McLuhanian probes, the 
“psychology of information”73), and the other about finding the questioning and 
questionable particularity that changes along with the sign (signifier with another 
Signifier, orality with literacy, the “psychology of form”). In the first prelude of the First 
Exercises, Ignatius used both the “visible” (the physical details in the events of Christ’s 
life) and the “invisible” (the “prison-cage” emblem) to ask the exercitants to understand 
Christ’s conquering the situation of communication. The “visible” and the “invisible” 
were not easily compatible. The “visible” had to learn from the rhetorical organization 
and reorganization of the “invisible”,74 and the rhetorical organization and reorganization 
                                                   
72 See, Ong, Romance, 255.  
73 Kenneth Burke. “Psychology and Form.” Dial 76, (1925): 34-46.  
74 In the Chinese ideography, when representing the ad infinitum of trees (木) in a symbolic forest, the 
solution is then to draw three trees (森) in imitation of a three-part rhetorical organization. Here, in the 
Western imagery thinking tradition, a more powerful emblem could be drawing just one seedling (that shall 
grow into a tree with human care).  
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of the “invisible” had to conquer its own rhetorical generalization with the help of the 
emblematics that was undiscoverable without examining the “visible”.  
As a side note, the so-called “doctrinaire” emblematics was simply that the 
signifier-Signifier emblematics (s-S, the rhetorical poet) was exchanged to be the 
Signifier-signifier emblematical residues (S-s, the poetic rhetorician). For example, the 
Buddhists in China had a powerful phenomenological description on the pattern of 
bitterness and pain in life: “the sea of bitterness has no edge” (the first imagery). 
However, the following reduction “turning your head around is the shore” (the second 
imagery) weakened the first imagery. A good interpreter on the imagery of “the endless 
sea of bitterness” would know that “turning you mind around” may or may not be “the 
shore”. The rhetorical movement from “sea” to “sea-shore” indeed harmed the powerful 
imagery in the original phenomenological description. The poetic rhetorician exploited 
the first imagery to conveniently make the argument in the second imagery.  
In postmodernity, we reflect upon the way the emblematics has been working in 
order to better discern the different ways to be emblematical. In its most general sense, to 
offer a comprehensive theory of the emblematics would be as difficult as crafting a 
wholesome theory for Chinese characters. The difficulties in understanding the 
emblematics (and the ideography) are not only that these compound images have their 
own historical developments, with meanings built upon previous image-makings. But 
more importantly, as much as the Chinese ideography could be visually doctrinaire and 
overtly entertaining, the emblematics in itself cannot promise a recovery and re-discovery 
from a reduced Western imagerial thinking tradition. If indeed the hope is true in the 
post-modern age, what could be some theorems on the Ignatian emblems in relation to 
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the post-modern situation of the emblematics? With this question, I shall move to the 
final probe into the “prison-cage”.   
Examining the Existentialist’s Situation Emblematically: The Final Probe into the 
“Prison-cage”  
The “prison-cage” emblem was within the development of human imagination as 
phenomenological approaches to the psychologically real, and it should continue to be a 
remark, with postmodern meanings, on the dynamic between rhetoric (in particular as 
using images in creating and reaching common grounds) and personalism (in particular as 
using words in examining and expressing the phenomenology of the self). In the final 
probe into the “prison-cage”, with the history of the emblematics, I want to focus on this 
dynamic between rhetoric and personalism.  
“Prison-cage” and the Art of Personalism  
When I was addressing the rhetorical distance in the Grecian para-emblems, such 
as in “Athena’s being born from the split of Zeus’ head” that the oral poets were 
democratically tempered to distance the communicative agent as “Zeus” (from being “I”) 
and the message as “Athena” (from being burdensomely specific), it should be clarified 
that it would be ahistorical to suggest that the locus communis in “Zeus” and “Athena” 
was created to avoid being individualistic. Again, the oral poets had no word for the 
“self”. 75 The democratic temper in “Zeus” and in “Athena” was personifications (para-
personalistic) of the communicative agent and the message.  
However, in this case, since there should be a real subjectivity (and inter-
subjectivities) in giving birth to an idea laboriously (unlike the lack of subjectivity in the 
                                                   
75 Ong, Hopkins, 19.  
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personification of erotic love as Cupid), one should have good reasons to criticize the oral 
poets for being para-personalistic, in the sense of still resorting to the rhetorical generality 
when a strong personalism was in demand. This is my main rationale to consider the 
Grecian emblematics as “para-emblems”, in critical concerns with the lack of a strong 
personalism which was prominent in emblems like the “prison-cage”.  
Now, as stated in chapter three, in Preface to Plato, Havelock was already able to 
develop a constructive critique of the Greek orality, by focusing on the cultural 
transformation from the “image-thinkers”76 to the “necessity of Platonism”77. The 
technology of writing, with its communicative intensity, prompted the Greek oral poets to 
move towards being able to provide some existential reflections on the self. In Preface, 
Havelock had it wonderfully that the closure of the consonant (somewhat as a 
“communicative stutter” that imitated the synchronic moment of uttering many words at 
the same time) was meant to be opened in the diachronic phenomenology of human 
communication.  
More straightforwardly, the rhetorical distance in “hiding” the agent and the 
message in “Zeus” and in “Athena” was not the intention of the oral poets – the “Homeric 
state of mind” simply did not know any other way to communicate the intellectual labor 
in giving birth to ideas. In this sense, the problematics of modern existentialism, such as 
in saying “I gave the hardest birth to the greatest idea” (in which the agent supersedes the 
action) can be understood as “literacy without any empathy towards the oral tradition” – 
there were also good reasons for the oral poets to highlight and empower the action, 
instead of the agent, as mankind’s shared situation.  
                                                   
76 Preface has two parts. This is Havelock’s title for Part One. 
77 Havelock’s title for Part Two.  
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In Mimesis, Auerbach, in relating the Homeric epic to the Old Testament which 
were historically unknowing to each other until later ages of communication, also 
contended that the proto-personalism in the Old Testament has always been the 
counterpart to the para-personalism in the Greek oral tradition. As I have examined the 
“carcass-lion” imagery, the emblematical surrealism in “carcass-lion” was the 
genealogical ancestor of the “prison-cage” emblem, though “carcass-lion” was the most 
powerful kind of phenomenological description that confronted any hermeneutical 
attempt to phenomenologically reduce and interpret the imagery. This is my main 
rationale to consider the “carcass-lion” to be the “proto-emblem”. Such “oral image” was 
at the heart of a strong moral consciousness in which the Ignatian emblem dwelt.  
This twofold genealogy within the “prison-cage” emblem (both Grecian and 
Hebraic) was of course hard to reconcile. On one hand, the “prison-cage” was part of the 
Renaissance emblem book culture in expressing the existential situation by being witty, 
analogous and rhetorically distancing. On the other hand, the “prison-cage” emblem was 
quite an “oral image” in being able to address the existential situation much more directly 
and accurately. In this sense, the Ignatian emblem was truly at the frontier (edge) of the 
Renaissance emblem book culture.  
“Prison-cage” and the Media-communication Dynamic 
In the previous chapter, I have used a modern term “existential absurdity” to 
describe the emblematical surrealism in the proto-emblem of the “carcass-lion” imagery. 
Here, it should be clarified that one cannot enter into the world with the absurdity of the 
world; one must enter into the world with “the worldliness of the world”. If indeed the 
postmodern absurdity of the emblematics can be understood as “media without 
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communication” (emblematical effects without the content; strange for the sake of being 
strange so as to exploit the mnemonic function of the emblematics), in the emblematics, 
what is “the worldliness of the world” when being examined with the media-
communication dynamic?  
As an exploration into the question above, part of the phenomenology of religious 
communication is that the founding fathers of religious orders tended to set human 
communication at the foreground (or as the counterpart) of the way nature works.78 In the 
Exercises, the “prison-cage” emblem was built upon the difference between the pre-
linguistic beings of animals and the linguistic human beings. In Personalism and 
Wilderness, Ong’s critique of the American personalism in Bugbee’s The Inward 
Morning was that the American personalists tended to set human communication at the 
background (or as part) of the way nature works.79 The American personalists’ 
fascination with the “wilderness” ended up becoming a particular kind of existential 
intimacy in listening to the whisper in the book of the nature (para-rhetorical, in low 
volume and pressure), though the solitude (the existential wilderness) of the American 
personalists also ended up becoming one man’s address to the whole world.80  
                                                   
78 This is not to indicate some “homo-centrism”; rather, this is an existential effort to rely exclusively upon 
human communication even though the spoken word is evanescent, rhetorically generalizing, and quite 
vulnerable to the repetitive mindset.  
79 A good example should be that in Inward, Bugbee wrote that “I myself is the leaping trout”. Bugbee’s 
poetic affirmation moved beyond the Romanticism subject-object interplay such as in saying “am I the 
leaping trout, or the leaping trout is me?” as phenomenological description without reduction, but it was 
less existentially powerful than saying “how do you know that I am not the leaping trout?” 
(phenomenological reduction with interpretation) in both remarking on the I-You difference and the lack of 
the subject-object interplay.  
80 See Thoreau, Walden. Also see Timothy Michaels. Privatio Dialogus: Toward a Phenomenology of 
Aloneness for the Philosophy of Communication (Doctoral dissertation, Duquesne University), 2019. 
Retrieved from https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/1770. 
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The above difference between American personalism and the Ignatian 
emblematics may be examined as a rhetorical habit of mind at the heart of the 
phenomenology of religious communication. The kind of public contention with Yahweh 
in the “carcass-lion” imagery, if being examined with an incomplete parallel to epideictic 
rhetoric, must be both “blaming” and “praising” at the same time, though within the 
emblematics, “blaming” or contending publicly indeed preceded.  
More straightforwardly, the synchronicity of the pathos in the proto-emblem of 
the “carcass-lion” imagery indeed had a diachronic phenomenology, which was built into 
the very act of “writing words down” or the downward movement of the spoken word. 
This should not to be confused with bathos as there was no blasphemy in the proto-
emblem of the “carcass-lion”. The emblematics in the “carcass-lion” offered real 
existential accounts for the self in grievance.81 In this sense, the “proto-emblem” was the 
particularity of the Hebraic orality-and-literacy dynamic in which literacy must fulfill its 
existential obligation as the birthplace of a true phenomenological description. 
To further clarify this “rhetorical habit of the mind in the phenomenology of 
religious communication”, I would like to raise the example of Lao Tzu’s Tao Te Ching 
(Dao De Jing)82 within the merit of comparative religion studies. In Verse 5 of Dao, Lao 
Tzu said,  
Heaven and earth are merciless, and regard all things as straw dogs.  
                                                   
81 Also see Jacque Derrida. The Work of Mourning. Translated by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas 
(Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2001) 
82 Jing or “经” means “classics” in Chinese, but Lao Tzu would not consider his work “classical”. A better 
title may be “phenomenology of the Dao” as the philosophical epoché of Lao Tzu’s phenomenological 
accounts for the worldliness of the world. See Mu Xin. The Memoir of Literature (Guangxi Normal 
University Press, 2013), 183.  
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The sages are merciless, and regard all people as straw dogs.83 
The above saying started with an existential remark on the “mercilessness” of the heaven-
earth,84 which itself cannot provide meanings (the absurd part), and followed by a 
critique of the sages, whom Lao Tzu alerted of and urged that people should not try to 
gain meanings from them.  
Here, the point is that: Lao Tzu could have said that “heaven and earth are 
unknowing to the human idea of ‘mercy’, and it does not matter if one considers them to 
be merciful or merciless”. This would be even more existentially radical, especially in 
that the sentence started from the perspective of “heaven and earth”.85 But in Dao, 
notably as Lao Tzu’s own meditations, he chose the standpoint of a person’s, as if a 
particular man or woman were saying “[I say], heaven and earth are merciless.” The 
question is then: did Lao Tzu hide the communicative agent (as the Chinese ideography 
were para-emblematical)? And the answer is: similar to the poetics in Buber’s I and 
Thou, in such cases, the agent is built into the act of speaking.86 Without dissecting the 
existential complexity in saying “I”, Lao Tzu’s problematizing existence and expression 
was very similar to Ignatius’ in the Exercises. Essentially, the technique was to build the 
communicative agent into the act of speaking. Again, within Daoism, “prison-cage” (牢 
笼) used to precisely mean the boundary of “heaven-earth” – the world as the existential 
edge of the Cosmo. This is the “rhetorical habit of the mind” shared by many powerful 
                                                   
83 Lao Tzu. Tao Te Ching. Translated by Stephen Addiss & Stanley Lombardo (Boston: Shambhala 
Publications), 5.  
84 Heaven-earth or “天地”.  
85 See Mu, Memoir, 176.  
86 Bakhtin’s theory of “speech genre” came into mind in which Bakhtin used the word “utterance” for the 
“speaking” word.  
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religious thinkers who foregrounded human communication as the counterpart of the way 
nature works.87  
In The Phenomenon of Man, a more contemporary Jesuit, Pierre Teilhard de 
Chardin was able to articulate this foregrounding human communication as the 
counterpart to the “para-rhetorical” organization of the earthly environment, with a more 
articulated existential philosophy on the act of bringing the information system of the 
world into the conscious examination of human communication. As counterparts to the 
Darwinian rhetorical generality that intentionally “misunderstood”88 a cat and a lion to be 
in the same family of the felidae so that rhetorical participations (deductions and 
inductions) may be planted into the scientific collaborations on studying the cat and the 
lion (which should be very different in real studies),89 de Chardin’s paleontology, in 
understanding the earth’s becoming more tolerating to the phenomenon of man, was 
“scientific” not in the sense of being accurately objective (following the natural laws), but 
in the sense of man’s in turn bringing “the world as it is” into “the worldliness of the 
world” within human communication.90  
Here, it should be a helpful note that after all, Lao Tzu had to use “Dao” to 
describe his philosophy of communication and Ignatius had to resort to the emblematics; 
de Chardin’s work acknowledged the innate difficulty in forming a competent sign for 
the complexity of the self in the world. From the Exercises, de Chardin was able to 
extend the existential exegesis (the invisible) to the examination of one of the keynote 
                                                   
87 Regardless of Ellul’s differing the truth and the real may fall short in analyzing the emblematics, in the 
case of the phenomenology of religious communication, Ellul was right that the real should be the 
counterpart to the true.  
88 Kenneth Burke call this “intentional fallacy”.  
89 See Darwin’s Vision and Christian Perspectives. Edited by Walter Ong (MacMillan and Co, 1960).  
90 This is to offer an understanding of de Chardin’s term “the noosphere”. 
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stages of the development in the earthly environment (the visible). From the Ignatian 
emblematics to de Chardin’s paleontology, in the last part of this probe, I shall provide 
some prolegomenon on the emblematical approach to the existential situation.  
Some Prolegomenon on the Emblematical Approach to the Existential Situation 
In the previous section, I have briefly addressed the dynamic between the 
complexity of the self and the complexity of the world. This dynamic was problematized 
in the noetic economy of the powerful religious thinkers, such as in Ignatius’ 
emblematics and in Lao Tzu’s proto-phenomenological accounts. Such eco-nomos of the 
mind, simply put, was to build the existential “I” into the act of speaking. And it is only 
possible in contemporary times that in I and Thou, Buber had it precisely that “the 
speaking of I and the existence of I are one and same thing.”91 Moreover, this ecology of 
the mind, with a particular dynamic between the hermeneutical complexity in 
understanding the worldly events and the existential exegesis in understanding the 
eventfulness of the self, can be genealogically traced back to the Old Testament writers’ 
using the proto-emblem. In this part, I would like to offer some prolegomenon on 
examining the Ignatian emblem along with this genealogy.  
I. The Artful Event and The Eventful Art 
In this project, I have used the term “art” mostly as a loose reference to the liberal 
art (alphabetic, diachronic, and democratic) in rhetorike as the Greek word for “public 
speaking”. My concern is with the Grecian para-emblem that had a bias of 
communication towards building common grounds – one should marvel at this kind of 
rhetorical generality that enabled the social empowerment and elegance of living in the 
                                                   
91 Buber, I and Thou, 1.  
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polis, and one should also understand Plato’s critique of the oral poets if such rhetorical 
technique could not be counterbalanced with philosophical inquiries. In other words, a 
philosophy of rhetoric (in particular, a philosophy of communication with moral 
concerns) was in demand during the technological transformation of the ancient Greek 
society, from a more oral culture to a more technological culture of chirography.  
When the Ignatian emblem is considered to be a form of “art”, I then mostly mean 
the Grecian part of the Ignatian emblematics as the rhetorical distance in communicating 
the existential situation. After all, the Renaissance emblem book was an art form, with 
good reasons to draw attention to the medium of the emblematics itself. And the emblem 
book was a “visual art”, not without a specialization in educating the young, given the 
existential revolt in “visual rhetoric” that in itself challenged the verbose of the oral-
rhetorical formulaic expressions. In the context of the Renaissance, “visual art” (with 
religious contents but new artistic forms and techniques) became prevalent for the similar 
reasons of the existential rebellions from the oral basis of human consciousness. In 
contemporary times, visual rhetoric still draws the attention of the young, and has been 
innately a young man’s business.92 In the history of teaching rhetoric, the emblematics 
should offer some good explanations and reconciliations for the kind of existential revolt 
that has prompted the pedagogical popularity within the so-called “visual rhetoric”.  
On the other hand, when the Ignatian emblem is considered as an “oral image” 
(somewhat anti-artistic), I then mean to contend that “orality” does not necessarily equate 
to being a general term for the oral traditions (e.g. the Chinese oral tradition, the 
American oral tradition and etc.) When we talk about the oral traditions, we indeed 
                                                   
92 Or, it is the grown-up man’s addressing the adolescent inside.  
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include all kinds of problems in the development of orality; in particular, we are critically 
concerned with the pattern recognition (cogito) that nature imposed upon the human 
mind, with which, for example, the cycling repetition of the four seasons of a year could 
reify the four-line organization of a stanza, or of a late Tang dynasty poem with complete 
symmetries – they could be simply too artistic. More straightforwardly, the oral traditions 
inherited both the problematics and the symbolical economy of the nature. All oral 
traditions were incomplete, although the Hebraic oral tradition was more interpersonally 
rooted and morally grounded than the Grecian oral tradition. But orality studies, after all, 
was only possible when communication scholars were able to relate the Hebraic and the 
Grecian to each other. And this particular act of relating, with one signifier and another 
signifier which were historically unknowing to each other, was only possible with 
modern existentialism – it was, after all, “I” (the author and the reader) who related the 
Hebraic (e.g. Buber, Levinas, Bakhtin) with the Grecian (e.g. McLuhan, Ong, Havelock).  
Within the above act of relating, I then propose the difference between an eventful 
art (an art piece, no matter how eventful, is still an art in imitation of the diachronic 
phenomenology of the spoken word; secondary orality) and an artful event (an event, no 
matter how artfully represented, is still an event that cannot exist without the diachronic 
phenomenology of the spoken word; orality). Here, the critique, in Boorstin’s term, 
should be that the current nostalgia towards eventfulness (innately religious), which 
resulted in “pseudo-events” 93, was in fact at the very starting place of the Greek oral 
tradition as an eventful art. Therefore, when we speak of personalism as “requiring all of 
                                                   
93 Daniel Boorstin. The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America (Vintage Books, 1992). Originally 
published in 1962. 
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us to be shamans of a society”94 that implies the virtue of poetics as a liberal art that 
teaches the living of a democratic life, it should be reminded that today’s common 
situation, not far from Ignatius’ being both within the commonplace and at the frontier of 
the emblematical tradition, is precisely to be at the edge of the common situation – the 
poets now must somehow conquer the situation of being a poet.95 
II. Existential Complex and Complex System 
In the discipline of communication, the field of orality studies has been mostly 
treated as the discovery of the Greek oral tradition, as conscious efforts into reaching the 
non-recordable unconsciousness of mankind’s collective infancy (primitive oral culture 
that was unknowing to literacy). But not many scholars have paid attentions to the 
existential implications in being able to distance oneself so as to study the oral traditions.  
In the history of our existential awareness, the proto-existentialists, like Lao Tzu, 
should enjoy the privilege of forging a term (the epoché as a powerful philosophical 
start), such as the “Dao”, to be a philosophical-hermeneutical entrance into the 
worldliness of the world. Therein, Lao Tzu was enabled to offer phenomenological 
accounts for the “Dao” with analogies of worldly experience – “[Dao is] as careful as 
crossing a winter river”.96 Without “Dao”, the philosophy of communication in Dao De 
Jing simply could not exist, for the lack of a powerful epoché.   
The modern existentialists, of course, could continue to use the noetic economy in 
such philosophical-hermeneutical terms (e.g. the Husserlian epoché that inherited 
                                                   
94 See Jasper Blystone. The Pragmatics of the Human Heritage (Long Beach Publication, 1997). Blystone 
meant that the shamans were the full person in a tribal society as much as “Zeus” was the full persona in 
giving birth to “Athena” from the split of his head. Blystone focused on the theatrical “ideal” of a person.   
95 William Carlos William was so critically aware of this in saying “I am a poet! I am. I am. I am a poet, I 
reaffirmed, ashamed.”  
96 Lao Tzu, Tao, 15.  
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Descartes’s questioning the world), but none of them could merely use the proto-
existentialist’s technique, because in distancing ourselves from the oral tradition in order 
to study orality, we knew that existence also involved informative systems of 
complexities that required meticulous examinations. In other words, the interface of the 
word is both between man and man (I-Thou) and between man and nature (I-it). Therein, 
to do justice to the “I-it”, a different kind of noetic economy had to be built into modern 
existentialism. The existential complex, therefore, invited a complex system. 
In Ignatius’ time, the complex system he used was the art of the emblem which 
involved all kinds of human imaginations (image-makings) from daydreaming and 
thinking in dreams. The emblematics, as a complex system, then provided the Exercises 
with good interpretative complexities that made it worthy of practicing and studying. And 
in order to examine the complex system of the emblematics, we then further needed an 
equally complex framework, as provided by semiotic phenomenology which involved 12 
steps (Phenomenological Description, Reduction and Interpretation, with 
phenomenological description, reduction and interpretation being built into each stage of 
Description, Reduction and Interpretation) of phenomenological analysis. The aim, of 
course, was to not miss any nuance in the Ignatian emblems. The way “communicative 
architecture” worked was in that the divisions and sub-divisions in the grandeur of 
buildings could be understood as an external memory system, with internal inputs in the 
personal act of signifying. In this sense, human science, in employing system theories 
into studying communication, should be the best kind of structural metaphor for human 
communication.  
  162 
However, regardless of the merit of information and system theories, a different 
kind of noetic economy must still be reached, as there is no way to build a complex 
system in complete parallels to the existential complex. And the incompleteness of this 
parallel (between information system and human communication) also needs to be 
expressed, which then preferably take its shape in the rhetorical habit of mind that 
foregrounds human communication as the counterpart of the way nature works. Rhetoric, 
therefore, should affirm its incompleteness – an enthymeme should not be equal to 
syllogism with one-part missing. Therein, it should be meaningfully radical to argue that 
the symbolic economy in nature should be the same as the symbolic economy of the 
machine. The “nature versus machine” polemic is then synthesized and 
phenomenologically interpreted into being a personalism that confronts both nature and 
machine – “I” am no longer restful in the economical design of the bridge, or the 
symbolic economy of the forest. In this sense, Buber’s I and Thou (strictly interpersonal 
and exclusively within the realm of the poetics) should be celebrated as a powerful 
spokesman for contemporary personalism.97  
III. The Pragmata of the Emblematics and the Pragmatics of Communication 
Eventually, it may be worthwhile to relate the pragmata of the emblematics, not 
just to the American personalism (the American writers), but also preliminarily to the 
American pragmatism (the American philosophers), given that pragmatism also had to 
deal with the difficult uncertainty in relating one signifier with another signifier.  
                                                   
97 Ong’s constantly referring to Buber’s work can be understood a contemporary Jesuit’s application and 
extension of the proto-personalism in the Exercises.  
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In From Enthymeme to Abduction, Lanigan reminded that in the classical law of 
logic, deduction was with a given rhetorical generality that asked for commonplace 
examples, and induction was with given commonplaces as a ceremonial practice of 
reaching the rhetorical generality; however, abduction, which was different from 
“deduction [that] proves something must be, and induction [that] shows something is 
actually operative”, merely suggested that “something may be … abduction must cover 
all the operations by which theories and conceptions are engendered”.98 Lanigan then 
highlighted the notion of “desire” (as the desire to “include others into communication”) 
in the postmodern situation of abduction that considered discursive discourses as 
incomplete signs.  
With Lanigan, as I have analyzed the element of desire (caritas, love as desire) in 
the Exercises that involved the genuine uncertainty of “grace” – with the joy of having it, 
the fear of losing it and the hope in having it again, there was also this postmodern 
situation of abductions in the Ignatian emblem, as one signifier with another signifier in 
the hope for a genuine sign. Again, to take the example of Matthew Ricci’s making the 
election “if to do missionary work in China”, when the cause (having the idea to do 
missionary work in China) coincided with part of the effect (actually going to China to do 
missionary work), there was an existential complex, somewhat paradoxical, in making 
the election by phenomenologically reducing an “open system” (choices of context) into 
the rhetorical organization of “to go or not to go”. And as stated, this was certainly not 
the Shakespearean rhetorical practice on “to be or not to be”, but the ecarte (the “open 
                                                   
98 Richard Lanigan. “From Enthymeme to Abduction: The Classical Law of Logic and the Postmodern 
Rule of Rhetoric”, in Recovering Pragmatism's Voice: The Classical Tradition, Rorty, and the Philosophy 
of Communication, edited by Lenore Langsdorf and Andrew Smith (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1995), 49.   
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cut”) of “a divided self” in making the election (by writing the choices down) that the self 
hopes for a reunion.  
Within American pragmatism, the above existential paradox was perceived by the 
Palo Alto group (and Gregory Bateson) as the “therapeutic double-bind” in the 
paradoxical communication. In The Pragmatics of Human Communication, when 
approaching the problems of paradoxical communication, Watzlawick, Bavelas and 
Jackson related existentialism to theories of human communication. 99 Here, for a 
convenient illustration, in a husband’s saying to his wife that “can’t you stop saying ‘yes’ 
all the time?”, the paradox in the husband’s saying then rendered his wife into an 
existential impasse. In relying “yes”, the answer defied the question; in relying “no”, the 
answer defied the questioner – a dead silence would be then the phenomenon.  
The problematics of this phenomenon, in the Palo Alto group’s tribute to Gregory 
Bateson’s work, was understood as that the communicative agent (the self) became the 
very psychological blind spot of the speaker’s – the message was indeed “[I say], can’t 
you stop saying ‘yes’ all the time?”. On this, Bateson, along with Bertrand Russell’s 
“logical paradox”, suggested that “I say” should belong to a separate realm away from 
the content of the saying, and accordingly, “I say” was logically difficult to be examined. 
To put this differently, the excessiveness in the husband’s problematic expression – both 
with no meaning at all in rendering the audience silent and with two meanings that 
problematically overlapped, came from the existential complexity of an unexamined self. 
In this case, with the American ethos, “the examined self” was to be aware of the 
                                                   
99 Watzlawick, Bavelas and Jackson, Pragmatics.   
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necessity of a rhetorical clarity (e.g. the Homeric approach to Eros as “I will love you as 
much as I will hate you”) in expressing self in action.  
With Bateson, Russell’s logical paradox indeed coincided with the rhetoricians’ 
critical concern with the rhetorical generality – for instance, the category of “furniture” 
(the communicative value) should not be confused with the actual “table”, “chair”, 
“desk” and etc. (the use value). On this, the semioticians, with some special attention to 
“visual rhetoric”, were famous for advocating “this pipe is not a pipe” in alerting against 
the residues of the rhetorical generality in the visual representation of a “pipe”. And on a 
similar scale, the Chinese sophists (the bianshi) were well-known for arguing that “this 
white horse is not a horse” in problematizing “part” (this particular white horse) and 
“whole” (the category of “horse”). In this project, given our analysis of the Grecian para -
emblems, the problem of expressing the self with a rhetorical commonplace has been 
within the myth of communication ever since the Greek studied and promoted rhetorike. 
The problem of using “Zeus”, instead of “I”, in expressing the labor in giving birth to 
ideas, could be diagnostic of the birthplace of the husband’s unexamined self in the 
Greek oral tradition.   
Now, the logical solution in separating “I” from the content of the saying should 
not be excluded too conveniently. The paradoxical excessiveness of the husband’s 
expression indeed resulted from both the situation of “no self” (his saying had no 
meaning at all) and “too much self” (his saying had two meanings that overlapped and 
intertwined). It may be recalled that when a kid sees a squirrel and exclaims “look mon, a 
squirrel”, not only the squirrel exists independently of the kid’s saying, but more 
importantly, the kid is not saying “look mom, [I discovered] a squirrel”; rather, he 
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became the squirrel in that moment of saying – such existential “confusion” or “overlap” 
can be quite necessary in the development of human consciousness.100 As a side note, the 
post-modern remarks on inter-objectivity (against phenomenology) should not be far 
from the logical solution to the existential excessiveness. The interpretative formula was 
then not Subject [subject + object], but (subject) [object + object]. Inter-objectivity is 
more or less a retrieval into the cognitive function of the rhetorical generality.  
By affirming the paradox as the “therapeutic double-bind”, the Palo Alto group 
then moved beyond the logical solution to the existential complexity in “I say”. Indeed, 
Watzlawick was almost contending for the twofold birthplace of human consciousness as 
both from nature and against nature: “from nature” in the sense that the signs in nature 
can also follow the pattern of one signifier with another signifier – a squirrel [the first 
signifier] moves towards the tree [another signifier], and “against nature” in the sense that 
“I” [the first signifier] whom catches the squirrel’s moving towards the tree [another 
signifier]. To put this differently, in “from nature”, “I” am not moving along with the 
squirrel, or “I” am part of this telos of nature (Zen), and in “against nature”, the 
movement of a squirrel has a para-rhetorical effect that “I” am moving along with the 
squirrel (Tao).101 More straightforwardly, it is, after all, not that the squirrel moves “me”, 
but “I” intellectually move both “me” and the squirrel in saying “look mom, a squirrel” 
with the spoken words.  
                                                   
100 With Rauch’s work, we knew that this is the birthplace of the “emblematical”.  
101 Zhuang Zi was famous for pondering the subject-object interplay in asking “am I dreaming of the 
butterfly, or the butterfly is dreaming of me?”, but it must be noted that Zhuang Zi also said, “you are not 
me, how do you know that I do not know the happiness of the fish” in remarking on both the I-You 
difference and the lack of I-it interplay.  
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As a preliminary inclusion, the American pragmatism in the Pragmatics of 
Human Communication, has interesting connections with the pragmata of the Exercises. 
Both Watzlawick and Ignatius dealt with the difficulty in giving existential accounts for 
the movement of “I” as both from nature (the visible) and against nature (the invisible). 
In critical concerns that the American pragmatism can be reduced to some kind of 
utilitarianism and the Exercises can be reduced to some military behaviorism, more work 
may be done to examine the notion of “abduction” (in the catching of the movement of 
the spoken word) and Ignatius’ uses of the emblematics as the “midway” towards fuller 
consciousness. With this kind of applicative mindset, I shall move to the final chapter that 
shall apply the Ignatian emblems (the first signifier) into the Chinese contexts (the second 
signifier), from the historical encounters between the ideography and the emblematics.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Encounters between the Emblematics and the Ideography: Appropriating the 
Ignatian Emblems to the Chinese Characters 
In the previous chapter, I have briefly reviewed the history of the emblematics 
from being an oral image to being a form of art in the Renaissance that provided Ignatius 
a way to perform the existential phenomenology in the Exercises. By “oral image”, I 
mean the innate habitus of the alphabetic mind that tried to conquer the word-image 
dynamic within the diachronic phenomenology of the spoken word. By “the art of the 
emblem”, I mean the particular characteristics of the Renaissance emblem book culture in 
which the word-image dynamic was examined critically and applied more accurately, 
though the emblematics became more spatialized with a bias towards the mnemonics of 
organizing phenomenological perceptions with moral reductions. With this general 
transition of the emblematics, in chapter five, I should extend the Ignatian emblem – the 
“prison-cage” was more of an oral image than a form of art – to the contemporary 
situation of the Chinese characters that have been commonly considered as 
“ideographic”.1  
The main argument is that: if indeed ideographic, examining the Chinese 
characters as the emblems should help us better understand the history of consciousness 
within the Chinese ideography, as well as the efforts to recover and rediscover the 
original phenomenological descriptions within the Chinese characters. This argument will 
be formed with three historical encounters between the ideography and the emblematics: 
                                                   
1 See Herrlee Glessner Creel. “On the Nature of Chinese Ideography.” T'oung Pao (Second Series) 32. 2/3 
(1936): 85-161.  
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1) from the Ignatian emblem in the Exercises to Matthew Ricci’s memory palace2 in the 
high time of the Renaissance and in the context of Ming dynasty China; 2) from Ricci’s 
memory theater to Ezra Pound’s appropriating the Chinese ideography as a medium for 
modernism poetry;3 3) from Pound’s modernism to Xu Bing’s Book from the Sky in the 
contemporary field of visual art.4  
To be more specific, the above historical movements were: 1) the movement from 
the Ignatian emblem as a way of meditation that involved the building of a “mediated” 
(in opposition to the “immediate” and the “all-at-once”) director-exercitant relationship, 
to Matthew Ricci’s memory palace that emphasized the moral-mnemonic function of the 
Ignatian emblem. Within Ignatius, Ricci tried to build a preliminary philosophy of time 
and history into the Chinese characters; 2) the movement from Ricci’s appropriating the 
Ignatian emblem (the memory palace was innately a performance as the way the 
Exercises has been practiced), to Ezra Pound’s experimental translations and 
mistranslations5 of the Chinese characters into English in a para-emblematical way. 
Pound (and Fenollosa) was not within the emblematical tradition, but his approach should 
help us better understand the modern situation of the emblematics; 3) the movement from 
Pound’s efforts to recover and rediscover the original phenomenological descriptions in 
                                                   
2 “Memory palace” is used interchangeably with “memory theater” in this project, though “palace” 
emphasizes on the architecture, and “theater” emphasizes on the drama. In Spence’s The Memory Palace of 
Matteo Ricci, he used “Memory Palace” in reference to a special case of Ricci’s being invited to teach the 
memory palace in Chen Dayue’s new book Master Cheng’s Ink Garden. Chen was a technological 
innovator of ink then.  
3 See Ezra Pound. Cathay: A Critical Edition. Edited by Timothy Billings (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2018).  
4 See Xu Bing. Tianshu: Passages in the Making of a Book. Edited by Katherine Spears (London: Bernard 
Quaritch Ltd, 2009). 
5 See Hwa Yol Jung. “Misreading the Ideogram: From Fenollosa to Derrida and McLuhan.” Paideuma 13.2 
(1984): 211-227.  
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the Chinese characters, to Xu Bing’s Book from the Sky as a postmodern take on the non-
sense (and meanings) in the Chinese characters. With a rich debate, Xu’s work can be 
understood as either the Freudian nightmare of the Chinese learned man’s fear of writing 
(with an emphasis on the post-colonial body) or as the prelude to the potential Chinese 
characters that could be born with renewing experiences.  
With the above movements, this chapter will be arranged accordingly. From 
Ignatius to Ricci, I explore into the early formation of a Jesuitical emblem. From Ricci to 
Pound, I focus on the history of consciousness in Pound’s discovering the original 
phenomenological descriptions in the Chinese ideographs. From Pound to Xu, I enter into 
the discursive discourses on the problematics of the contemporary field of visual art. 
Eventually, I shall close this dissertation with my own tentative appropriations of the 
Ignatian emblem into the Chinese context.  
From Ignatius to Ricci: The Formation of a Jesuitical Emblem 
By “a Jesuitical emblem”, theorizing the Jesuitical emblematical tradition is not 
the aim of this section, especially in concerns with the rich variety of those emblems that 
were created and recreated by the Jesuits in early modern Europe.6 Yet the way Matthew 
Ricci’s memory palace was innately an inter-cultural performance should be a powerful 
reminder of the performative nature in practicing the Exercises. Ricci’s memory palace, 
which was both a particular case within the Chinese context and a common praxis among 
the Jesuits, should remind that for Ignatius, compound images could be eventful as much 
as words are innately eventful.7 With the implicit movements of the emblematical wit, the 
Chinese visitors to Ricci’s memory palace, like the exercitants of the Exercises, were 
                                                   
6 See Daly & Dimler, Jesuit Emblem.  
7 Ong, Presence, 111. 
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asked to make more explicit both the meaning of the rhetorical movements and the 
rhetoric within these movements.  
Now, Ricci was at the frontier of the Renaissance emblem book culture for being 
able to apply the Ignatian emblem into the context of Ming dynasty China (1368-1644). 
Within Kierkegaard’s distinguishing the “apostle” from the “genius”,8 it was certainly 
more about Ricci’s made-decision to do the missionary work than about his genius that 
prompted him to the building of the memory place. Moreover, Ricci simply felt it natural 
to begin the teaching of a philosophy of history with the emblematics, as he himself 
began to practice the Exercises with the Ignatian emblem of the “prison-cage”. In Ricci, 
the emblem book (the memory palace can be understood as a three-dimensional emblem 
book with four emblems) was not yet a form of art in the sense that art has become the 
cognitive edge of human experience, but still an oral image in which the word-image 
dynamic had to be conquered within the diachronic phenomenology of the spoken word.  
In comparison to his well-known books, Ricci’s memory palace was not well-
received in the late Ming dynasty.9 As the Exercises was attacked in Ignatius’ time for 
promoting artificial memory (“artificial” in the sense of being “in contrary to the way 
nature works”), the Chinese men of letters in the 16th century preferred the traditional 
mnemonic method of repetitive recitations over the communicative architecture in Ricci’s 
structural remembering.10 It was not until contemporary times, with modern Chinese 
scholars’ critical reflections on alternatives to the “dialectical materialism”, that the 
                                                   
8 Kierkegaard, “Genius and Apostle”, 92. 
9 See Spence, Ricci, 266-268.  
10 In Spence’s report, Ricci was employed by the local governor of the Jiangxi province to teach his three 
sons the memory palace so that they could do better at the imperial examination. However, his three sons 
still used the traditional mnemonic method and did well in the highest exam in pre-modern China. See 
Spence, Ricci, 4.  
  172 
philosophy of time and history in Ricci’s memory palace began to be revisited as an 
alternative to Hegel’s and then Marx’s theory of historical movements.11 Limited by the 
realm of this project, I shall review the way Ricci taught the building of the memory 
palace concisely, based on the incident that Cheng Dayue, a Chinese intellectual and a 
technological innovator of ink then, invited Ricci to contribute pictures (along with the 
Christian teachings) to Cheng’s new woodblock-printed book Master Cheng’s Ink 
Garden.12 
In the reception hall of where the Jesuits resided in China, Ricci placed four 
Chinese characters, written on the Chines scrolls, respectively on the four corners of the 
room. Along with those Chinese characters, Ricci then placed four pictures on biblical 
events. When those who were interested in learning the memory palace visited, Ricci 
would then guide them through these four character-picture compounds, one after 
another, anti-clockwise (writing from right to left was then the habit of mind in China), 
and with Ricci’s narrating the biblical events from his memory. In the daily practices, the 
pictures Ricci used were from Jerome Nadal’s Images from the Gospel that Ricci found 
his woodcut copy to be even more helpful than the Bible in explaining Christianity, as 
images are innately good cross-linguistic media.13 In special circumstances, such as when 
Nadal’s Images from the Gospel was borrowed away by a fellow Jesuit,14 Ricci then had 
to adaptively use other pictures with similar contents, though on different biblical events.  
                                                   
11 In Hegelian dialectics, the sign (history) itself will conquer the demand for a signified, with one signifier 
(thesis) with another signifier (antithesis). The oral residues in the Hegelian dynamic between the thesis 
and the anti-thesis did not necessarily set the person in contrast to the sign, as the way Ignatius did within 
the Exercises and Ricci within the memory palace.  
12 Cheng Dayue. Chengshi Moyuan [Master Cheng’s Ink Garden] (Beijing: Zhongguo Shudian, 1996). 
Originally published in 1609.  
13 Spence, Ricci, 62.  
14 Spence, Ricci, 63.  
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Taken as a whole, the three-dimensional reception hall (with enough decorative 
designs for the remembering) with four corners (as cognitive edges) can be understood as 
Ricci’s appropriating the communicative architecture within the Exercises, although there 
were certainly pedagogical concerns that Ricci was introducing a foreign art of memory 
to the local Chinese intellectuals, as well as cross-cultural difficulties that Ricci simply 
couldn’t directly teach the Exercises which would require more space for isolations. And 
it should be noted that Ricci had his own doubt in being able to popularize the memory 
palace with the Christian teachings embedded.15 However, the memory palace was by all 
means a complete work. And this completeness was highlighted by the fourth character-
picture compound in which Ricci simply considered the picture to be sharing the same 
phenomenological birthplace with the Chinese character.16 In order to reveal the process 
in which Ricci reached the fourth character-picture tautology, I shall review these four 
character-picture compounds one after another in the following.  
For the first two Chinese characters, Ricci chose two events in the life of Christ’s, 
which was then straightforwardly related to the Exercises. The first Chinese character 
was “wu”17 (武 or “violence”) which is composed of two ideographic parts of “stop” (止) 
and “war” (戈). “Wu” can be directly translated to “violence” (instead of the more 
descriptive “warfare”) in that there is a built-in argument in this Chinese character with 
the speech act of “stop the war”. With “wu”, Ricci used the picture of Peter’s floundering 
in the Sea of Galilee. Therein, Ricci was able to build a rhetorical connection from “stop 
                                                   
15 Spence, Ricci, 60. 
16 After introducing the images and pictures separately for the former three character-picture compounds, 
Spence titled Part Eight as “The fourth image: the fourth picture”.  
17 I use “pinyin” (the standard Romanization of Mandarin) here in remarking that part of the development 
of simplified Chinese indeed overlapped with the development of “pinyin”, though the causal relations 
between the “secondary orality” in “pinyin” and the “literacy” in simplified Chinese remain to be 
examined.  
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the violence” to “doubt in the faith”. A combined topoi was formed: those good and bad 
doubts in believing one’s being able to stop the violence. When narrating the biblical 
event, Ricci would offer his own phenomenological accounts for the good doubts (that 
happened to Peter as a particular person) in believing in one’s being able to accomplish 
something genuinely difficult.18  
The second Chinese character was “yao” (要 or “want”) which is composed of the 
two ideographic parts of “west” (西) and “woman” (女). “Yao” can be translated to “want” 
for this Chinese character itself implies no moral-phenomenological reduction. As “yao” 
originally was an ideograph for the female body, the designer of this Chinese character 
could be simply interested in describing the psycho-sexual dynamic in human desires 
without reductions and interpretations. With “yao”, Ricci used the picture of Christ’s 
encountering two disciples on the road to Emmaus after the resurrection. Here, given the 
ambiguity and the hidden meanings of the story,19 one can only be sure that Ricci 
complemented “yao” with a moral-phenomenological reduction, though when narrating 
the event to the Chinese visitors, Ricci would highlight the existential meaning in Christ’s 
choosing the suffering over the ordinary happiness. The Ignatian element within was: it is 
only in making the election that having the idea “to suffer” or “to be happy” became an 
existential choice, within which the synchronicity of joy and pain should call for 
diachronic expressions. In this sense, the moral reduction was that Ricci alerted of the 
disciplines’ un-made choice in the ordinary happiness of jewels and cash. And it should 
be noted here that the complexity of Ricci’s character-picture compound was not at all far 
                                                   
18 In Mimesis, Auerbach considered this to be a keynote source for the “realism” in the West.   
19 See Spence, Ricci, 130 for questions like “why seven miles?”; “was ‘village’ the right word for 
Emmaus?”; “why did only one disciple gave his name?”; “why did the disciples say that they ‘had hoped’? 
and etc.  
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from the “prison-cage” emblem that preluded the existential element of the election in 
which rhetoric should get the content it deserves.  
In relation to the second character-picture compound, on the third Chinese 
character “li” (利  or “profit and harvest”) which is composed of the two ideographic parts 
of “grain” (禾) and “sickle” (刀) that describe [a farmer’s holding a] sickle, [to cut] the 
crops [in the field]. In connection to “yao”, Ricci complemented “li” with a moral 
reduction. Here, the designer of “li” was not without a sense of being emblematically 
witty in using “the sickle” to warn of both the hard labor in harvesting and the potential 
harm in wanting too much from the harvest (the farmer’s naiveté). With “li”, Ricci chose 
the meaning of “the sickle” to be the vice in wanting excessively; he used the narrative of 
the sin of Sodom to particularize the excessiveness to be the sin of lust. Now, the third 
character-picture compound could be doctrinaire for reducing the meaning of “profit and 
harvest” to excessive desires, though it was within Ignatius’ made-decision that those 
who decide to live a spiritual life should have no financial possession at all.20  
The fourth character-picture compound deserves some special attention, because 
in completing the memory palace, Ricci considered the Chinese character to be 
tautological to the picture. The fourth Chinese character was “hao” (好 or “goodness”) 
which is composed of the two ideographic parts of “woman” (女) and “child” (子) that 
together describe a mother’s [holding] the child [in the arm]. Here, it should be noted the 
designer of “hao” intended no particular gesture, but the topoi of “the mother and the 
child”.21 With “hao”, Ricci provided the particularity of the picture of Virgin Mary’s 
                                                   
20 See Ignatius, Diary.  
21 This is very different from Greek rhetoric in which the actions were highlighted. Achilles’ mother 
(Thetis) would hold Achilles by the heel and dip his body into the River Styx, yet without his heel being 
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holding Baby Jesus in her arm.22 Therein, Ricci’s habitus to be phenomenological in the 
emblematical way could not be overstated – not only Ricci revealed the structural 
similarity of the mother’s being on the left and the child on the right, but more 
importantly, Ricci challenged the rhetorical generality in “hao”23 with the historical 
particularity of Virgin Mary and Baby Jesus. Ricci completed the building of the memory 
palace with a strong Ignatian meditation.  
The importance of Ricci’s memory palace to the emblematical tradition should be 
that Ricci felt it habitual to approach the Chinese characters as emblems. Again, Ricci 
was in the emblematical tradition; it was both his genius and his being an apostle that 
made the building of the memory palace possible. Unfortunately, the memory palace was 
not well received in the late Ming dynasty, partly due to the prevalence of the traditional 
mnemonic method, and partly in that the Chinese intellectuals were by no means 
unfamiliar with the “deconstruction” of Chinese characters as Ciceronian inventions.24 
Regardless of the memory palace’s being less influential, Ricci was at the frontier of 
applying the emblematics to the Chinese written words in the high time of Renaissance 
and within the Chinese context. In emphasizing the historical particularities and moral-
phenomenological reductions, the personalism in Ricci was a powerful appropriation of 
the Spiritual Exercises.  
                                                   
washed over by the water. The concern with “fate” was that mothers cannot fully prevent the tragic destiny 
of the sons.  
22 See Belting, Likeness, 290-91 for the complexities in the meanings of this picture.  
23 In terms of Innis’ Empire and Communications, the designers of Chinese characters knew that their 
designs would be used by all the learned men in the empire; they tended to have a bias towards conquering 
“space” rather than “time”.  
24 See Xu Shen. Shuowen Jiezi [Analytical Dictionary of Chinese Characters] (Beijing: Zhonghua Book 
Company, 2013). Originally published in the early 2nd century.   
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With the memory palace of Ricci’s, one may conclude a Jesuitical emblem to 
have the following characteristics. A Jesuitical emblem could:  
1) Have a strong emphasis on the First Week of the Exercises in which the 
artistic desire in the first prelude lead to the birth of a strong moral 
consciousness;  
2) Serve a particular purpose, with Ricci’s doing missionary work in China as a 
good case study.25 
3) Be structured with a communicative architecture in the daily life (in Ricci’ 
case, the reception hall), within which lay the dynamic between mediating on 
something “visible” and on something “invisible”.  
4) Protect and promote mediations towards action. In today’s terms, the memory 
palace was not an “installation art”, but was close to the art of rhetorical 
performance as “re-membered” speeches.  
5) Have a strong philosophy of time and history that the users of the emblems 
(like the exercitants of the Exercises) should try to build a diachronic 
phenomenology into the rhetorical generality of the emblems.  
6) Be highly adaptive, with an innate confidence in conquering the cross-cultural 
communication in the Western-Eastern word-image dynamic.  
With the above characteristics, I move towards the modern situation of the emblematics 
as in Ezra Pound’s appropriating the Chinese characters as a medium for English poetry.  
                                                   
25 I use Heidegger’s term pragmata to highlight the emblem as a tool for communication. When examining 
“this emblem”, in Husserlian phenomenology, one must bracket the “emblem” so as to examine what “this” 
is, but in Heideggerian phenomenology, “this emblem” is a pragmata in which one has already 
communicated by calling “this” an “emblem”. See Heidegger, Being, 64. Also see Patočka. Body, 122.  
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From Ricci to Pound: Understanding Pound’s Emblematics within the History of 
Consciousness  
Ezra Pound’s appropriating the Chinese character as a medium for poetry may 
help us better understand the modern situation of the emblematics; Pound tried to recover 
and rediscover the original phenomenological description in the Chinese characters. To 
be more specific, within the stages of development in Chinese literacy (from 
phenomenologically descriptive, to morally and phenomenologically reductive and to 
phenomenologically interpretative), a significant part of the difficulty is that the moral-
phenomenological reduction indeed overlaps with the original phenomenological 
description, and therefore, one needs to constantly “re-member” the original 
phenomenological description in order to prevent moral reductions from being non-
phenomenological or even doctrinaire.  
In Pound’s search for the lost phenomenological description in both Chinese 
characters and English poetry, he then no longer dwelt within the emblematical tradition 
that enabled Ricci to equate the Chinese characters to be the emblems. Unlike Ricci’s 
mastery in Chinese, Pound knew no Chinese, and therefore had to form his own 
phenomenological interpretation based on the notes of Earnest Fenollasa who provided 
Pound the basic meaning of the ideographic parts of the characters.26 Interestingly, 
without knowing the meaning of the Chinese characters – and it was knowing the 
meaning of the Chinese characters that enabled Ricci to make rhetorical movements from 
Chinese commonplaces to Christian commonplaces – Pound’s effort to fight the moral 
                                                   
26 See Ernest Fenollosa and Ezra Pound. The Chinese Written Character as a Medium for Poetry: A 
Critical Edition. Edited by Haun Saussy, Jonathan Stalling and Lucas Klein (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2008).  
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reduction by recovering the phenomenological description became his own 
phenomenological interpretation, which in turn provided refreshing insights into the 
original phenomenological description within the Chinese characters. Even more 
interestingly (inter-sectingly), in Pound’s take on the Chinese characters, his own 
phenomenological interpretation tended to coincide with the original phenomenological 
description.  
Now, Pound’s basic technique was not far from the semiotics of Roman 
Catholicism that a sign is composed of one signifier with another signifier.27 Like the 
McLuhanian probe, Pound understood the Chinese characters as being composed of one 
signifier (one ideographic part), with another signifier, and with another signifier, so on 
and so forth till the meaning became more definitive to the interpreter. Therein, Pound’s 
work can be understood as reversing the phenomenological perception from 
phenomenological reduction and interpretation to the original phenomenological 
description, and his own phenomenological interpretation tended to coincide the original 
phenomenological description within the Chinese characters.  
More straightforwardly, my argument is that: it was not that Pound went against 
the perceptive order in the Ignatian emblem (Ignatius gave accounts for the 
phenomenological description, and asked the exercitants to provide the 
phenomenological reduction and the interpretation); rather, it was that this perceptive 
order was recovered and rediscovered within Pound. Pound used phenomenological 
reduction and interpretation to look for the description, which ended up becoming the 
                                                   
27 See Soukup, “Ritual and Movement”.  
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original phenomenological description. Examining one of the Chinese poems Pound 
translated should clarify the argument.  
In “Some notes by a very ignorant man”,28 Pound revealed his creative process in 
turning the Chinese character into a medium for modernism poetry. Based on Fenollosa’s 
notes on the meaning of the ideographic parts of the Chinese characters, Pound translated 
a poem from Sugawara no Michizane (845-903)29 into English. And it may be noted that 
Sugawara wrote this poem when he was eleven years old in imitation of the Tang dynasty 
poems. My more literal translation of Sugawara’s poem follows.  
The moon shines like snow in a sunny day,  
And the plum flowers are the bright stars.  
One may sympathize with the turning of the golden mirror,  
The fragrance of this jade above the garden.  
In his practicing the poetic style of the Tang dynasty, Sugawara achieved quite a witty 
simplicity. For instances, in the second line, a more logical order should be “and the 
bright stars are like plum flowers” with the first line’s starting with the moon, while 
Sugawara suggested the perceptive order as moving from the plum flowers to the bright 
stars as some inter-objectivity. In the third line, in using “the turning of the golden 
mirror” to describe the sunset, Sugawara imaginatively pictured the moon to be on the 
other side of the sun (less about the length of day and night as with the word “even-ing” 
in English, and more about the three-dimensional space). In the last line, by comparing 
                                                   
28 Fenollosa and Pound, Chinese, 61-74.  
29 For the poem, see Joshua S Mostow. Pictures of the Heart. The Hyakunin Isshu in Word and Image 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996), 213-216.  
 
  181 
the moon to be a jade in the sky, Sugawara suggested that the elegance of the moon could 
be smelled as the fragrance of a jade.  
More can be said about Sugawara’s wit, but the keynote value of this poem, in 
imitation of the poems from the Tang dynasty, was in being able to “paint” a night with 
the bright moon in the sky. Interestingly, in Pound’s translation, the static painting within 
the poem claimed more movements. As Pound translated,  
The moon’s snow falls on the plum tree,  
Its boughs are full of bright stars.  
We can admire the bright turning disc,  
The garden high above there, casting its pearls to our weeds.30  
Pound’s translation involved more movements than the original aesthetics. This can be 
directly evidenced by the last line in Pound’s translation “casting its pearls to our weeds” 
where Pound imagined the moon to be “the garden high above”. And this innate 
preference towards movements can be further evidenced in Pound’s interpreting the 
Chinese characters. For example, “jing” (镜, “disc” or “mirror”) is composed of four 
ideographic parts. On the left side, there is “gold” (金); on the right side, there are “erect” 
(立), “sun” (日), and “the running legs [of the kid]” (儿). In Pound’s interpretation, the 
phenomenological description in “jing” was then: “[catching] the golden [light of the sun] 
[in the moment] of [the rising] sun that erects, [as if the sun has its own] running legs.” 
Pound called himself “a very ignorant man”; he knew this technique of understanding the 
Chinese characters as compound signs could sometimes misguide the translator from the 
commonplace meaning of the Chinese character. However, as Pound’s phenomenological 
                                                   
30 Fenollosa and Pound, Chinese, 64.  
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interpretation almost became the rhetorical variation of the original phenomenological 
description, his misunderstandings often renewed the original phenomenological 
description within the Chinese characters with unexpected insights. For example, Pound 
took “kid” (儿) as “the running legs” for granted, with which the phenomenological 
reduction of “kids” to “running legs” became explicit.  
To conclude, not far from Ricci’s building a diachronic phenomenology into the 
Chinese characters, Pound simply moved the Chinese poems (that aimed to be painting-
like) with the alphabetic joy of communication. The seeming opposition between Pound 
(phenomenological reduction and interpretation in search for description) and Ricci 
(phenomenological description that asked the exercitants to provide reduction and 
interpretation) can be reconciled within the history of consciousness. More 
straightforwardly, Ricci emphasized moral-phenomenological reduction to teach the birth 
of a strong moral consciousness in the Exercises, and Pound looked for the original 
phenomenological description that should recover the deadly fixed meanings of the 
Chinese characters. There was a shared moral force in both Ricci’s and Pound’s 
approaches to the Chinese characters, which were embedded within using the 
emblematics. Within Pound, the modern situation of the emblematics was not in total 
separation from the emblem book culture in the Renaissance to which the Ignatian 
emblem belonged.   
From Pound to Xu: Emblematical Residues in the Contemporary Field of Visual 
Art   
There were elements of Romanticism in Pound’s presuming a lost 
phenomenological description, which can be legitimized by the innate difficulty in 
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organizing human experience with moral reductions. In postmodernity, the most 
prominent characteristic of the emblematics could be precisely the diminishment of good 
moral-phenomenological reductions. In this section, to borrow the term “oral residues” 
from Ong,31 we may call this “emblematical residues” to highlight the loss of the moral-
phenomenological function of the emblematics that used to be commonplace in more oral 
cultures.  
Emblematical residues have been identified not only by critical media studies in 
pointing out that images can appear strange merely to exploit the mnemonic habitus in 
the emblematics, without asking the viewers to provide phenomenological reduction and 
interpretation.32 More importantly, “the discernment of spirits” has been practiced more 
directly as “critiques”. Therein, it is well known that the “epoché” in Descartes’ first 
meditation was the “suspension of judgment” which tried to eliminate all con-fusions 
from the innate incompleteness of the oral tradition. In other words, unlike the Ignatian 
“discernment of the spirits” that demanded an emblematical kind of moral-
phenomenological descriptions and reductions, Descartes’ way of questioning the realm 
of reality was by disembodying the image-generating body. In disagreement with 
Descartes, the Czech phenomenologist Jan Patočka had it wonderfully that: it is not that 
the daydreamer (who tries to generate images voluntarily) does not have a body; rather, 
he or she simply has a dream body.33  
In the emblematical residues, media and communication are divided, and one is 
no longer obligated to conquer the media-communication dynamic within the diachronic 
                                                   
31 Ong, Orality, 35.  
32 This is McLuhan’s constructive critique in the Mechanical Bride that one ought to learn to provide his or 
her own phenomenological reduction and interpretation even to non-phenomenological descriptions.  
33 Jan Patočka. Body, 11. 
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phenomenology of the spoken word. (This is the ethical implication in McLuhan’s 
saying, “the medium is the message).34 In postmodernity, the emblematics may have lost 
its pragmata as a medium that used to have particular connections to rhetoric – not only 
as renewing ways of discovering possible means of persuasion, but also as the 
phenomenological basis of “believing in” that sets communication as the counterpart to 
the information world (“believe that”).35 More straightforwardly, “believing in” refers to 
the innate difficulty in making arguments within the truth (in the sense that one must 
divide and differ in telling the truth), about which the emblematics provided a way of 
expression and communication. This should be well evidenced in the Spiritual Exercises. 
Here, it may be clarified that in examining the postmodern situation of the 
emblematics, I do not aim at lamenting that the emblematical tradition in Matthew 
Ricci’s memory palace was long forgotten. Nor do I aim at promoting the Romanticism 
in Pound’s dis-familiarizing the Chinese characters. As Ong used the term “residue” to 
remark on both the problematics of “secondary orality” and the tenaciousness of the oral 
traditions, I do want to reveal the media-communication dynamic that is still embedded in 
the postmodern situation of the emblematics. After all, what is the present encounter 
between the emblematics and the ideography in post-modernity?  
To explore into the question above, the Chinese system of writing is still under 
development; technologies of writing overlap with the development of communication 
technologies. On one hand, one has good reasons to alert of the ideographic basis of the 
Chinese characters. As the emblems could be used as propagandas when employed as 
                                                   
34 Eric McLuhan emphasized on the meaning of this tautology. See McLuhan and Zhang, “Dialogue”, 246.  
35 This is part of Gabriel Marcel’s affirming the American personalism in Henry Bugbee’s Inward. Bugbee 
would remark that as soon as he found out the meaning of nature, he has already forgotten what to say in 
trying to make arguments.  
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non-phenomenological reductions that discouraged the original phenomenological 
description and potential phenomenological interpretations,36 the ideography can cancel 
out the good difference between word and image (the realm of truth and the realm of 
reality), and provide supports for bad arguments when no support may be found in the 
phenomenological basis of the oral tradition itself.  
On the other hand, the historical development of the Chinese characters may only 
be more examinable when the Chinese characters have been related to the diachronic 
phenomenology of the alphabet. This can be evidenced by the most recent development 
of the Chinese written characters from traditional Chinese to simplified Chinese, within 
which modern designers of Chinese characters were able to change many of the 
ideographic structures of the traditional Chinese.37 Therein, users of the simplified 
Chinese should have good reasons to re-member the traditional Chinese, in similar 
concerns with the more nuanced complexities of the emblems in the Renaissance (in 
comparison to modern-day emblems). But again, in examining the historical encounters 
between the ideography and the emblematics, and not just by examining the history of the 
emblematics since such examination would lead to a nostalgia towards the Renaissance 
emblems (similar to the nostalgia towards the traditional Chinese), semiotic 
phenomenology (as meta-cultural and meta-meta-cultural framework) has been a 
powerful interpretative entrance into the stages of development of both the emblematics 
and the ideography. One may even argue that the Chinese characters have become even 
                                                   
36 See Peter Daly. “The Nachleben of the Emblem in Some Modem Logos, Advertisements, and 
Propaganda.” In Companion to Emblem Studies, edited by Peter Daly (New York: AMS Press, 2008), 489.  
37 See Shengdar Lee. Comprehend Chinese-Character Simplification: Learn Traditional Chinese 
characters and Simplified Chinese characters (Chinese Book Web, 2013) for a brief introduction of the 
development of the current simplified Chinese. More scholarly work needs to be on the history of 
simplified Chinese.  
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more “emblematical” (with more bias towards time and history), when both the 
ideography and the emblematics can be critically examined.  
To elaborate the argument above, I shall examine one particular written character 
among the first group of simplified Chinese – the ideograph for “justice” (义 or “yi”),38 as 
a tribute to Havelock’s discussing the formation of the Greek concept of justice.39 The 
traditional Chinese character for “justice” (義) is composed of the two ideographic parts 
of “sheep” (羊) and “I” (我) that form the imagery of “three layers [of the body of the 
sheep] beyond me” which can be understood as implicitly emphasizing the collectivity 
(as in the flock of sheep) in carrying out just actions.40 In the simplified Chinese, the 
modern designers of Chinese characters were able to change the ideographic structure to 
“义” which is composed of “a dot [of heart] in the middle, with one stroke to the left and 
one stroke to the right”. 
To examine “yi” with semiotic phenomenology, from “義” to “义”, there are two 
stages of development in the phenomenological perception of “justice”: from the 
phenomenological reduction in “義” that explicitly contended for the collectivity of 
justice, to the phenomenological interpretation in “义” where the designer remarked on 
the dialectical movement in “justice” with “one stroke to the left and one stroke to the 
right”, and with “a point [of heart] in the middle.” If indeed the argument is that the 
simplified Chinese for “justice” has become even more “ideographic” (and more 
“emblematical”) in moving towards phenomenological interpretation, the rhetorical 
                                                   
38 The first group of simplified Chinese had 230 characters that started to be used from Feb. 1, 1956.  
39 Eric Havelock. The Greek Concept of Justice: From its Shadow in Homer to its Substance in Plato 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978)  
40 The original phenomenological description in choosing the “sheep” as the ideographic symbol may have 
been lost, but this is like asking why Jesus used the metaphor of “shepherd”.  
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element within this movement was a particular kind of topoi that remarked on the 
dialectical movement itself. If one may collect and recollect all the simplified Chinese 
with the ideography of “one stroke to the left and one stroke to the right” such as in “文” 
(literacy, or “wen”) or in “交” (communication, or “jiao”), the phenomenological 
intentionality of the modern designers of Chinese characters to “getting to the dialectical 
movement itself”, as embodied in compound words like “civilization” (文明, “literacy” 
with “light”) or “communication” (交流, “exchange” with “flow” [of water]) should be 
very close to the semiotics in Roman Catholicism as “one signifier with another 
signifier”.41 
Within the change of the ideographic structure in the Chinese character for 
“justice”, it is not only that the ideography must adapt to different emphasis on the 
phenomenological perception of “justice” in different historical times, but more 
importantly, the simplified Chinese has begun to be built upon this innate dynamic 
between the obligation to make an argument and the effort to recover and re-discover the 
genuine rhetorical contingency within the original phenomenological description, or 
simply between semiotics and phenomenology. In short, simplified Chinese has been the 
technological development of the Chinese writing system to be able to better manage the 
phenomenological complexities in traditional Chinese with a noetic economy that allows 
more participation by revealing the genuine rhetorical contingencies.  
Now, in Book from the Sky, Xu Bing’s imitation of the way the Chinese characters 
worked was certainly in the contemporary field of visual art, within which Xu played 
                                                   
41 See Richard Lanigan. “Netizen Communicology: China Daily and the Internet Construction of Group 
Culture.” Semiotica 207 (2015): 94-101 for the difference between putting two Chinese characters together 
and putting two English words together.  
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with the Chinese characters as media without communication (meaning). In comparison 
with Pound’s attack on the Western intellectual tradition (with an implied critique of the 
Western imagery thinking tradition), Xu’s descriptive neutrality was further removed 
from the moral embeddedness of the emblematical tradition. In post-modernity, Book 
from the Sky is open to interpretation as phenomenological description with some 
reduction and no interpretation. Xu refrained from making particular arguments on the 
Chinese characters.  
Among contemporary scholars, Liu understood Xu’s work as part of the 
monstrous compound between Chinese characters and English words,42 which did haunt 
the modern mind of Chinese intellectuals who had perhaps over-dramatized the liberal 
temper of the phonetic alphabet.43 With Liu, Sky was then the Freudian nightmare of the 
Chinese “man of letters (characters)”, whose traditional training (along with the 
psychological intensity of writing) in the full complexities of Chinese characters has lost 
its meaning in a post-modern age. Given that in Sky Xu had a bias towards the 
ideographic structure of traditional Chinese, one could understand Sky as deconstructing 
the excessive complexities of traditional Chinese (with heavier oral residues).  
However, Liu’s focus on the modern mind of Chinese intellectuals did not address 
that Xu was not the first one to use Chinese characters as a media for communication – 
Matthew Ricci did that almost five hundred years ago in the 17th century. Here, a better 
critique of the dynamic between Chinese characters and English word should be: Sky was 
indeed in parallel to the post-modern situation of the emblematics, with an unresolved 
                                                   
42 See Liu, Empire, 31-50.  
43 Lu Xun was famous for advocating the total alphabetization of Chinese characters. See Lu Xun. Lu Xun 
Lun Hanzi Gaige [Lu Xun on the Reformation of Chinese Characters] (Shidai Publications, 1951), 10.  
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recognition of the necessity of moral reductions in the order of perceptions, and the loss 
of the original phenomenological description at the birthplace of phenomenological 
perceptions (in all cultures). The question is then: if indeed “nightmares”, how to 
meaningfully interpret a “dream body” that can no longer re-member? With this question, 
I move towards the final section with my own mimesis of the Ignatian emblem in the 
Chinese context.   
Stages of Development: Compound Signs as Phenomenological Approaches to 
Ontological Growth 
In the previous sections, I have examined briefly the historical encounters 
between the emblems and Chinese characters, from Ricci to Pound and to Xu. My 
arguments are: 1) in Ricci, the Chinese characters began to be characteristic of the 
diachronic phenomenology of words; 2) rather than reversing the perceptive order in the 
Ignatian emblem to from reduction (Earnest Fenollosa’s notes), to interpretation (Pound’s 
take on Fenollosa) and description (the lost phenomenological description in Chinese 
characters), Pound’s work was indeed within the history of consciousness as his 
phenomenological interpretation often ended up complementing the original 
phenomenological description; 3) as an alternative to the post-colonial mindset, Xu’s 
Book from the Sky may be better understood as a “dream body” that cannot remember, 
and the encounter between the emblematics and the ideography in post-modernity 
demands even more careful examinations.  
In the vicinity of media ecology, Zhang commented on the Chinese characters in 
the age of electronic communication wonderfully that “Reading a Chinese text feels like 
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watching a motion picture. How many frames per second is up to the reader.”44 Here, 
Zhang’s phenomenological accounts could be understood as both pointing out the 
connection between ideographic writing and electronic communication (with 
emblematical residues) and the “technologizing of the words” as ideographs in the age of 
electronic communication.  
More straightforwardly, reading into the space between the Chinese characters is 
not too far from examining the silence between the spoken words, as rests in 
communication and as potentials for communication. The “_”, as the space of silence 
between the written words, can be understood as the tenaciousness of orality. If indeed 
the Chinese characters are compound signs in the noetic economy of one signifier(s) with 
another signifier(s), what are the phenomenological approaches to the ontological growth 
in the noetic movement of the words, being built-into the characters-words?  
To probe into the above question, I propose a contemporary appropriation of the 
Ignatian emblem as phenomenological approaches to the ontological growth. I choose the 
river compound for the oldest perception of time. The compound images follow:   
1. "River-palm [of hand]". A wrinkled hand is a many-branched river. Hand 
in closure, a fist, creates a vortex. "I am caught up in the trend of more and 
more Chinese students are studying abroad. How am I going to survive the 
vortex?"  
2. "River-blanket". Yellow river is the Chinese national identity. "I am 
protected by that nationality, which differs me from the fellow American 
students."  
                                                   
44 Peter Zhang and Eric McLuhan. “Research in Brief Media Ecological Moment in Flusser.” Canadian 
Journal of Communication 40 (2015): 510.  
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3. "Stream-home". Spencer said that psychologically one will be forever in 
his hometown river. “This is where I am born in China, which differs me 
from other Chinese students.” 
4. "River-mirror". Walking along the bank of the local river, the river mirrors 
not only me, but also the city that surrounds me. "I am in the provincial 
culture, and I interact with the local students."  
5. "River-valley". Mississippi cuts the American land in order to form a 
valley. "I am to understand America historically as a whole."  
6. "River-heart". A Spiritual River and the birth of a worldview. Mu Xin said 
that “if I must name some starting point or end point or some other point, I 
would have to say that European culture is my John the Baptist, the United 
States is my Jordan River, and Jesus lives only in my heart.”45 
It may be clarified that the above image compounds are not strictly Ignatian as the 
Ignatian emblem also had a Grecian element similar to Erich Newmann’s “history of 
consciousness”.46 Yet I try to follow the orders of phenomenological perception, from the 
phenomenological description in the compound signs, to the phenomenological reduction 
of the worldly experiences, and eventually to an existential statement in personalism. 
With this hope for a media-communication reunion, I shall close this dissertation with the 
stages of personal growth in the context of inter-cultural communication.   
  
                                                   
45 Toming Jun Liu. “An Interview with Mu Xin.” North Dakota Quarterly 64.2 (1997): 20.  
46 See Newmann, History of Consciousness.  
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